South China Sea Will Be Playing Field for China & U.S.

Source: Southern Weekly

(Zhao Chu, deputy director of Shanghai National Defense Institute for Strategic Studies, executive editor for Military World POINT magazine, engaged in research in international and military strategic problems.)

After the Cold War, Russia could hardly maintain its naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, and China had relatively modest sea and air forces, lacking high seas capabilities. Besides, the United States had withdrawn its naval base in the Philippines in a wave of budget cuts. Therefore, there appeared an unusual military vacuum in the South China Sea.

Observers have noted that the United States played a heavy role in the present South China Sea “storm.” Besides a general declaration, the United States took military measures by dispatching aircraft carriers permanently stationed in Japan and creating joint military exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam. Because the military exercise wasn’t colored with actual combat, and to avoid provoking China, they were given subtle names, such as antiterrorism. However, during this time of fierce quarreling between China and Vietnam, such a diplomatic military move by the United States had very obvious implications against China.

Does this mean that the United States is carrying out the so-called “C” type military encirclement strategy against China? Does this mean that America intends to confront the Chinese for the South China Sea or even the entire Pacific Ocean? The news called attention to these questions but offered no answers.

Another piece of news indicated other symptoms. On June 25, the first annual China-U.S. consultations on Asian-Pacific affairs were held in Hawaii, led by both countries’ deputies of foreign affairs. This is a very important development in Sino-U.S. strategic interaction because, first of all, the main theme of this consultation is Asian-Pacific affairs. This reflects that in America’s consideration of the affairs, China’s status and weight has increased to a level that the United States must offer special treatment. The United States realized that it needed to consider China’s intent, power and interests before designing a future plan. Second of all, from the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea dispute, almost all heated issues in the local area are directly or indirectly related to China, and the United States seems to stand opposite from China on almost all issues. This shows that if China and the United States can’t have a pipeline for the smooth exchange of regional policy, the United States will probably lose its interest in future regional issues. Therefore, to the United States, communicating with China in full is not only needed for preventive strategies but also as an opportunity for shaping and influencing China’s policy under the understanding of non-military power.

Combining the two stories above and the developments of related affairs in recent years, America’s overall thoughts about the South China Sea issue are now roughly evident. Hillary Clinton has vowed that the United States will not leave the South China Sea. The unspoken reasons are that firstly, the awakening of China’s consciousness about the power of the sea would no doubt be a key threat to America’s global hegemony; secondly, the South China Sea resides in the strategic geographical hub that joins two oceans and two ends of a continent, and China occupies a critical position for Asia-Pacific maritime strategy in the region. What the United States is worried about is that once China has the aid of rapidly growing high seas naval power, and the support of other modern military strategic systems, it may gain control of the South China Sea and make America withdraw eastward several thousand miles, leading to a geographic and strategic gap. Thus, America has to take actions to show its determination, and at the same time, implicitly encourage countries that have conflicts with China like the Philippines and Vietnam to boycott China, interfering with the smooth growth of China’s power. This concept can be referred to as Clinton’s “smart power.”

With regard to this, China’s policy is one of peace based on diplomacy. This means that it maintains an attitude of great restraint, faces provocation and pushes bilateral negotiations forward in the name of emphasizing sovereignty, as well as increasing trade and other contracts with Southeast Asian countries. As the leading country providing international industrial products and capital, China has broad economic interests in common with other countries in the region. We can say that America’s use of regional disputes to contain China is an asymmetric strategy replacing military combat with diplomatic and non-military actions. Nevertheless, China’s resolution to use diplomacy and trade is also highly targeted, asymmetric strategic thinking. The two sides’ implicit contest with reservation reflects the future of the United States’ concerns, doubts, intentions and capabilities and also their willingness to explore cooperation and a joint control of possible crises in the future.

Generalizing on recent developments in global sea power, we can say that the only thing that catches strategic scholars’ attention is China’s deep water fleet. In the 1990s, China’s naval focus moved strategically from the East China Sea and the Western Pacific to the South China Sea, which in itself actually avoided a confrontation with the U.S. Navy, but the geo-strategic importance of the South China Sea has irritated America’s security nerve.

If we can say that Sino-U.S. interactions of sea power over the past 20 years were mainly off the coast of Eastern China and the Pacific Ocean, then the main friction between China and U.S. military and sea power in the future will be gradually transferred to the South China Sea, until it forms a relatively balanced structure.