A Western Gift to Russia

In the joint press conference that U.S. President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron held in Washington three days ago, both men asserted that they are not on a collision course with Russia over the Syrian crisis. In response to journalists’ questions, they frequently repeated that they are not striving to make strategic gains from the crisis at Moscow’s expense.

The interpretation of this united U.S.-British stance could be found in the postponement of the draft resolution to the U.N. Security Council that calls for starting the Syrian regime change process, which clears the way for international and Arab envoy Kofi Annan to explore the opportunity for mediation to end the violence and launch a political process that would end the crisis or at least contain its dangerous repercussions. But the actual significance of this U.S.-British stance, which seems to enjoy Western consensus and clear Arab opposition or reservation, is that it concedes to Russia’s authority in Syria and calls on the Kremlin to come up with an innovative solution that it deems appropriate. This may be changing President Bashar Assad’s regime or changing his behavior through a peaceful transition process, which so far has not been governed by any pre-conditions or deadlines.

The gist of the Western position is to provoke Russia into ending the Syrian crisis while keeping Syria as an ally and partner, which, it can be said, is the last such place for the Kremlin in the Arab and Islamic worlds and in the Mediterranean [region]. In this case, it does not and will not constitute any serious threat to any of the West’s allies, whether Israel, Turkey, Iraq or even Lebanon, with its modest and fragile size and its role in this regional context.

The matter does not constitute a Western concession or a U.S. gift to Russia. The Americans — who leave an important, rich country like Iraq and who are not interested in a no less important country like Egypt or even Libya and its ilk — do not see in Syria, especially in its current state, an attractive target or enticing spoils. They have given multiple indications that they are uninterested and disinterested in any serious military or political role in the Syrian crisis, the most recent of which being the Friends of Syria conference in Tunisia.

The Syrian fireball is in Russia’s court, which appears to have become more confused and hesitant, since it is with Assad’s regime at times, with a regime excluding him at other times, and sometimes with a Syria that excludes both of them. This is especially so after Russia realized that the West does not want to go into a “miniature Cold War” and haggle over that burning ball. And perhaps Russia suspects a Western ambush or an economic and political clash with the Persian Gulf states that could benefit the Western economy much more than fighting over a country that is losing its strategic value day after day.

It is now Russia’s turn to come forward with its special initiative that would make up for the certain failure of Annan’s mission.