Bertrand Badie: “Obama’s Diplomacy Is Passive Hegemony”

Andres: Can we conceptualize or at least categorize the term “passive hegemony”?

David Gonzalez: How can we call “passive” a power that seeks to strengthen its hegemony, albeit declining, through various wars and the imposition of its mode of operation on other countries? American diplomacy is far from using only the so-called “soft power” that could give it its strength. Is it not rather the E.U. that could, ultimately, be termed “passively diplomatic”?

Bertrand Badie: The formula seemed appropriate: I do not want it to be synonymous with “soft power,” or even as a harbinger of any decline. The idea is primarily to distinguish the sequence of Obama’s administration from those that preceded it. When elected, Barack Obama certainly was not trying to put an end to American power and has never discussed or questioned the idea of U.S. leadership — or even that old messianic tradition imparting the U.S. a unique role of leadership in the world.

In fact, the new president initially sought a change in tone and method to distinguish him from George W. Bush and the neoconservatives. He intended to restore the United States by presenting them before the world as less aggressive, less inclined to conquest and to military action and more open to globalism, the variety of cultures and the plurality of worlds.

It was the case, in fact, that rebuilding the country’s leadership became presentable. This new tone was expressed in his famous speeches, which were delivered in Cairo in June 2009 and the one that he delivered to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2009.The difficult part was translating these new directions and ideas into an innovative practice. The result was disappointing for reasons to which we shall return. So, this change in form was accompanied by a kind of tetany that had provided no relation to the withdrawal, which was in accordance with the old “isolationist” model. The new president kept private a hegemonic strategy of proactive initiatives, which had been totally secret under his predecessor. Such rehabilitation was the effect of having abandoned the middle powers and the emerging countries or the hosts of diplomatic protest most defiant of international initiatives, in particular.

This is why I speak of “passive hegemony,” that is to say, a renewed leadership, which is more reactive than proactive, more dependent than ever on initiatives that are smaller than it is itself. Among the neoconservatives who have not waived their project, a current begins to emerge in American intellectual circles that describes the world as “non-polar” and warns against any outdated hegemonic models. Barack Obama has settled into an intermediate model, of which it may be too early to fairly assess its value.

Alex: You’re referring to a relative passivity vis-à-vis the foreign policy of George W. Bush. Could it also be a passive “front” in the margins of the discourse that you mention, where external operations would be based more on the CIA than on the diplomatic corps or the army itself?

Bertrand Badie: This is not entirely excluded. But if we return to the diplomatic face of American foreign policy, we must admit that Obama prefers quiet accommodation, such as with Russia or China: a rather wait-and-see attitude that is cautious towards Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But this is without ever erasing the fixed points of U.S. foreign policy on these issues, such as the unwavering support for Israel and the determination to avoid addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, with the premise of an absolute refusal to leave the Islamic Republic with access to nuclear weapons. Hegemony is still there, but the criticism of the neoconservative experiment regularly places high or risky initiatives outside of the selected issue.

Bill: Beyond the passive, is it not the hegemonic character that has long since begun to be questioned, with frequent strong joint stances on Russia and China, especially in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises?

Bertrand Badie: Yes, we are now touching upon the depths of the issue. We went from probably 1989 or 1991 into a sequence of international life that makes the idea of hegemony unproductive or impossible. Behind this, two ideas were traditionally found: the valuation of power and, in particular, the “superpower” and the desired adherence of the weakest to the latter (the “superpower”), especially to the idea of being protected. Today, globalization has eroded the power: By installing interdependence in the center of the international game, it has banned hierarchical and unilateral power. It has given the weak the capacity of blocking what weakens the most powerful and has projected the company to the center of the international arena. It makes the issues and conflicts be reduced to standard logic and especially military power.

At the same time, the end of the bipolarity and the East-West conflict made the need to protect infinitely less relevant, thus widening the autonomous strategies of “go it alone” and dispersing diplomatic initiatives. In short, the deviating diplomacy took precedence over the older diplomatic disciplines. However, the hegemony has never agreed to relinquish its role of yesteryear. Domestically, it is almost impossible to argue before the American public with the idea of a loss of leadership, though it is marked as messianic. Internationally, the situation is unprecedented: The hegemony collapses, not because of the rise of a new power able to supplant, but simply because the power pays less than before.

There is, therefore, no ready-made model of replacement. This apparent gap thus leaves room for a policy that is ultimately quite dull and unimaginative and a policy for the renewal of forced hegemony becomes impossible. It is in an artificial survival whose myth is evident throughout America’s losses in Iraq and Afghanistan and through the ability of a man — or a network — to challenge the superpower, or even through the ability of Israel to say no to the very prudent and polite suggestions made by the White House.

Game Over: How do you explain the discrepancy between the original speech and the practices within the four years of Obama’s presidency? The grip of Clintonites on diplomacy? The impotence of the United States to do what they want in the world like before? Anything else?

Bertrand Badie: You’re right: It’s a bit of all this and much more besides. First, the bet was risky: Change the tone without changing the substance and, in the absence of a built-in alternative, it had no chance of resulting in anything more than changes at the margin.

