The Untenable Weakness of the United States

“How many mines does it take to make a minefield?”

“None; you only need a press release.”

This surreal dialogue took place in 1991.* A journalist asked the question during a press conference. General Schwarzkopf, at that time commander of the U.S. Army during the Gulf War, gave the answer. Tom Clancy used his response as an example to emphasize U.S. power: To terrorize the enemy, only a press release is needed, especially if the weapon in question is as insidious and invisible as a mine. Twenty-two years have passed since, and it appears that the balance of power has shifted. For al-Qaida — a terrorist organization created following the Gulf War to avenge the presence of “infidel” soldiers in a territory deemed sacred to Islam — less than a press conference was needed to close down American embassies in 20 Muslim countries and to evacuate American citizens from Yemen.

A phone call from al-Zawahiri, an al-Qaida ideologue, to his Yemeni lieutenants was sufficient to cause the biggest diplomatic retreat in American history. The State Department has taken the threats of attack from the past few days very seriously. The Yemeni secret service confirmed the threats, which claims to have tracked 25 al-Qaida militants who clandestinely entered the capital in the last few days with the intent to carry out an attack. Yemen did not reveal the suspects’ names until yesterday.

According to New York Times intelligence sources, al-Zawahiri’s phone call represents the greatest threat to U.S. security since 2001. Similar warning signs were not considered threatening enough in September 2012, when a crowd of extremists attacked the embassy in Cairo and that same evening when terrorists assaulted the consulate in Benghazi, killing Ambassador Christopher Stevens in the process. Then, the Department of State did not consider the threat of an attack on the 11th anniversary of 9/11 very likely.

Anyway, it is true that an ambassador had been sent to Benghazi (which is not even the capital of Libya) on a secondary diplomatic mission that lacked military security, as most of the security was entrusted to local forces. Maybe not entirely reliable [local forces], to put it mildly. The CIA was aware of obvious and numerous warning signs, as the declassified documents from the congressional inquiry show. The State Department had taken for granted that post-Gadhafi Libya as well as post-Mubarak Egypt (but particularly Libya, freed from its dictator courtesy of an American military intervention) were friendly toward the U.S. Failure to prevent September 2012 and the “overprevention” happening these past few days of summer 2013 seem to be two opposing extremes. However, in the eyes of an al-Qaida leader, both may be perceived as strong signs of weakness.

In the former case, the U.S. was neither able to protect its ambassador, nor react to the offense. In the latter case, however, the U.S. has even given up defending its diplomatic missions, instead closing them momentarily as a security measure. In reality, both episodes are two sides of the same political coin: The total lack of confidence that the U.S. shows in its own strength abroad. In the first case (Sept. 11, 2012), security was taken for granted because it had been entrusted to local forces in countries considered friendly. Washington did not count on its strong forces abroad, even in unstable places such as Benghazi. If the U.S. did not intervene with force — neither during nor after the assault at the consulate — it was because they did not want to antagonize a country that they had helped to liberate. It was not because they have not had the chance to [intervene]; technically, it would have been possible to intervene even during the two-hour clash in front of the consulate.

In the second case, however, the State Department has fully realized that at least 20 diplomatic missions are at risk. But it does not ask for Marines to protect them, although it could do so. As soon as the jihadist threat becomes serious, the State Department opts to close its shops, at least for a few days. Washington prefers not to act, in an attempt to avoid antagonizing Arab states from the outset. This [preference] means that by now, it is taken for granted that every U.S. military presence abroad is fraught with losses. Since the beginning of time, however, a nation that is considered the most powerful in the world should be recognized by the power it projects abroad, for its ability to intimidate and/or have everybody’s respect without even firing a single shot. For its ability to win a battle with a single press release? Not yet.

*Editor’s note: The original author mistakenly attributes this exchange to Schwarzkopf and a reporter. Instead, it appears in Tom Clancy’s book, “Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship” as a means to introduce another question posed by Schwarzkopf: “Have you ever been in a minefield?”