How Will America Leave Iraq While Also Staying There?
Published in Al Arabia
(U.A.E.) on 5 November 2011
by A'asam Na'aman (link to original)
(U.A.E.) on 5 November 2011
by A'asam Na'aman (link to original)
Translated from
by Nickolas Smith.
Edited by Andrew Schmidt.
The American military will leave Iraq before the end of this year so its soldiers can celebrate Christmas with their families. This was finally announced by President Barack Obama, but is it conceivable that the U.S. will abandon Iraq so easily and quickly?
The answer is yes, and no. Yes, because of their economic and political policies. No, because their oil interests and security requirements motivate its military to stay, but in a different way.
Politically, Obama needs to bring back his forces quickly in order to promote his campaign and win the upcoming election. Economically, the cost to America as a result of the invasion and occupation of Iraq will be more than 4,400 dead, 30,000 wounded, and $3 trillion by the end of the year. 2008 was the date when a security agreement, which ended last year, was made with the government of Nuri al-Maliki. The U.S. is unable to withstand more human and material losses in addition to the continued financial and economic crisis that has plagued it since the summer of 2008.
However, there are political, economic, and strategic reasons for the U.S. to maintain an active military presence in Mesopotamia. Its exit will leave a political and security vacuum in plain view that will not delay Iran, through cooperation with allied Iraqi forces, from filling it. This strategic development will in turn consolidate the alliance between Iran, Syria, and the forces of the Arab resistance in Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Palestine (Hamas). All this threatens America's oil interests and "Israel's" long-term security, which will be at the mercy of a regional power centered on Iran. Iran would control all of the communications, transportation, and private transport of oil through both land and sea pipelines from the shores of Iran to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This extends to Lebanon and Palestine on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and throughout Mesopotamia and the Levant, i.e. the heart of the Middle East.
In light of these needs and necessities, Washington prepared a plan to retain an active military presence in Iraq. Its goal is to support a scheme to continue its ongoing effort to remove Syria from its alliance with Iran and deplete the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance forces, at the very least. All of this in order to spread unrest and chaos in a manner that leaves the system completely crippled and unable to remain defiant toward its allies as well as the insurgents in the region.
How Does Washington Hope to Reach Its Objectives?
Perhaps a careful look at what has happened — and is finally happening — in Iraq will shine the spotlight on America, its targets, and its intentions at this stage. Al-Maliki's government launched mass arrest campaigns, arresting 615 people from various parts of the country. Al-Maliki claimed that they were Ba’athists reorganizing their party and working with their allies in the military toward a military coup. The majority of the arrests were in the Salahaddin province — where they also ended. The provincial council there has decided to declare the territory administratively and economically independent as the provincial board of Al-Anbar province similarly decided to do.
Indeed, the Ba’athists and residents abroad who intend to return immediately after the American departure cannot, at least at the present time, pull off a successful military coup alone. From here, independent Iraqi observers tend to interpret the behavior of al-Maliki's government as provocative and aimed at mobilizing loyal political forces, especially those friendly to Iran with his ultimate goal being to restore solidarity in the face of challenges present after the departure of the Americans. Another team of observers agrees with the above mentioned interpretation. But al-Maliki is also making sure his move is parallel to that of Iraqi political forces loyal to the United States. Islamic forces of the Arab and Kurdish variety want the U.S. to stay and some of them feel the need to declare that.
In this context, these observers are pointing to several phenomena that support what they are doing. The recent increase in random security operations and bombings has targeted sectarian groups in order to promote sectarian strife and civil war. Moreover, Kurdish leaders in the north have doubled their public support for retaining a U.S. military presence. Though his trip to Ankara was strained, Kurdish Regional President Masoud Barzani held talks with Turkish officials regarding this matter.
Furthermore, some observers have trouble connecting the Iraqi security scheme to growing U.S.-Turkish intervention in Syria through the creation of pockets of rebels along the Turkish-Syrian border. This is specifically occurring in the Hasaka border region where high numbers of Syrian Kurds are arriving in the northern Iskenderun region in the Syrian province of Idleb. They point to what was recently published in the New York Times about Turkey hosting an armed opposition group against the Syrian regime. They have also been accused of providing shelter and protection to the group’s leader, Colonel Riad al-Assad, and dozens of components of what is being called the "Syrian free army." This "free army" is a camp guarded by the Turkish army, from which the Americans allow them to launch attacks across the border.
Writer and Iraqi political activist Dr. Abdul Hussain Shaban goes further than the Iraqi independent observers. He believes Iran, though it may prefer ending the U.S. military presence in Iraq, may have military leaders who are not afraid of continued American occupation. This makes it so that any U.S. troops that remain in Mesopotamia would be considered a typical Iranian hostage if the U.S. were to launch a war. Shaban said that al-Maliki and his allies are aware of this fact and consequently act according to its requirements. Which would it be?
