Ten Years Later: Sept. 11 and the Freedom Agenda

This Sunday is the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks targeting the United States, symbolized by the dramatic picture of the collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York.

After the passing of 10 years since this event, people still debate the origin of these ideological attacks. For those who are accustomed to blaming Islam as responsible for any sin, the tragedy of September 11 was an inevitable product of the masterminds of the doctrine. For others, maybe the attacks seemed Nietzschian rather than Islamic: the product of a sense of arrogance, and impressive work.

The best that can be done is to evaluate the implications of the attacks in terms of the goals its perpetrators allegedly sought.

At that time, the organization al-Qaida presented the attacks of September 11 as the second phase of its strategy. The organization claimed it destroyed one of the “two great powers” in the modern world: the Soviet Union. In this second phase, it was the United States’ turn, the remaining superpower, turn to collapse.

That did not happen and it does not appear that it will happen any time soon. If anything has occurred, it is that the attacks of September 11 reinforced a sense of patriotism among the majority of Americans, just as the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor did six decades ago. In another form, the strike that doesn’t divide it strengthens it.

As is the case with all other countries, shared memories sustain America, among which some promote joy and some lamentation. For most Americans, the tragedy of September 11 still serves as a deep wound, but it also represents an addition to the shared memories of American patriotism.

More specifically, the terrorists mentioned five goals:

First: the launching of a series of attacks in “apostate” countries to keep the ember of global jihad alight. However, this didn’t happen. Despite attacks in Bali, Madrid, Mumbai and London, the “endless bombings” promised did not materialize.

Second: the end of the American military presence in Muslim countries. This has not happened either. In the year 2001, there were about 5,000 American soldiers in the greater Middle East — an arc of countries with the absence of stability that extends from North Africa to Southwest Asia. After the passing of 10 years, despite large withdrawals from Iraq, the number of American soldiers in the region has increased to approximately 150,000. At present, one can find American “military facilities” — a diluted word referring to bases — in 30 Muslim countries. This is an unprecedented record. Seven Muslim countries have signed cooperation agreements with NATO.

The third goal was to end American support for the governing regimes in many countries. The terrorists hoped to pave the road for the Americans to withdraw support for these regimes. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States undertook a review of the policy of support of the status quo in the region that has reached 60 years of age. The Bush administration saw the Middle East as “a swamp of tyranny that had become a breeding ground for the insects of terrorism.”* The resulting change in American policy and what occurred was the opposite of what al-Qaida expected. Authoritarian regimes were shaken, and some of them fell. However, “pure jihadists” did not take their place.

The so-called “freedom agenda,” revealed in Washington in 2003, helped create space for a range of forces, including non-violent Islamic groups, which gave Arabs wider political choices. (I also believe that the popular uprising in 2009 in Iran struck a fatal injury to the Khomeini regime.)

The fourth goal was to instigate a global “clash of civilizations,” in the hopes that it wouldl lead the “downtrodden” third world to stand with the terrorists. But this didn’t happen either. Today, it is rare to hear conversations about the “clash of civilizations,” a topic that was so familiar a decade ago, except for a conference or two sponsored by the mullahs of Tehran.

The fifth goal was to launch a global recruitment campaign to produce a new generation of terrorists. The generation of “insects” bred during the Afghan conflict in the 1990s is composed of men reaching retirement age. Many of the prominent members of that generation died during the post-9/11 American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, less than five of the 30 individuals who made up the al-Qaida senior leadership remain alive and outside of prison. The rest are either dead or in Guantanamo Bay. The hoped-for new generation has failed to emerge.

In many Arab countries, al-Qaida has almost disappeared because it needs new members. Far from instigating Muslims to rush to arms in a new round of the “global war against the apostates,” the attacks of September 11 have produced a slow but growing sense of revulsion against terrorism in a number of Muslim countries.

Al-Qaida tried to attract radical Palestinians by supporting the elimination of Israel but failed in this endeavor. Apart from a small number of lawless people of Palestinian descent who fought and died in Iraq, al-Qaida was unable to attract new Palestinian elements.

Some armed groups have tried to use the label of al-Qaida, now without credibility, to gain a type of imaginary legitimacy. We find them in many small, poor countries in West Africa and in youth gangs inside Somalia. An Algerian terrorist group used the al-Qaida label before abandoning it.

Certainly, there are many armed conflicts that involve Muslims. Chechnya does not “rest” after brutal repression. Chinese policy in East Turkistan (Xinjiang) still produces violence. Muslim minorities in the Philippines and Thailand are still agitated. In Afghanistan, a moribund Taliban is still inflicting death and destruction in a small number of provinces. In Pakistan, many terrorist groups are still active within the Swat valley. However, none of these conflicts can be linked to the strategy that produced the September 11 attacks against the United States.

In light of its inability to recruit within the Muslim world, the leaders of the Salafi terrorist group are focusing on Muslim minorities in the West. During the past decade, more than 800 “warriors” with Western European passports were arrested within Afghanistan alone. Observers of the terrorist presence in cyberspace know that the remaining review processes are managed by Muslims, including converts, from Europe and the United States.

This Westernization of jihadists confirms the decreasing link of “the goal” to the lives of real people through the Muslim world.

*Editor’s note: Although this quote has been accurately translated, it could not be verified.