The Friendly Enemy

The deteriorating relations between the United States and Pakistan have made uncertain the future of the American-Pakistani alliance. This alliance is key to the success of the mission in neighboring Afghanistan.

Pakistan was the first nation to whom the Americans appealed for help after the Sept. 11 attacks. They appealed to the Pakistanis not because Islamabad was Washington’s reliable ally, but because the Americans needed their support in order to carry out a successful mission next door. For Pakistan, infiltrated by Islamists, this was a chance to obtain extra funds for defense, and more importantly, a chance to improve relations with India, a key American ally. In other words, the Pakistani-American alliance was created out of necessity and not because of any common values or interests.

It is no secret that Pakistan has two sides to its involvement in Afghanistan. On one hand, they help the coalition forces, and on the other hand, they actively support the radicals. The fact that Osama bin Laden was found in Pakistan reinforces what has already widely been known. Pakistan rightly deserves the title of “frenemy.” Backing out of this alliance would be difficult for Washington, because the alliance is necessary to successfully fight in Afghanistan. For example, most of the equipment for the International Security Assistance forces in the Hindu Kush is routed through Pakistan.

The alliance between Pakistan and the United States has been in crisis in the past months. Pakistan ejected a large part of the American personnel stationed on its territory, including intelligence officers. This has been done in response to the American raid against bin Laden’s compound and to the shooting of two Pakistani nationals by a CIA agent. The decision to suspend $800 million of aid is further evidence of the widening rift in the uneasy alliance. The lack of trust between Islamabad and Washington is becoming increasingly apparent.

The suspension of aid by the United States is supposed to serve as a measure to force Pakistan to do what the Americans want them to do. This includes a more vigorous campaign against Islamic extremists within Pakistan, especially those on the border with Afghanistan. Experts warn, however, that this might have the opposite effect. The lack of financial and military support might lead the Pakistanis to conclude that it is better to tolerate the extremists rather than to fight them, especially since Pakistan is preparing to be a major power in Afghanistan when America leaves. The risk of a Pakistani revolt is quite high, because the Muslim society in the country, even in light of bloody attacks on civilians, prefers the Islamists over the Americans.