The Fall of Gadhafi Serves Obama’s New Approach

The fall of Libya’s Colonel Moammar Gadhafi looks to have rich strategic value. It has revived the “Arab Spring,” which had been wounded by the fluctuation and frustration of the Libyan state of affairs. Only a week ago, there was widespread chatter about the failure of military intervention in Libya, or at least about how poorly the intervention had been strategized … and how poorly the Libyan opposition was organized and how badly it suffered from internal disharmony … and how the horizon had been blocked by Gadhafi’s firm immovability … and how risky it was for the Libyan rebels to distance themselves from the type of peaceful resistance seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria … and how risky it was for them to become the first among the “Arab Spring” to seek refuge in armed action. For weeks we have been discussing the transformation of the “Arab Spring” into an incendiary summer in Libya.

Today the story has changed. The victory of the Libyan rebels has presented us with a different narrative, one with historic significance. Consider the following:

First off, because this victory came by way of strong Arab and international assistance and through foreign military intervention, it provides a model example for those who advocate intervention — under conditions that distinguish it from occupation — in cases where the people of a given nation are unable to rescue themselves from the oppression and brutality of their leaders, from the theft of their country’s resources, from the deprivation of liberties or from the smothering of all popular resistance. We must remember this: If it were not for the NATO intervention, Gadhafi would have stifled the rebellion with total ease. The NATO airstrikes weakened Gadhafi’s combat forces and cut him off politically and militarily. This course of action recalls the model used in Sierra Leone, rather than those used in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Second, the rebels would not have achieved their victory over the tyrant, nor would NATO have assisted them in this, if it weren’t for the Arabs covering for them. Observers have noted that the thrust of policy-making regarding the “Arab Spring,” and particularly regarding the Libyan situation, came in large part from the Gulf states (e.g. Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia), as well as from Jordan and Turkey.

Third, the fall of Gadhafi will be seen as a victory for the tactical approach of U.S. President Barack Obama and his administration, as U.S. allies begin to adopt more prominent roles in foreign conflicts. In dealing with the Libyan and Syrian situations, the U.S. has stressed the importance of European and Arab support prior to military intervention (re: Libya) and political and economic escalation (re: Syria). In other words, multilateralism, as opposed to unilateral action, is the motto of the West these days. This is an important new development with respect to European-American as well as Arab-American alliances, including those involving the Arab Gulf states. This new approach has been taking shape for quite some time under the heading: “Lessons Learned from the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Fourth, analysts searching for the greatest success of Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the National Transitional Council, point to his ability to persuade the commander of the battalion charged by Gadhafi with the duty of defending Tripoli to lay down arms upon the arrival of the rebels, hence managing to avoid a bloodbath, widespread chaos and acts of revenge, and the plundering of the state — in other words, managing to avoid everything exemplified by Iraq.

In effect, the rebels had already succeeded just before the fall of Tripoli and Bab al-Azizia, by stressing to their conquering armies the importance of adhering to the law and protecting human rights, rejecting the spirit of revenge and the self-conceit of victory. In a similar vein, note their talk of how the members of Gadhafi’s battalions are true sons of Libya unless they persist in their treachery — a wise and judicious lesson in summoning the spirit of reconciliation and harmony and reconstruction. Thus, the most important challenge facing the rebels today may be this: to demonstrate that the act of freeing oneself from tyranny does not necessarily guarantee chaos, schism, ruin, the disintegration of society, and the forfeiture of stability and security. Will they succeed?