Japan Slowly Slipping from US Control

A few days ago during an interview with the U.S. magazine Foreign Affairs, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe re-emphasized the need to revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and turn the Japan Self-Defense Forces into a “national defense force.” If Japan succeeds in revising its constitution, its future direction and relations with neighbors in Asia as well as the U.S. will be profoundly affected.

Certain voices in Japan advocate revising the constitution to throw off postwar restrictions, both self-imposed and those introduced by foreign nations. Their main argument is that the postwar constitution was drawn up by the U.S. and forcibly imposed on Japan. Actually, the United States’ postwar control over Japan was motivated by two key purposes: to prevent Japanese militarists from pursuing reprisal and to use Japan to advance U.S. strategy for global domination. After the war, the U.S. General Headquarters (GHQ)* demanded that Japan write a new constitution. The draft produced by the Japanese preserved the emperor’s authority, which did not satisfy the Americans. Therefore, in February 1946, the GHQ put forth its own draft, which was deliberated over for three months before finally being passed by the Diet. The new Japanese Constitution embodied Japan’s national will to walk the path of peace.

Since then, the United States’ attitude toward the Japanese Constitution has changed several times. It began with a mood of approval in the early postwar period, which transformed into disregard during the Cold War, when it pushed Japan to expand its military to help contain the Soviet Union and China in spite of the laws in its constitution. Then in the 1980s, the U.S. began reprimanding Japan for freeloading off their security agreement, encouraging the nation to interpret the constitution more flexibly and share more in the United States’ defense burden. By 2001, after the Republican administration launched the Afghan War, the U.S. publicly pushed Japan to revise its constitution. However, the current Democratic administration under Obama appears to hold a more cautious attitude toward the issue.

Some U.S. strategists liken the U.S.-Japan alliance to a cork preventing Japan from becoming a militarist power. But in fact, it is more like an eggshell within which Japan’s right-wing forces and military power develop like some strange bird, awaiting the right conditions to eventually break out of its shell. In the 1970s, for example, Shintaro Ishihara and others proclaimed to the U.S., “Japan can say no.” Now he is expressing that as a technologically advanced military power, Japan should discuss the possibility of acquiring nuclear armaments. The U.S. is gradually losing its influence and control over Japan. We foresee that if the Liberal Democratic Party receives a two-thirds supermajority from the House of Councillors in support of constitutional revision after the election in July, this strategy will inevitably proceed.

Japan has a history of allying itself with leading powers. It formed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and the German-Italian-Japanese Alliance in 1940.** Under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan at the time, it launched a war against Russia under the former alliance and against China and the U.S. under the latter. After World War II, Japan allied itself with the U.S. but has not since invaded any nation; one of the key reasons has been the restrictive effect of the new constitution. Once this constitution is revised, not only will Sino-Japanese relations be severely affected, but the U.S.-Japanese alliance will also face major new choices. The U.S. could be led by the nose by Japan to join in military confrontation against China on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Alternatively, under constant threat from the Japanese right wing that the nation may go nuclear, the U.S. could be forced to take Japan’s side on every major issue, thereby losing its dominant position in the alliance. Or, reaching the limits of its tolerance for Japanese right-wing aspirations, the U.S. could move to contain it, creating a rift in the alliance fueled by differences in outlook on history and war.

The author is Vice President of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University.

*Editor’s note: This is a reference to the position of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, known in Japan as General Headquarters, established during the occupation of Japan after World War II.

**Editor’s note: This alliance was known as the Tripartite Pact and established the Axis Powers of World War II.