Premature Predictions of the End of the American Century

There are numerous reasons why the Americans insisted on a background role in the current military intervention in Libya and instead deferred to France and Britain and then pressed for NATO leadership. Undoubtedly, consideration of the delicate American-European relationship played a role. The European perception of American power is two-fold. If the U.S. intervenes anywhere it is, in the eyes of the Europeans, an imperialistic war monger, only interested in the resources of other countries. But if, on the other hand, it shows restraint in using military force to intervene in a conflict, it is immediately noted that the Americans are betraying their own democratic ideals, human rights, the rule of law and so on.

The monthly journal Osteuropa devotes its newest edition to the “Fixed Star of America: Central Europe’s Ideal and Illusion.” The majority of articles highlight the American view of Central Europe, which differed rather sharply from the Western European view of the U.S. during the era of George W. Bush. But, “[t]he differences between Central Europe and Western Europe are diminishing. In place of idealizing the United States, Central Europe is making an increasingly pragmatic profit and loss calculation,” reads the magazine’s editorial.

Czech cultural journalist Petr Fischer strikingly describes the differences between Americans and Europeans: The Americans are straightforward, pragmatic and utility-oriented, while the Europeans are curvy, convoluted and reflective. And “[w]hile Europeans forever carry the burden of their long history… Americans easily and without much fuss shake off what was for them, just a few years ago, a valued treasure or a life trauma.”

A kind of European schizophrenia is described as follows: On one hand, they voluntarily adopted the American model of individualism and striving for happiness. On the other hand, they harshly criticize the U.S. exactly because of its “prototype of the throw-away and junk-food society,” which is looked down on with contempt. At the same time, as Fischer states, the Europeans never delivered their own model.

Augsburg historian Philipp Gassert urges the journal to treat the discussion in European intellectual circles about the “end of the American century” with caution because they would only be too happy to “confuse short-term developments with long-term trends.” For Gassert such trends are, for example, that the U.S. share of the world economy has been stable since the 1970s, and that “[t]he cultural and political influence of the U.S. in the world may still be higher than during the East-West conflicts, when its influence was limited by Soviet hegemony.” Don’t forget: The U.S. population has strong and steady growth, while the populations of other developed countries (including China, but excluding Brazil and India) are expected to stagnate in the long run.

The era of Bush Junior certainly disturbed many Europeans, and even some facets of the Obama administration are irritating. But, and here Professor Gassert is right, considering the historic long-term analysis, the Bush years were probably a glitch, like other glitches that have occurred in America’s recent history. It is foolish and premature to write off the United States.