Iran and War: The Thin Red Line

The thin red line is one that has unforeseeable conditions occur when it is crossed. It marks the point at which the detonation of a war could be inevitable. The problem is to define it, to delimit it. The problem is the responsibility of those who establish it, since one cannot look back if someone crosses it. The problem is sending messages and not having the awaited response, the potential conflict and its consequences get out of hand. The problem is that the actors involved understand it in a distinct manner.

The United States needs to avoid war. Without doubt, its interests are stability, control and the prediction of behavior in the strategic region. But apart from this, Washington is operating with the most elevated debt in all of its history and with a phenomenal fiscal deficit that not only does not help to resolve the problem, but also increases it daily. That is why the White House is looking in these moments for how to decrease its spending and its military bases, including embassies like that in Iraq. At the same time, at the root of the confrontation with Tehran, fuel prices are escalating without remedy, generating problems for the world’s economies already in a recession. If this were not enough, the United States knows that Russia completely opposes the Pentagon introducing itself into the Kremlin’s geopolitical strategic zone. Also, it seems that, in principle, it is not in the interests of Washington to dissatisfy Moscow at the moment with respect to this particular subject.

So, Obama then decides to draw his red line with total clarity, and this way communicates it, of course, precisely via Russia: The United States will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Period. However, and this is the key, having a nuclear capability does not necessarily implicate crossing the red line. Having the potential to elaborate a bomb as long as there is no assembly is something that Washington is willing to allow. But not Israel.

For Israel, the interests have nothing to do with the world economy, the supply or price of fuel, the deficit or American debt, but what it perceives as the most serious threat to its national security since 1948. In this sense, Israel has established something that seems to be a much thinner red line than the one drawn by Obama: In Tel Aviv’s vision, Iran cannot be able to have the capacity or potential to assemble a bomb, even if it does not assemble it. Furthermore, Ehud Barak has signaled a more delicate point: Iran is working to become immune from any attack on its nuclear installations, constructing sophisticated subterranean complexes that are deeper each time. The moment that Israel perceives that Iran is going beyond the immunity barrier, they are likely to detonate the attack, regardless of how advanced the nuclear program is. We are talking about months.

In every scenario, Israel would be capable of exerting limited damage after many complications — not eliminating — the Iranian atomic project, but this will not prevent attack. It is thought that Tehran’s response will be fierce, even though Israel is proving to have enormously developed its defensive powers in the face of the missiles that could be thrown at them. The conflict can be easily regionalized, involving actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon. The monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula are also interested in stopping Iran’s nuclearization, but it is difficult for them to collaborate in a war in which Israel was involved.

The question is that the subject gets complicated with regard to the United States, since the war games (recently documented by the New York Times) demonstrate that Washington would have to become entangled in the confrontation, even if it does not wish to do so.

This is one of those instances in which nobody wants a war, but everyone finds themselves moving along that direction in each day that passes. If it is true that the actors wish to explore last possibilities to minimize the risks of a conflict, they must exercise the utmost restraint in terms of the emitted rhetoric and, in exchange, send the necessary messages with total clarity. They must find a point in which Iran can feel that it has been able to deter or contain the West and feel victorious in the meantime, but at the same time not only the United States, but also Israel can co-exist with the result. Can they achieve this?