Like the Japanese in the Jungle

The Israeli conception that the United States still has the leverage to take down and lift up leaders in the Middle East is archaic and dumb.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to yesterday’s Ma’ariv headline, warns the American administration not to weaken General Tantawi, the head of the military council standing at the helm of Egypt at the moment. In the body of the release, Israeli sources were quoted claiming that the Americans are repeating their mistake of the beginning of the year, when they abandoned President Mubarak and indirectly aided his downfall. A “senior diplomatic source” cautioned that carrying out the elections in Egypt too prematurely may raise the Muslim Brotherhood to power.

It’s no use to dwell on the validity of this forecast, though it seems like the situation in Egypt is a little more complicated. What is just as interesting is the anachronism of the expectation that Washington could and should exert influence on the happenings in Egypt. It testifies to what extent officials in Israel refuse to separate from the erstwhile world, and the clear demarcation lines between “ours” and “theirs” that used to be in it. No less than that, it brings up the question of the degree to which we can apply our Americo-centric outlook to the entire globe, only considering what is going on with the decision makers in Washington to be important.

Let’s assume for a second that the Obama administration views things exactly like the senior echelons in Israel. What is it supposed to do? Stand behind the military coup, like the CIA did for the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973? Bring down an elected government, like the Americans did to Mossadegh in Iran in the early ‘50s? Or perhaps intervene with military force like they did in Vietnam and recently in Iraq in 2003? All these interferences had in the long run negative ramifications for the status of the United States in South America, Indo-China and the Middle East, and all of them belong in the days of the Cold War, when two superpowers were struggling for global hegemony and taking excessive liberties, including military invasion of other countries.

Those days are gone for good. The United States today is part of a multi-polar world where its decisive military power is no longer an omnipotent factor. Its intelligence agencies are restrained by an administration that got hurt too many times by schemes that looked sophisticated on paper. It fights the leftovers of two wars overseas that finished inconclusively and charged a heavy economic and political price.

President Obama realizes this very well. He knows that his abilities are limited and therefore prefers not to flaunt them. He knows that the American public won’t support any form of military involvement and cannot be swayed by the force of the “domino theory” of the bygone past. He knows that the world knows this as well: American espousal of Mubarak would not have saved him or even postponed his end, and would only have increased the grudge against Americans on the Egyptian street — which is now a player in the system, contrary to the good days of yore when negotiations could be carried out solely with the tyrannical regime.

It’s very convenient to present the American president as a naïve idealist. In my eyes, he is a realpolitik statesman who understands the new world and is not bound by the illusions and nostalgias of those still clinging to the old order which no longer exists.

Israel’s concerns about what’s going to occur in Egypt are understandable and justified. This is taking place in our neighborhood and might affect us directly, but the way to deal with them is not by holding on to aged concepts. The words and actions of the United States won’t have any effect on the lifespan of the Tantawi rule. The Israeli message, whether put through to Washington for real or only leaked for internal purposes, only speaks to the fact that the only democracy in the Middle East is also the last country to refrain from parting with the Cold War, just like those Japanese who did not leave the jungle for decades after Japan surrendered in World War II.