In accordance with the strategy popular among diplomats — “Nothing to do at home, one summit and they’ll leave you alone,” — no less than 53 heads of state and government, from all around the world, went to Seoul for a bit, so that they could have a place to return from. Not before, of course, their wives could benefit from two days of shopping and cultural programs, by which time the illustrious and oh-so-worried husbands were fussing over taking care of the world in plenary sessions and sections dedicated to the themes of security and nuclear safety. Naturally there had to be the well-deserved group photo and the signature on the useless final document, 99.9999 percent composed of sentences, the deluxe diplomatic content sounding something like, “Well, would it be to be … well, we’ll work and we will fight and fix it!” And, “Hopefully, there’s going to be peace!” Those that believe I’m exaggerating only have to look closely into the agenda and the communiqué of the summit in Seoul with the pompous and empty title of “Beyond Security, Towards Peace.”
To save you the effort, I’ll briefly tell you what’s what.
The story began two years ago, with the summit in Washington, the first in a cycle from which, very likely, there will be no easy escape. What added fuel to the fire was Iran and, to a lesser extent, North Korea. The topic is an ancient one, more precisely, its origins are from the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty: How do we make it so that we respect the sovereign right of the states to develop applications for nuclear energy and, at the same time, make sure that, under the shelter of sovereignty, military capabilities are not being developed (i.e. more straight talk), in other words, that they’re not manufacturing bombs? The answer to this question should have been given, according to the same treaty, by the International Atomic Energy Agency, an intergovernmental organization located in the institutional system of the United Nations. With the scientific tools and the authority of on-the-spot inspections, it should be able to say, at any given moment, whether the civil nuclear programs of a country have or have not taken the path of dangerous and illegal militarization. The inability to respond to this question in regards to Iran brought the IAEA full international recognition and fame, in the form of a Nobel Peace Prize! It was during this peak moment in which the politicking and the competition between the various big players in international relations turned an arbitrator-inspector into a player in disguise, which sheltered as much as it could the government in Tehran from accusations of hijacking its civil programs in favor of the military, giving it the historic opportunity of getting close to the brink of nuclear militarization.
All of this nonsense could not have, probably, justified such a summit. But it so happened that the peaceful nuclear power plants of Japan were hit by a mountain of water thanks to a giant earthquake. The result has been the most serious and prolonged nuclear safety crisis since Chernobyl. A wave of fear circled the world almost instantly, and it quickly mobilized politicians everywhere. In Germany, for example, in just a few months major decisions have been taken in regards to closing some existing nuclear capabilities, which were at the state of requiring major repairs, and in disposing of all others in the next few years!
Finally, the interests on the agenda for the American elections had their say. President Obama, running for a new term, needed something resounding, a success in the international fight against terrorism that would protect him from the furious attacks of his Republican opponents and that would give him the aura of a “world leader.” Nothing better than a Summit! If you take into account the hurry of the great high-level idle-ocracy of the UN to get noticed, based upon even the slightest opportunity, then this recipe for a summit meeting every two years has guaranteed success. And that’s how we arrive at Seoul 2012, after which there will be Netherlands 2014 and so on.
Despite the fact that the institutional and political approach is derisory, the problems that are hiding just behind the corner are very serious. No less than 480 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were lost in nuclear power plants from some states only in the last two years, sufficient fuel for the production of about 19 atomic bombs. Complications related to dealing with highly enriched uranium, its transformation into “depleted” material, the problems relating to the security processes, transport, handling, reports of attempts to dispose (through the black market) of special fissionable material and an appetite for bigger terrorist activities make the problem of the nuclear resources for civil programs one of international security and very complicated. The ridiculousness of the situation comes from the fact that anyone can see that there are legal and institutional tools to deal with the issue. Summits like the one in Seoul are nothing more than public image exercises for politicians that have nothing to do at home, an opportunity for wasting funds and for the heads of state and governments to chat among themselves, man to man. As we have seen, however, in the case of Obama and Medvedev, these chats may end up with heavy costs on the political level, especially if anyone makes sure to some microphones on that you could have sworn were off!
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