Iran and Closing the Strait of Hormuz

Iran began its maneuvers in the Arab Gulf and the Sea of Oman on December 24, 2011, accompanied by naval drills geared toward closing the Strait of Hormuz — flexing its muscles and raising a storm of proclamations and responses around its preparations to close the Strait to international navigation. This came in response to an ultimatum on whether or not the West would raise sanctions against Iran by imposing new penalties on the export of oil, and on whether the United States or Israel would launch an attack on Iran, because of its nuclear program. It is claimed that Iran has the ability to close the Strait “much easier than drinking a glass of water.”

A war of words between Iran and the United States and her allies has resulted from this. Some analysts attributed this to the fact that Iran’s threat to close the Strait is tied to the intensification of Western pressure, and that its maneuver originally stems from its feelings of weakness as a result. Therefore, Iran tried to strain relations in the West while dismissing its own internal state of deterioration. With this, Iran promised to undertake different maneuvers in February 2012. On the other hand, the goal behind the Iranian maneuvers and the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz may be to hit two birds with one stone: Firstly, to terrorize the countries of the Arab Gulf by their having to compensate for the (oil) shortfalls in the case of dangerous Western actions, and secondly, to deter the West and bend them away from imposing more sanctions, or to extort the West on different issues between the two parties, in addition to intimidating the West by stopping the flow of oil to it following the closing of the Strait.

Furthermore, Iran’s threat to retaliate against the countries of the Gulf if sanctions are imposed on its oil is well known; the Iranian Mullahs may launch a mad campaign of threats and warnings on the countries of the Arab Gulf in this regard. And in light of this environment and these conditions, intimidation of the Arab Gulf countries may be closer to the Iranian mentality and intimidation may become its major priority, since Iran is too weak to stand against the entire world. Thus, the closing of the Strait is considered a red line, since it is a lively artery and (closing it would be) a provocation to the West and to the whole world. Its closing would stop a large percentage of oil exports, since approximately 40 percent of world oil exports passes through it; this would inevitably cause a war.

Nevertheless, after the U.S. threat was confirmed to Iran — that it would respond in a destructive way on an attempt to close the Strait — Iran retreated from its threat to close it, because this, in reality, would be tantamount to “the straw that broke the camel’s back” and would result in an all-consuming war: Suicide and nothing less. Moreover, Iran’s retreat from its threat to close the Strait clarifies Iran’s political blunder in terms of facing its internal and international problems. The same thing, in this case, applies to Greer’s saying: “Farazdaq’s allegation is that he will kill exponential numbers… I preach the length of welcome, squared.” Furthermore, supposing the closing of the Strait is realized, then the world — and especially the West — will not permit ships to leave or go to Iran, and thus Iran will have shot itself, since this popular proverb applies to it: “gone mad with sympathy for himself.” And with this, Iran’s economic situation will get worse and worse…