Only a Firm Hand Will Work with Iran

Did the never-ending Iranian crisis, which has now been going on for over a decade, turn a corner during the last meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, at the end of February? The 5+1 group (the United States, France, Russia, UK, China and Germany), who essentially represent the international community, presented Iran with a new plan designed to reestablish confidence and to engage in genuine negotiations regarding the nuclear program. More attractive than the prior offers, this proposal consisted of limiting the immediate demands on Iran — the most worrying of which lies in the domain of the enrichment of uranium by 20 percent — in exchange for a limited exemption from sanctions.

However, as it has been repeatedly demonstrated over the past few days through official statements, the Tehran media and “expert” Iranian opinions, this offer was perceived as the beginning of an agreement. If they are to be believed, the international community would have begun to accept the views of the Iranians and Tehran’s patience would have paid off. Therefore, it would be up to Iran to wait a little longer to achieve its ends. In other words, our good will has been interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Has the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, leader of the revolution and supreme decision-maker in this sphere, already made the decision to produce the bomb? We cannot be certain. But what is sure is that the closer Iran gets to the nuclear threshold, the more temptation there will be to cross this threshold. Since 1945, all of the countries that have invested as much as Iran has in a nuclear military strategy have ended up carrying it out, with the exception of those in extraneous circumstances such as changes in regime (Brazil at the end of the ‘80s) or international conflicts (Iraq in 1991). So what should be done? The international community’s strategy must include four elements.

Refining Sanctions

First, we must not falter on our immediate demands for 20 percent enriched uranium, which are designed to gain time and avoid an Israeli strike.

Second, sanctions must be refined by concentrating our efforts not only on those who have a more direct involvement with the nuclear program (and who have already demonstrated their competence at slowing down this program), but also on those who affect the assets and individual fate of Iranian leaders and guardians of the revolution — often businessmen. The sanctions can yield results, but they are only efficient in the long term. Yet, they have only truly been affecting Iranian power for a year; the very fact that Iran has since agreed to go back to negotiations shows that toughening sanctions can be effective. As for the Iranian population, it suffers endlessly from more disastrous economic management than the sanctions themselves.

Third, we must persuade Iran that it is possible to resolve its predicament while still allowing Tehran to save face. We know that a long-term solution would facilitate the enrichment of uranium by less than 5 percent (an indisputably “civil” rate) after a period of regaining confidence. After that, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have complete freedom to inspect the country in order to be satisfied that its nuclear materials are only being held for peaceful usage. Today, it is unable to give such an assurance.

The problem is that even those who would be ready to abandon the military option in Iran seem to believe that Western countries actually want a change in regime and, if Tehran were to relinquish its nuclear power, Iran would expose itself to an increase in political pressure. It is therefore up to us to persuade them that this is not the case. It is not a question of abandoning Iranian democrats and sacrificing human rights in favor of non-proliferation; we must find a way to separate these two issues.

Using Force a Viable Option

Fourth, we must convince Tehran that the United States’ use of force is a viable option, even if it is a last resort. Let us be clear: Nobody can wish nor recommend military action against Iran. But at the end of the first Gulf war in 1987-88,* the fear that the U.S. would declare war was instrumental in the decision of Imam Khomeini (1902-89) to demand a ceasefire. What is important for the Iranian leaders is safeguarding their power. They undoubtedly do not fear what would necessarily be a limited Israeli attack; that could even enhance the prestige of the regime. An American attack would be on a much larger scale and would be bound to target Iranian power resources such as bases and command centers of the guardians of the revolution.

We are mistaken to often reduce the nuclear crisis to a confrontation with the U.S. when, in reality, the conflict is between the UN and Iran and Europeans continue to play an essential part in it. But the United States still holds the key. Barack Obama must have tried everything; his calls for unconditional direct talks were rejected by Tehran in February once again. Nobody can deny his determination to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. He must now convince Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu of this determination, which will be one of the goals of his next visit to Israel. Essentially, is it up to Washington to prevent Israel from taking an initiative that could prove disastrous for the region, especially now that the war in Syria (in which Iran is playing an increasingly more involved role) is getting out of control and threatening to destabilize Lebanon and Iraq? Above all, Obama must persuade Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader of Iran) that pursuing Iran’s current trajectory will only end in jeopardizing his own power and that of the regime.

*Editor’s Note: The first Gulf war was in 1990-91; the war referred to here is possibly the Iran-Iraq War, which ended in 1988.