Taiwan-U.S. Relations and Taiwan's Presidential Election

Both the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) and KMT (Kuomintang) primaries have come to an end, and it’s clear now who will be the candidates: incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen. Although President Ma Ying-jeou, who is seeking his second term, cannot visit the U.S. due to his job, he plans to talk to think tanks in Washington D.C. via video conference and urge the Obama administration to separate the “U.S. beef problems” from other issues. Whether it be progress in U.S. arms sales or including Taiwanese travelers under the Visa Waiver Program, President Ma is looking for anything to dilute the embarrassment of being overtaken by Tsai in the polls. Rumor also has it that Tsai would follow the convention of visiting Washington D.C. as the DPP’s candidate in the presidential election.

The influence of Taiwan-U.S. Relations on the Taiwanese presidential election is becoming more apparent. However, rather than being busy “playing the American card” to score in the election, it’s more important for the candidates to analyze the recent personnel changes the Obama administration has made concerning Asia-Pacific affairs.

Obama is also starting his own campaign for the 2012 U.S. election, and recent reappointments on his national security and Asia-Pacific affairs teams will affect America’s entire global strategy and foreign policy in the next two years, let alone her approach to Asia-Pacific matters.

Recent personnel changes on the national security team include having the CIA Director, Leon Panetta, replace Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. Gates reinitiated U.S.-China military exchanges after visiting Beijing this January and has been asking to leave his post. Panetta’s position will be given to Army General David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan who Obama highly trusts. Panetta plays an important role in the Democratic Party and served as the White House Chief of Staff under President Clinton. That, along with his experience in the CIA, makes Panetta qualified to be head of the Pentagon and assist Obama in stabilizing his foreign policy while seeking a second term. As Obama announced the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. troops just yesterday, he scored points in terms of foreign policy. General Petraeus, on the other hand, is a well-respected leader in the army. Last year, America’s front-line commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal’s public criticism of Obama’s failure to withdraw troops harmed Obama’s prestige as the commander in chief. Now, Obama asks Petraeus to replace McChrystal so as to pacify the worries.

U.S. Adjustments on Asia-Pacific Affairs Personnel

Senior officers who handle Asia-Pacific affairs, including Taiwan and China issues, have also been changed. James Steinberg, the deputy secretary of state, and Jeffrey A. Bader, senior director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council, were both considered “China-friendly.” They recently left. Led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, many in the Department of State successfully pushed for a more forceful U.S. attitude toward China in 2010, including more aggressive responses to Beijing’s “core interest” in military expansion. It’s also easy to spot the input of Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in several of Hillary’s speeches during her Asia visit; she stated that the “U.S. returns to Asia.” In the future, the Department of State will surely shape Obama’s China policy. Thomas E. Donilon, the national security advisor who was just appointed last year, is also an expert on the Korean peninsula. He dealt with Beijing several times to urge China to pressure Kim Jong-il. It is said that Bader’s successor will be Daniel Russel, a “Japan expert,” who will further Obama’s ongoing goal of strengthening America’s Asia-Pacific alliances.

These personnel re-arrangements need to be approved by Congress and will not take effect in the immediate future. Yet it reveals the general direction of American policy: to ensure America’s ability to react to regional crises (North Korea) in the next year and half. Obama also wants to ensure the effectiveness of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and a successful hosting of the next APEC conference following the announcement of the U.S. joining the “Trans-Pacific Partnership.” Continuing the “interacting while hampering” policy on China is another objective. These personnel changes also imply that Washington D.C. intends to broaden and strengthen alliances with Asia-Pacific partners (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, India, etc.). In light of the coming election, there is no way that Obama will soften his attitude on U.S.-China relations.

Visiting U.S. a Plus for Election

Although the U.S. won’t alter its policy toward Taiwan, the evolution of Taiwanese politics after the campaign starts and the subsequent impact of cross-strait (Taiwan-China) relations will affect Obama’s decision on later choices in posts relating to Asia-Pacific affairs. For Ma, he needs to adjust to America’s “balancing” strategy in Asia. For Tsai, though a visit to the U.S. makes for an appealing “export-contributed import campaign,” she’ll no doubt encounter pressure on her China policy from new Asia-Pacific affairs team should Obama be elected in 2012. She’ll also have to show that no major changes will take place if the DPP comes back to power. These are what Ma and Tsai should be focusing on.

The author is a research fellow for the Taiwan Brian Trust.