It seems that al-Maliki and his allies do not mind the survival of the American occupation according to the palliative formula that can be marketed at the lowest possible political cost. Perhaps this is the tacit approval behind the broad pre-emptive campaign against the Ba’athists opposed to any possible outcome that aims for the retention of a U.S. military presence in the country. In this case the Ba’athists will find themselves paradoxically facing their Sadrist opponents as a common enemy.
The answer is yes, and no. Yes, because of their economic and political policies. No, because their oil interests and security requirements motivate its military to stay, but in a different way.
Politically, Obama needs to bring back his forces quickly in order to promote his campaign and win the upcoming election. Economically, the cost to America as a result of the invasion and occupation of Iraq will be more than 4,400 dead, 30,000 wounded, and $3 trillion by the end of the year. 2008 was the date when a security agreement, which ended last year, was made with the government of Nuri al-Maliki. The U.S. is unable to withstand more human and material losses in addition to the continued financial and economic crisis that has plagued it since the summer of 2008.
However, there are political, economic, and strategic reasons for the U.S. to maintain an active military presence in Mesopotamia. Its exit will leave a political and security vacuum in plain view that will not delay Iran, through cooperation with allied Iraqi forces, from filling it. This strategic development will in turn consolidate the alliance between Iran, Syria, and the forces of the Arab resistance in Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Palestine (Hamas). All this threatens America's oil interests and "Israel's" long-term security, which will be at the mercy of a regional power centered on Iran. Iran would control all of the communications, transportation, and private transport of oil through both land and sea pipelines from the shores of Iran to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This extends to Lebanon and Palestine on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and throughout Mesopotamia and the Levant, i.e. the heart of the Middle East.
In light of these needs and necessities, Washington prepared a plan to retain an active military presence in Iraq. Its goal is to support a scheme to continue its ongoing effort to remove Syria from its alliance with Iran and deplete the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance forces, at the very least. All of this in order to spread unrest and chaos in a manner that leaves the system completely crippled and unable to remain defiant toward its allies as well as the insurgents in the region.
How Does Washington Hope to Reach Its Objectives?
Perhaps a careful look at what has happened — and is finally happening — in Iraq will shine the spotlight on America, its targets, and its intentions at this stage. Al-Maliki's government launched mass arrest campaigns, arresting 615 people from various parts of the country. Al-Maliki claimed that they were Ba’athists reorganizing their party and working with their allies in the military toward a military coup. The majority of the arrests were in the Salahaddin province — where they also ended. The provincial council there has decided to declare the territory administratively and economically independent as the provincial board of Al-Anbar province similarly decided to do.
Indeed, the Ba’athists and residents abroad who intend to return immediately after the American departure cannot, at least at the present time, pull off a successful military coup alone. From here, independent Iraqi observers tend to interpret the behavior of al-Maliki's government as provocative and aimed at mobilizing loyal political forces, especially those friendly to Iran with his ultimate goal being to restore solidarity in the face of challenges present after the departure of the Americans. Another team of observers agrees with the above mentioned interpretation. But al-Maliki is also making sure his move is parallel to that of Iraqi political forces loyal to the United States. Islamic forces of the Arab and Kurdish variety want the U.S. to stay and some of them feel the need to declare that.
In this context, these observers are pointing to several phenomena that support what they are doing. The recent increase in random security operations and bombings has targeted sectarian groups in order to promote sectarian strife and civil war. Moreover, Kurdish leaders in the north have doubled their public support for retaining a U.S. military presence. Though his trip to Ankara was strained, Kurdish Regional President Masoud Barzani held talks with Turkish officials regarding this matter.
Furthermore, some observers have trouble connecting the Iraqi security scheme to growing U.S.-Turkish intervention in Syria through the creation of pockets of rebels along the Turkish-Syrian border. This is specifically occurring in the Hasaka border region where high numbers of Syrian Kurds are arriving in the northern Iskenderun region in the Syrian province of Idleb. They point to what was recently published in the New York Times about Turkey hosting an armed opposition group against the Syrian regime. They have also been accused of providing shelter and protection to the group’s leader, Colonel Riad al-Assad, and dozens of components of what is being called the "Syrian free army." This "free army" is a camp guarded by the Turkish army, from which the Americans allow them to launch attacks across the border.
Writer and Iraqi political activist Dr. Abdul Hussain Shaban goes further than the Iraqi independent observers. He believes Iran, though it may prefer ending the U.S. military presence in Iraq, may have military leaders who are not afraid of continued American occupation. This makes it so that any U.S. troops that remain in Mesopotamia would be considered a typical Iranian hostage if the U.S. were to launch a war. Shaban said that al-Maliki and his allies are aware of this fact and consequently act according to its requirements. Which would it be?
It seems that al-Maliki and his allies do not mind the survival of the American occupation according to the palliative formula that can be marketed at the lowest possible political cost. Perhaps this is the tacit approval behind the broad pre-emptive campaign against the Ba’athists opposed to any possible outcome that aims for the retention of a U.S. military presence in the country. In this case the Ba’athists will find themselves paradoxically facing their Sadrist opponents as a common enemy.