The U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: Pros and Cons

A debate is going on among Iraqi political circles about the U.S. withdrawal from the country by the end of this year, as the political blocs disagree, as usual, on the withdrawal and its impact on the country’s future and on relations with Washington. A full withdrawal by the end of the year carries a wide range of important consequences that would largely determine the future of this country and the direction it heads toward. Will this withdrawal be an important step toward the restoration of its sovereignty or will it lead to its slide into chaos, violence and civil war?

The withdrawal would lead to further chaos and violence because there is no agreement between the constituents of the Iraqi people about the future of the country. This is reflected in the current political and sectarian polarization, which has contributed to the main political blocs’ failure to form a perfect government so far.

Iraqis are divided into three cross-sections on the U.S. withdrawal: the first one, led by the Sadrists and some members of the Iraqi List, demands the withdrawal of all troops, in accordance with the Security Agreement. The second section, consisting of Turkmen and some members of the Iraqi List and of the National Alliance, calls for withdrawing part of these forces and maintaining part of it. The last one, consisting of a Kurdish majority, some members of the National Alliance and some of those with close ties of friendship with the U.S., wants troops to stay.

Even if military withdrawal were complete, Iraqi-U.S. relations will remain strong and U.S. influence in Iraq will remain powerful and effective. It would not be reasonable for the U.S., having sacrificed about 4,500 dead soldiers and hundreds of billions of dollars, to leave Iraq to be controlled by neighboring and regional countries without having a say in decision-making in the country.

Many Iraqi politicians are aware of the dangers that U.S. withdrawal will leave for their future and for that of Iraq. They are thus attempting to find a formulation acceptable to the majority of the Iraqi people. As such, they are trying to highlight the need to further arm, equip and train the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Concerning the Issue of the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces and Its Impact on the Iraqi Arena

The Security Agreement has been planned and completed, stipulating that all U.S. troops withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011. So, will America withdraw its embassy, consulates and its influence from Iraq?

We say that U.S. troops will remain in Iraq because there is a relationship and a long-term cooperation agreement between Iraq and the United States. Furthermore, we have the Strategic Framework Agreement, which includes all aspects of cooperation.

However, we believe that U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has become an urgent need because Iraqi citizens no longer accept its presence. They see that it attracts violence, especially al-Qaida, which considers foreign presence a magnet to its fighters from inside and outside Iraq — fighters who believe in the doctrine of “the global front to fight the Crusaders.”

U.S. presence in Iraq has become a factor to attract armed groups managed by external forces. This is used as a playing card against the Americans in the Iraqi arena — even politically, with the issue of withdrawal used by some politicians and political blocs as a card for national bidding, to mobilize the man on the street against U.S. military presence. The desire for the departure of these forces grew among the majority of Iraqis as a result.

Iraq also has an urgent need for a long-term strategic partnership with the United States in light of the challenges it faces at this stage — whether the regional neighbors’ interventions in its internal affairs, which threaten its security and stability and control its destiny and social peace, on the one hand, or security challenges, on the other hand.

Iraqi military forces were built under exceptional and tense conditions, as far as sects are concerned. The issues of sectarianism and nationalism took precedence over professionalism in the formation of these forces, making them devoid of military doctrine and lacking in many of the elements that form the foundation upon which armed forces are established. This will have a negative impact on their ability to counter any external or internal threat Iraq might be exposed to in the future. This obliges the government to hold a partnership based on benefiting from military and logistic capabilities enjoyed by the United States to supply the Iraqi forces and contribute to their training, development and armament, to be able to perform their tasks of countering internal dangers and protecting its borders from any external attack.

Despite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s assurance that Iraqi security forces are able to take responsibility, preserve security and work with professionalism and patriotism, or his pledge to continue to strengthen their capacities and their combat capabilities by equipping them with the newest weapons and equipment, he refuses to express his attitude toward the U.S. withdrawal. He is hesitant and unsure of the readiness of Iraqi forces to maintain the security and borders of Iraq, saying recently “I will invite the leaders of political blocs to discuss this topic. Should they agree, I will say yes to keeping the troops; and if they disagree I will say to say no to maintaining these forces.”

Here, the prime minister holds the stick from the middle. He does not want to lose the friendship of the Americans, nor does he want to antagonize the Sadr movement, whose leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, announced that he would order the freeze on the Mahdi Army to be lifted if U.S. troops stay in Iraq after the end of the current year. A group of scientists and intellectuals in Iraq said in a statement about the division of the blocs concerning the U.S. pullout: “There are those who want to keep numerous U.S. troops in Iraq to train the Iraqi army and police.”

Among the motivations for maintaining these troops is the fear of a security vacuum that the Iraqi Armed Forces will not be able to fill and the fear that neighboring forces will sneak up on it to take advantage of the vacuum and take the U.S. troops’ place, under the pretext of protecting the democracy and freedom the Iraqis have gained.

