Barack Obama’s Swan Song

One of the main reasons for Nazi Germany’s disaster during World War II was that there were too many open military fronts. This seems logical and reasonable because no army, no matter what its demographic resources, is able to wage war in so many regions of the world. From 1939-1945, this was especially clear in one of the Third Reich’s allies, Japan. Moreover, we will never know how Soviet imperialism might have turned out after the initial phase of the Barbarossa operation (the Nazi attack on the USSR). After all, if Hitler’s Japanese allies had attacked the Soviets on their eastern border, Stalin would have been hard-pressed to send his elite Siberian troops to Europe at such a critical moment, and then the war might have turned out completely different.

Another reason for the defeat of the Third Reich, according to many historians, was an excessive belief in the Fuhrer’s commanding talent and strategic military sense. It’s estimated that if German generals had had greater freedom of movement on the battlefield, then the campaign in Russia, even if it didn’t proceed successfully, would at least not have had such tragic repercussions of defeat. One could conclude that one of the major allies of the Allied forces was Hitler himself, or rather his dilettantism, constantly leading the Wehrmacht towards the abyss of crushing defeat. The leader of Nazi Germany cared more about consolidating his own power, as well as his personal image as the savior of a country that had been in failure from 1914-1918, than he did about the real interests of his country. Those interests rarely coincided with the dictator’s individual needs, which oscillated around the process of creating his own image.

And now, after this historical introduction, I’d like to answer one question: do the disastrous decisions and the behavior of the leader of the Third Reich give rise to any analogies? I’m not talking at all about the current trend of suspecting someone of fascist tendencies. I’m thinking more of a similar situation, and not a similar character. After all, in the modern world there is continuously no lack of unresolved armed conflict, where exceedingly often the United States is one of the combatants. Still wanting to play the role of the global policeman, the United States includes itself in more and more military campaigns. Sometimes active diplomacy is the only involvement abroad, but usually it ends with the American side taking it a step further. These steps have gone too far as Washington has finally driven itself into a thicket of complications, from which exiting is a rather difficult, if not impossible, matter. After Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military backing of the liberty-seeking Libyans was very limited, but it is difficult to say with certainty if this is because of lessons learned, or if this is just a result of America’s changing foreign policy priorities. Let’s add post-crisis budget-cutting priorities. But in the case of the United States, does financial breakdown really have much influence in the reduction of military potential outside the country’s borders? And how will this eventually manifest itself other than through resigning from initial anti-missile plans (radars in the Czech Republic, missiles in Poland)? After all, the first construction plans for a global anti-missile umbrella fell more because of opposition from Russia and less from the necessity of reorganizing recently strained public finances. Either way, America is paying the cost for its involvement on so many fronts. For now, this does not foreshadow for them the same catastrophic effects as in Nazi Germany. For now, even in similarly difficult and controversial cases, “never say never” is a thesis that, although today may seem unreal and abstract, could very well come true very quickly.

Likewise, ignorance, which became one of Hitler’s constant ailments, isn’t a stranger to the American president. It turns out that his public declaration to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan by 2014 was not very well thought out; it was declared without any consultation from senior military commanders, including General David Petraeus, who leads the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Therefore, is there some difference between Hitler’s contempt for officers during World War II, and President Obama’s current ignorance? In Washington’s case, will the limits of such calculated actions to consolidate the president’s personal prestige be as spectacular? Probably not. But to some degree, they are stamping their impact on the current domestic situation internationally.

The present level of internal political stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan is far from ideal. Indirect supporting proof of this thesis can be found in two British documentaries. In the 2006 film “Iraq: The Death Squads,” we learn about the quick transformation of the capital, Baghdad, under the absolute influence of Iraq’s special forces after the Western military coalition’s victory. On the other hand, the second film, “Embedded in Afghanistan,” shows that the newly created Afghan army has not yet reached its full battle readiness to ensure sufficient order in the country. And the army is definitely not a capable of successfully resisting the well-organized and well-armed Taliban in partisan battles. Therefore, is this over-exaggerated success too early to be the swan song before a seemingly honorable withdrawal from hasty battle adventures? In this sense, for Americans it would be a second Vietnam, after which everyone felt that the U.S. lost the war, although obviously no one would publicly admit those inconvenient facts. Everyone distances themselves from the failures in Afghanistan as well, despite the fact that the initial goals were either not achieved at all or were achieved to a very limited extent. Time doesn’t quite heal all wounds. However it leaves clear scars on a large part of the international community that drew itself into the Afghan war. And now, together with the United States, it will take a long time to digest that proverbial spoonful of tar in a barrel of honey of international complacency.