Syria Between Clinton and Panetta

In Ankara, Clinton explored the possibility of establishing a no-fly zone in northern Syria, setting up a task force of Americans and Turks intent on intervention. However, Panetta considers the situation more complex and in need of a “major, major policy decision,” the details of which are yet to be revealed. The issue as a whole is not on the top of the agenda for the administration, since it is focusing on the last leg of the presidential elections.

Who do we believe then? Which of the two officials represents the state of things in Washington: Clinton or Panetta? Or are both representing one side of Washington’s position, which cannot be understood clearly unless we consider both accounts/positions together?

I don’t believe that we are witnessing just another example of internal conflict within an American administration. We have before us the formation of an American policy towards Syria in which each secretary addresses one of the successive stages of its implementation. Clinton mentioned a no-fly zone, but some have said that this does not mean American air forces and aircraft carriers will crack down on Syrian war planes and air defenses. The issue could be resolved through an intermediary, by arming the Free Syrian Army with Stinger missiles, which proved their effectiveness by defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, where they downed over 270 aircraft. The Lebanese press claims that after Clinton’s visit, Washington and Turkey solidified their intent to supply the Syrian opposition forces with these missiles on the condition that they remain under the supervision of the Turkish army, which can easily and quietly disperse them in northern Syria.

Panetta said nothing that refutes this assumption, despite his statement that deciding to impose a no-fly zone would be premature. The Secretary of Defense’s statements could be understood in the following way: After the elections, which Obama will most likely win, the “Syrian issue” will be the first of the issues that Washington will settle. It will be in a position to impose a no-fly zone and establish humanitarian corridors and safe havens through American/NATO/regional (specifically Turkish) forces. Then, it will be able to direct selective strikes on strategic Syrian targets, including al-Assad’s hideout, his presidential palace and the Syrian army’s command and control centers. By that time, efforts to prepare, train, arm and screen the Free Syrian Army will have come a long way. This army, along with what remains of the Syrian Army, will be entrusted with maintaining Syrian security after al-Assad.

Perhaps the discrepancies between the statements made by Clinton and Panetta extend no further than this. Washington long ago left the realm of a “political solution” to the Syrian crisis. Washington considers the overthrow of al-Assad the subject of its Syrian sentence. … As for the predicate, that will come later and depends on developments in the Syrian crisis. It is only in this context that Washington is interested in a larger presence in the field work being done in Syria.

Here we notice a shift in the American priorities regarding the Syrian opposition. The Syrian National Council is no longer an appealing partner for Washington for two reasons. First, it is subject to control by the Muslim Brotherhood, and Washington does not want to put all its eggs in the “political Islam” basket. Secondly, the liberals and seculars of this council are not in the best shape, being no better than Ahmed al-Jalabi, the leader who turned out to be a liar or a joke.

A lot of factors played a role in America’s decision to become involved in the domestic Syrian opposition. The Free Syrian Army played a central role in attracting American attention, just as the important defectors (Tlass and Hijab) played a similar role in the search for an alternative administration in the transitional period in Syria. The luster of the National Council and the opposition abroad has faded, so regional and international interest shifted to the actors on the ground, which excludes all forms of opposition from abroad.

If this interpretation is correct, then Washington is headed in the direction that Clinton and Panetta mentioned. But this does not necessarily seal Syria’s fate: The Syrian regime and its allies still have quite a few cards to play. The Lebanese press also revealed a surface-to-air missile formula for Stingers that the Syrian regime could arm the PKK with, thereby moving the battle to the heart of Turkey and the heart of the power struggle between the Turkish state and the revolting Kurds. The Syrian regime is still unexpectedly strong, despite the pressure and isolation it is currently facing. The Syrian Army is not showing enough signs of fracture or fatigue and continues to fight fiercely in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs. That is at least how things seem for now.

And for their part, Syria’s allies have yet to wave the white flag. According to Panetta and other sources, Iran hopes to establish a new “Jaysh al-Mahdi”* in Syria, and I don’t know what would stop the Lebanese Hezbollah from establishing a Syrian counterpart. Russia is entering a war for gas and warm water, battling to defend the Caucasus from Syria. China would like greater political power not based solely on buying American debt or figures from the Wall Street Journal. It is as if the battle for Syria were a microcosm of the world’s conflicts and the current balance of power, which makes it the most arduous test of unilateral action and the new international order.

*Editor’s Note: The Jaysh al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army, is a predominantly Shi’a paramilitary force that developed in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion. The group led the first major conflict in Iraq between U.S. forces and Shi’a fighters.