There is also a lack of relay in the international system: When the U.S. came out of neoconservatism, Europe entered the “soft” version of it. Suffice it to say that Barack Obama could not find a Western ally who would join him to be the counterpart to what was Tony Blair and George Bush …. And do not speak of Benjamin Netanyahu! Domestically, the sensibility is that Obama remains a minority even in the Democratic camp: The Clintonites who disagree with the diagnosis of the current president continue to hold the bulk of the Department of State, which deprives the White House diplomats of any successful relays. One not only recalls the names of Hillary Clinton, but also Richard Holbrooke and Dennis Ross …. One must also add the well-known effect of a thus far accurate system that cannot change its foreign policy so easily.

A final element to be considered: We are no longer in the international system of old, where the mighty had a real capacity for decision or negotiation. Today, the international order is a complex interplay of social factors, including countless actors. Hence, it is not subject to any discipline: One need only to look at the game of the Arab Spring to understand how the free choice of the hegemony is now paralyzed when dealing with such events. It is far from the time that the European consortium could hold an annual international conference to decide the fate of Piedmont, Greece, Poland and Belgium!

Zoe: Who are the real allies and enemies of the United States in the volatile regions of the world?

Bertrand Badie: Perhaps one of the great ambiguities of our world today is due to the expiration of this term. It is true that international relations are typically built around the concept of the enemy. But this is a generalized system of interdependence that makes one think of this game where everyone from our childhood was “held by the goatee.” China has no interest, for example, in the collapse of the United States and, in particular, of the U.S. economy. Its success does not rely on the failure of the opponent, as in the traditional model of enmity, but on a subtle interplay of cooperation with it. In fact, the enmity now exists only in “asymmetric” relationships, putting the U.S. with an opponent that is much less than they are themselves, like Iran or Korea North.

But can we still speak of enmity when the asymmetry facing state power is so uneven that the parties are unable to compete on the same registers? If the concept of enemy is thus questioned, if it was so hard to apply to existing sources of violence (al-Qaida, AQIM, etc.), the concept of an ally loses its meaning in turn. Can we, indeed, join forces if there is not a common enemy in front who is of the same type and the same weight? In fact, by stubbornly and constantly rehabilitating these old notions, we create an international game completely out of sync with new realities.

Americafirst: Since you seem to believe that neoconservatism is no longer currently relevant, what will be the new ideological structure supporting United States’ foreign policy?

Bertrand Badie: It is not at all certain that neoconservatism is no longer valid. First, it is an updated form of the old messianic model that profoundly affected the United States and, more generally, the Western world. It can be taken as the radical expression of a long history, of which there is no indication that it is now complete. Taking into account the Republican side, the primaries have even shown a bidding war between versions of neoconservatism that are different but equally intense: those of Rick Santorum, Newt Gingrich or Rick Perry … not to mention fans of the tea party. As for Mitt Romney, the neoconservative aspect is less clearly visible, but it remains a component of his discourse.

Let us take the Democratic side: Neoconservatism there definitely does not have the same harshness, but there is a more subtle component of the global ideological architecture. The idea of a “League of Democracies” is popular, which was extracted from Wilsonian dogma and which remains very strong, even in Obama’s entourage. It gives the Western democracies a custodian role of the world that is not far from the “Bush ideal.” Finally, Europe, overwhelmingly on the right, remains dominated by principles that are far from being incompatible with the neoconservatism across the Atlantic, especially since the left has given up forging a foreign policy alternative for some time.

Observer: Is the emergence of China as a military power and claiming a sphere of influence ranging from Africa to the Pacific not a key factor in this change of strategy? Moreover, can the U.S. allow themselves to continue spending on their defense with a budget like this (even if there is a clear economic benefit in terms of technological advances) to support a diplomacy that would be characterized by force?

Bertrand Badie: We must first note that Barack Obama has in no way cut into the U.S. military budget; on the contrary, it has slightly increased. His “passive dominance” is not about waiving the expression of leadership, but simply retaining or containing it. China, meanwhile, cannot be retained — at least not right now — as a military partner to the United States. The difference in the available budget means is huge. A “sphere of influence” in China has not, by any means, been built already. In any case, if it were to be formed, it would certainly not have the same meaning as the one given to this concept by the United States.

Beijing is not looking to build itself into hegemony but, rather, to continue to build and acquire its means of development — that is to say, its supply of energy and raw materials. So there is a difference between a conventional military power and what I call a “practical power,” which seeks an indeed rather cynical way to further its development.

Louis: Finally, what have been the achievements of Obama’s diplomacy over the last four years?

Bertrand Badie: A change of style, undoubtedly. A prudence, obviously, which frequently puts it behind in comparison with European diplomacy, and especially that of Nicolas Sarkozy (on Iran in particular). As a result, the tax is willingly low. A lucidity that allowed him to adapt to the Arab Spring — or at least its beginning — more efficiently than was the case on the Old Continent. But this does not amount to much if one seeks to qualify a real political alternative. That’s also “passive hegemony.”