Lessons of the War on Iraq

Nine years have passed since the United States’ invasion of Iraq and the withdrawal of U.S. forces has been announced. Thus the black page of the occupation has been turned and the time has come to take away lessons and admonitions. This is a task that academics undertook to enlighten public opinion and prevent the repetition of mistakes, risks, and bitter experiences. If Bush had remained in power, he would have kept on acting rashly and announcing victory and the achievement of goals, as if regime change in and of itself is a historical task with which the United States is entrusted, despite the fact that what is actually happening is that all the stated U.S. goals have failed and the opposite has been realized.

The U.S. occupation did not produce a democratic country that is a model fit for other Arab peoples and countries to imitate, and it did not create a friendly, allied country for the United States in the region. In addition, it moved the element of strength from the Arab side to the Iranian side. And if all of this is not enough, the United States lost 4,000 soldiers and a trillion dollars and turned Iraq into an incubator for terrorism in which al-Qaeda terrorists do as they please.

U.S. academics have written ten studies concerning the war on Iraq, the first of which is that the United States lost the war and it cannot be allowed to be repeated. The second one deals with how it is clear that it is not difficult to drag the United States into war, while the third says that the decision to go to war was taken on an individual basis and was not preceded by true dialogue. The fourth study puts forth that there was exaggeration in the assessment of the stability of secularism and the the strength of the middle class in Iraq and therefore in the circumstances’ being ripe for democracy. The fifth talks about how the United States was exposed to treachery and ran the risk of making a fool of itself, so after now it will not be permissible to heed exiled politicians with ambitions to return to their countries on the back of U.S. tanks. The sixth study puts forth that managing the occupation is an extremely difficult process, while the seventh says that the invading force should not be surprised if the enemy defend themselves in various and unexpected ways. The eighth addresses the fact that a regular army’s confronting popular resistance is an ugly operation that leads to the committing of war crimes. The ninth study points out that good planning is not sufficient, while the final one states that it is the United State’s duty to reexamine its global strategy and not just its tactical measures.

In the United States as in Israel, no sooner does war end than a review and accounting for shortcomings and the learning of lessons start. And from the Arab side, no sooner are defeats realized than they are turned by the media into alleged victories and annual celebrations of triumphal holidays.