Is the U.S. Looking toRedirect Its Troops to a NewBattlefront after Afghanistan?

On June 23, the world received amazing news: The U.S. achieved victory in Afghanistan and will therefore begin to withdraw its troops from there. In his speech, Obama said that his country has largely achieved its goals in Afghanistan and therefore, within a year, one-third of the American soldiers will leave.

In fact, we are talking about the evacuation of the same troops that Obama had deployed to the region two years ago to “strengthen” the U.S. presence. By 2014, there will be no U.S. or allied troops left in Afghanistan. They do not intend to extend their “Afghan walk” longer than the American one.

As the reader may recall, one of the main goals of the mission was to defeat al-Qaida, which dealt an unexpected blow to the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. The alleged assassination of Osama bin Laden in neighboring Pakistan is hailed as a “victory” by the Americans. In any case, Obama used the long-awaited removal of “terrorist number one” to announce the start of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Even assuming that the assassination indeed took place, that is the extent of America’s success in the matter. As is commonly known, the elimination of one leader does not lead to the elimination of the terrorist network. In this case, in 10 years of struggle, the organization was only weakened, not destroyed.

In addition, this was not the only problem Americans faced. And no matter what Obama says, many in the American political elite think differently. Back on June 8, The Washington Post published a statement by Henry Kissinger, who admitted: “The stated goal of creating a government and domestic security structure to which responsibility for the defense of Afghanistan can be turned over is widely recognized as unreachable by 2014.”

As for getting rid of the Taliban, which the United States called al-Qaida’s closest ally, the achievement here is much more modest. In fact, the coalition currently controls less than one third of Afghan territory. Outside of the military bases and cities, the Taliban feel like a fish in water.

Of course, there is no sign of progress of Afghan democracy. Resistance to the occupational forces is growing from month to month. If a couple of years ago the north of the country was considered to be relatively safe compared with the south, now the attacks on NATO troops are becoming commonplace there as well.

Of course, outwardly things don’t look so bad. Yes, the U.S. wasted hundreds of billions of dollars to support the “Afghan democracy,” but the death toll for U.S. troops has been many times less here than it was for the Soviet military. By June 20, irrecoverable losses of U.S. troops amounted to 1,633. It would seem that this is not much when you compare it to Vietnam. However, when you look at all of the outcomes of this war, it becomes clear that the successes of the U.S. and its allies are nothing to boast about. Total losses amounted to 2,520 dead soldiers. To this we must add the loss of mercenaries from private military and national security companies. This increases the death toll by another 1,764 people. The total amounts to 4,284 deaths.

Yet for the West at the moment, this death toll is too heavy. And the fact that the operation by the U.S. and its allies was doomed to fail was known from the very beginning. It was only a matter of time. To continue a costly war indefinitely with an enemy who finds sympathy with the Afghan people is impossible, especially when allies like Canada begin running away from the war zone.

However, the Afghan “Dien Bien Phu” cannot be looked at from just a military standpoint. It was not the soldiers and officers who lost the war but the politicians who sent them to a place where no one has ever really won a war and where there is no purely military solution.

From a political point of view, the American withdrawal may outshine even the “Vietnamese costs.” It is difficult for the United States and its allies to admit that their presence in Afghanistan not only did not succeed at its mission but also bred a lot of enemies of Western civilizations. U.S. experts recently conducted a survey that yielded shocking results: 40 percent of Afghans candidly and explicitly stated that the purpose of the American presence in Afghanistan was not to fight terrorists but to destroy their country and Islam.

This is not the opinion of people who hide out in the mountains but normal Afghans. It is very important to note that they did not give evasive answers and spoke about their sentiments openly. Is it really surprising that the Afghan people so openly show their hatred for those who came onto their land with no invitation and weapons in their hands? However, Americans played no small part in carving out the image of democracy for the Afghans. Endless drone strikes on weddings and funeral processions serve as evidence of this. With this approach, it’s not surprising that one killed Taliban member is immediately replaced with two Afghans who dream of revenge by getting back at the West for this democratization.

Still, the U.S. president cannot be blamed for completely misinforming the public. In fact, he contradicted himself in the very same speech. According to him, the war should be ended responsibly at a time when there is a risk of military overstretch. It is fair to say that the military does not agree. In fact, this decision goes against the wishes of military officials, who recommended more cautious and less hasty actions. Is this not an implicit admission of failure to meet the set out mission objectives?

And what will happen after the withdrawal of the NATO forces? All the functions still being performed by the occupation forces, according to Washington’s plans, will be entrusted to the current Afghan leadership.

With this approach it is anyone’s guess how many days or even hours the Taliban will take to make Karzai repeat the fate of Najibullah, abandoned by Moscow.

It would be naive to think that Washington does not understand the implications of its withdrawal. So is this the inability to continue an expensive military operation in a time of crisis a pre-election stunt or a maneuver for the redeployment of the U.S. combative forces in a new direction?

It’s likely the answer has to do with all three issues. The U.S. presidential elections are just one year away. Judging by the polls, over 70 percent of Americans believe that Washington should withdraw from Afghanistan. And the candidate who first gets on the bandwagon of the Afghan withdrawal can count on at least part of the votes.

The economic issues are just as serious. Obama mentioned them in his speech talking about the rapid changes in political and economic life of Americans and the need “to focus on nation building here at home.” Now even the most influential American economy analytics do not rule out the U.S. default. There are not that many recipes for how to avoid it. First and foremost, there needs to be a sharp reduction in spending. An extremely cautious approach should be taken in the social sphere, as any belt-tightening may bring the Americans to the streets.

However, one can try to plug the gap by reducing excessive military spending. In this regard the United States has no rival on the planet. Moreover, over the past 10 years, and owing to the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, this spending has grown to hundreds of billions of dollars.

Now the “defense” budget of the most democratic state in the world is equal to that of the military spending of all other countries combined. However, in order to maintain superiority, even more modest spending would be ample, since much of it had been directed toward the Afghan war.

Now it’s up to the U.S. military to withdraw its troops in such a way so as not to make it look like a shameful flight from the battlefield and a defeat of democracy. They can’t just simply leave Afghanistan with their head held high. No wonder that, about a month ago, some reports emerged that the U.S. had begun negotiations with the Taliban. Leaked information suggests that the Americans are even willing to accept under certain guarantees that Karzai would allow these al-Qaida allies, as Washington earlier asserted, to be part of the Afghan government. But it would be tantamount to an outright transfer of power to the Taliban, which the very next day would take this power into their own hands. So far the negotiations have not been successful. The Taliban, knowing that time is on their side, demonstrate clear perseverance and have placed as a condition for negotiations a full withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Afghan land. This clearly demonstrates the actual alignment of power in Afghanistan.

No matter how the U.S. finishes its Afghan affairs, NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would be seen as the biggest “victory of Islam over the Crusaders.” However, it would not only be a loss for the West. The victory of the Taliban will give impetus to jihadists around the world. The “ripples” from the American flight from Afghanistan would inevitably affect Central Asia, Iran, India and China. But first and foremost it would affect the nuclear state of Pakistan, which is becoming increasingly immersed in a state of instability.

However, this may all change. As we know, despite the triumphant Obama, tens of thousands of American security forces continue to be stationed in Iraq. And no one will give precise guarantees that in the event of “unforeseen circumstances” after the election in 2012, Washington will stick with its decision.

Yet one of the main intrigues is the question of precisely where the withdrawn American troops will be heading. These suspicions are brought on by a vague statement Obama made on June 23 in his Afghanistan speech regarding the changing nature of threats in the region.