Edited by Mark DeLucas
Four Questions Concerning the Next War
Published in El Pais
(Spain ) on 2 February 2012
by Lluís Bassets (link to original)
(Spain ) on 2 February 2012
by Lluís Bassets (link to original)
Translated from
by Robin Salomon .
Edited by .
It will be in the summer, a time when wars stir up. Something is brewing in the middle of the presidential campaign, with Obama and Romney locked in the decisive fight. Thus it is a time of transition, when windows are open to unusual efforts. Everything will happen very quickly, with precision bombing carried out by unmanned aircraft and a larger bombing loaded with piercing shells. Then the answer will come, which could result in war. After all is said and done, nothing will be as it was before. To clarify the consistency of this story, which many want to avoid, one must answer a few questions:
1. Is Iran a threat? It is, without a doubt, despite all of the Iranian protests concerning the civil nature of its nuclear industry. Civil nuclear development leads to a technological threshold, called the zone of immunity, from which there is no setback. Despite the secret wars of Mossad against Iran, diplomatic pressure and embargoes, many signs indicate that a crucial point has already been reached, so that if exceeded, we would have to deal with a new nuclear power in the Middle East. Israel views this event as an “existential threat.” For the Saudi monarchy, this is an intolerable challenge to its hegemony in the Gulf region. And from the point of view of nuclear proliferation, an Iranian bomb would be an invitation to other countries in the region, including Egypt, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, who would follow the same path.
2. Is it possible to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat? There are theories for all tastes, although none consider it possible to happen without changing the regime. Iranians have learned from bombings carried out by Israel on the Iraqi and Syrian reactors in 1981 and 2007, respectively, to maintain facilities that are widely dispersed and protected, and in some cases, in unattainable depths not even reachable by megabomb busters. Pessimists believe that the nuclear program would be delayed a few months or a year, maybe; optimists think the uproar would happen in two years. Proliferators have learned from Saddam Hussein: The best way to avoid being attacked through proliferation is by already grasping the bomb. If you don’t have it, as happened to the Iraqi dictator, you will be attacked or perhaps even invaded — another argument to attack now.
3. What results could Israel obtain with a preemptive strike? This is the question where the area of uncertainty is greater. The capability of the Iranian military response is probably not as confident as to what their statements and gestures intend to show. They may try to close the Strait of Hormuz, attack Israel with missiles or launch a bombing campaign around the world. Oil prices will be affected. The Iranian opposition would be easily weakened, as they would be forced to close ranks with the regime on an issue that puts national pride at stake. A certain kind of anti-imperialism would be reignited, which had been hindered by the Arab Spring.
4. What kinds of effects would this produce on the geopolitical map? If there is great uncertainty regarding the immediate results of an attack, it is even greater concerning the effects on geopolitics in an area subject to an earthquake of change. Israel is at a crucial moment for their future in an unprecedented international isolation, imminent on Egypt’s direction. All this also plays with the possibility of rupture or modification of the Camp David peace treaty, which has guaranteed more than 30 years of stability on the western border. Jordan can also precipitate events toward a hardening of relations with Israel. Their only security is the unwavering friendship expressed by Obama, despite the less than ideal treatment he has given to Netanyahu. Israel needs to fully restore military deterrence in the area after the wasteful war in Lebanon and the only partially recovered one in Gaza. Sooner or later, Israel will have to negotiate with Islamic governments elected at the polls — in Egypt and Jordan at least, and perhaps in Syria — and under the new and unusual conditions of some constituencies and an Arab public opinion that will freely express its hostility. A preemptive strike against Iran may then be a show of force prior to a negotiation with the new agents of history in the Near East.
1. Is Iran a threat? It is, without a doubt, despite all of the Iranian protests concerning the civil nature of its nuclear industry. Civil nuclear development leads to a technological threshold, called the zone of immunity, from which there is no setback. Despite the secret wars of Mossad against Iran, diplomatic pressure and embargoes, many signs indicate that a crucial point has already been reached, so that if exceeded, we would have to deal with a new nuclear power in the Middle East. Israel views this event as an “existential threat.” For the Saudi monarchy, this is an intolerable challenge to its hegemony in the Gulf region. And from the point of view of nuclear proliferation, an Iranian bomb would be an invitation to other countries in the region, including Egypt, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, who would follow the same path.
2. Is it possible to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat? There are theories for all tastes, although none consider it possible to happen without changing the regime. Iranians have learned from bombings carried out by Israel on the Iraqi and Syrian reactors in 1981 and 2007, respectively, to maintain facilities that are widely dispersed and protected, and in some cases, in unattainable depths not even reachable by megabomb busters. Pessimists believe that the nuclear program would be delayed a few months or a year, maybe; optimists think the uproar would happen in two years. Proliferators have learned from Saddam Hussein: The best way to avoid being attacked through proliferation is by already grasping the bomb. If you don’t have it, as happened to the Iraqi dictator, you will be attacked or perhaps even invaded — another argument to attack now.
3. What results could Israel obtain with a preemptive strike? This is the question where the area of uncertainty is greater. The capability of the Iranian military response is probably not as confident as to what their statements and gestures intend to show. They may try to close the Strait of Hormuz, attack Israel with missiles or launch a bombing campaign around the world. Oil prices will be affected. The Iranian opposition would be easily weakened, as they would be forced to close ranks with the regime on an issue that puts national pride at stake. A certain kind of anti-imperialism would be reignited, which had been hindered by the Arab Spring.
4. What kinds of effects would this produce on the geopolitical map? If there is great uncertainty regarding the immediate results of an attack, it is even greater concerning the effects on geopolitics in an area subject to an earthquake of change. Israel is at a crucial moment for their future in an unprecedented international isolation, imminent on Egypt’s direction. All this also plays with the possibility of rupture or modification of the Camp David peace treaty, which has guaranteed more than 30 years of stability on the western border. Jordan can also precipitate events toward a hardening of relations with Israel. Their only security is the unwavering friendship expressed by Obama, despite the less than ideal treatment he has given to Netanyahu. Israel needs to fully restore military deterrence in the area after the wasteful war in Lebanon and the only partially recovered one in Gaza. Sooner or later, Israel will have to negotiate with Islamic governments elected at the polls — in Egypt and Jordan at least, and perhaps in Syria — and under the new and unusual conditions of some constituencies and an Arab public opinion that will freely express its hostility. A preemptive strike against Iran may then be a show of force prior to a negotiation with the new agents of history in the Near East.
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