The facts indicate that the U.S. did not invade Iraq to hand it over on a silver platter to people who have proven their failure in managing the affairs of the country since the first year of the occupation. The U.S. troops stationed in Iraq will not be withdrawn. If they leave by the front door, then they will emerge from the back door. Their bases in Iraq will not be handed over to an Iraqi government split and conflicting over spoils and personal and partisan gains.

Those who own the minds of Iraqis have painted a gloomy picture of what the future holds for Iraq, saying that Iraq will remain teetering between the pain of calamities and disasters, between the jaws of division and partisan bickering. Iraq is plagued by these ruling factions buckling under the occupier and is following its guidance and approach.

A lot of military leaders see that their troops are not qualified to protect the country after the U.S. withdrawal, which means that Iraq’s security and stability will remain at risk. They say that the troops will be unable to protect its airspace and borders until 2020. Currently, the Iraqi army is domestically ready to confront terrorism. However, it will be unable to protect its airspace and borders, as long as it depends on the Americans to do so.

Positions are divergent among the Iraqi political blocs on the U.S. withdrawal, and each bloc seeks to capitalize on this subject in the future. They are getting into a game of fragile political alliances due to the fact that each sect’s overriding goal is to maximize its own interests and gains and to impose its precedence, capitalizing on the difficult stage Iraq is going through, even if it is at the expense of the higher interests of Iraq and its national unity. What counts is the position each sect will gain, not the restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty and preservation of its unity.

The withdrawal of U.S. combat troops at this time can lead to one of two contrasting consequences: the first one is that a state of violence might prevail and a civil war might break out. There are indications that this has begun with the recent wave of bloody violence. There are many factors that contribute to making this pessimistic scenario true; most notably, the Iraqi forces’ lack of readiness to assume security functions and the lack of confidence among Iraqi sects and the waves of violence from perpetrators who consider the U.S. combat forces’ departure as an opportunity ignite a reign of terror and murder. These waves are represented by al-Qaida, which consider it as scoring a victory over the United States and forcing them to withdraw. That is to say, Iraq’s current circumstances make it more susceptible to political, security, social and economic anarchy. And this will contribute to the growth of the roles of other external parties, such as Iran, seeking to fill the vacuum after U.S. withdrawal to implement their agendas and maximize their interests.

The second potential consequence is that the withdrawal will be a step toward restoring Iraq’s sovereignty and dignity. If all U.S. forces remain next year, it would pose a great challenge to Iraqi groups being able to hone their vigor to control the country; abandon their political and sectarian differences; let go of the fear that a civil war will break out and ravage the country; and to realize that a civil war would not be in the interest of any party, especially after the bitter experience of sectarian violence that has prevailed in the country for years.

In both cases, the important conclusion seems to be that neither the withdrawal of U.S. forces nor their stay would determine the future of Iraq. It is the Iraqis themselves, and no one else, who are in position to determine the fate of their country and pull it out of this dark tunnel. This in itself depends on the ability of the Iraqi parties to modify the approach of sectarian elements that have ruled the Iraqi equation; to make a real move toward democracy and convey citizenship with equal rights and duties to all Iraqis regardless of their ethnic or sectarian differences; to elevate the level of responsibility in the management of the affairs of the country; to focus on the priorities of national reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among all communities; to achieve development and economic progress; address the issues of unemployment, poverty, reconstruction and the return of refugees; build the institutions of the collapsed state, especially the army and police forces; resolve pending issues such as the amendment of the Constitution and the settlement of the problem of Kirkuk; stop an expansion of foreign powers’ influence; and eradicate extremist organizations in the country.

There is no doubt that U.S. withdrawal itself is an important step because it will remove one of the justifications for the continued violence. But using the lack of readiness of the Iraqi security forces to justify maintaining U.S. troops is to be rejected because actually achieving peaceful coexistence and reconciliation of Iraqis, ending internal polarization and dismantling external entanglements would serve as a genuine safety valve to help achieve political stability and security. Submitting the fate of Iraq to American presence is a losing bet and will prolong violence and political uncertainty.

We are calling upon the political blocs to take into consideration the future of Iraq, as well as the capacity of the United States, and to reach an agreement that would maintain the interests of the parties and paint a bright future for the relationship between the two countries.

We see that the American withdrawal at the moment will have far more cons for Iraqis than pros. Yet, we must respect the opinion of the majority among the political bloc. Thus, we propose to end the U.S. troop presence on Iraqi soil, according to the Security Agreement to respect the principle of the Charter.

If a new agreement were reached before the expiration of the Security Agreement postulating that half of the current troops remain, it should come with the condition that they supply the Iraqi army with all that would enable it to undertake the real responsibility of protecting internal and border security in Iraq during the period of the new agreement. And they should supply Iraqi forces and contribute to its training, development and armament to be able to carry out its tasks of countering internal risks and protecting its borders from any outside interference.

The author is the Deputy Secretary General of the Community of Global Peace in Iraq and the Middle East.