What Can the West Offer the Taliban?

In terms of Washington’s negotiations with the Taliban, there are so many variables and unknowns that the outcome is impossible to predict. We don’t even know if such a dialogue is even held.

The idea of negotiating with the Taliban is not new. Already in October of 2008, American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates openly talked about the possibility of such talks, at a time when such an idea was only whispered about around Washington. The controversial idea was even endorsed by David Petraeus, the American commander who successfully used a similar tactic in Iraq. Petraeus also suggested including Iran in any eventual negotiations.

The latest news of the start of such negotiations is not earth-shattering, especially since such talks were unsuccessfully attempted in the past. At the present time there is no chance of a significant change on the ground in Afghanistan; hence, these negotiations cannot be labeled as any kind of breakthrough. It should be noted that the British negotiated for 20 years with the IRA in Northern Ireland before achieving relative stability. In the case of religious fanatics, the dialogue will not be any easier, especially since there is no certainty that Washington is even negotiating with representatives of Mullah Omar and not, as has happened in the past, with impostors.

Negotiating with the enemy can be seen as a NATO and American defeat. Radical Islam was not vanquished. On the other hand, it was known at the start that the idea of a never-ending global war on terror makes little sense. It was naïve to think that every extremist could be eradicated or that the ideology would be totally wiped out. From the very beginning it was evident that the war in Afghanistan would end through some sort of political compromise. If it were possible to negotiate a deal where Afghanistan would be stable and not export radical Islam, it would be seen as a victory. We should be reminded that the objective of the war was to increase the security of the West. From a strategic standpoint, the fate of the Afghan people is irrelevant as long as it doesn’t negatively affect the security of the West.

It is hard to see where these negotiations might lead. What price is the West willing to pay to stabilize Afghanistan? Are they ready to once again hand Afghanistan over to the Taliban, who might depose Hamid Karzai? Another unknown is the result of such a deal on neighboring countries, who are grappling with Islamic extremists as well, such as Tajikistan and especially Pakistan, which recognizes the potential value of negotiating with the Taliban. It is a widely established fact that radical Islamists want to create a regional religious state. NATO’s retreat would make this task much easier.

One thing seems to be certain. The Taliban have a stronger negotiating position. They do not care if the war drags on for eternity. NATO, on the other hand, has a time constraint. This situation seems to reflect Henry Kissinger’s maxim — that guerrillas win when they don’t lose, and that conventional armies lose when they don’t win. The United States is tired of war; its army needs rest, much like the American economy. Time does not favor the West.