The Anthropologists from the CIA. Anthropological Weapons

Anthropological Weapons

The Americans wanted to decrease war losses, so they founded a socio-cultural research unit which remains a part of the CIA.

Tracy St. Benoit is leading an anthropological research project in Afghanistan, but she was not hired by any university, nor think tank, nor even a scientific institute, but the American Army. In 2007 her interest was drawn to why the Pakti province would so often be the scene of suicide attacks against the coalition troops, mostly carried out by so called black widows, or women who lost their husbands and are ready to become martyrs for their religion. Benoit observed that indeed, Pakti was full of jobless widows without any profession, work, or means of support. Many of them, under the influence of the fanatical recruiters get convinced to participate in suicide attacks against the western forces as their situation seems hopeless. In addition to this, their sons join the Taliban partisan groups, as this is the only way to earn some money for their mothers.

Benoit suggested that training should be organized for the lonely widows in Pakti, informing them of the coalition and their mission in Afghanistan, and most of all that they should participate in some vocational courses. Later, some job positions should be opened for them, according to their qualifications. The results surpassed all expectations. In just a few months the number of attacks dropped several times and – instead of collaborating with the Talibs – the women dedicated themselves to gardening, weaving and other activities.

Benoit was in one of the first five filed teams of cultural anthropologists, allocated around Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007, as a part of the new military unit called Human Terrain System. This is the first military unit within the CIA consisting of cultural anthropologists. Its main goal is to decrease American Army losses resulting from so called cultural illiteracy in such exotic places like Iraq or Afghanistan, where the wars are conducted. “The decision to form the unit was made in 2005” – says Joshua Foust, a journalist from Washington reporting on the Afghanistan War. “I am surprised that it was not made earlier, as the war in Afghanistan started in 2001, the war in Iraq started two years later and it was easy to predict that cultural anthropologists would be needed.”

“The lack of knowledge on tradition, languages and culture of the countries where the United States use their forces led to several misunderstandings: in the first stage of war, the soldiers did not know when it is allowed and when not to enter the Muslim house”-says Foust, “or how to address women, how to speak with the seniors, what the local holidays are and how to act so as to not insult the locals.”

War Discipline

It took two years to prepare the Human Terrain System. The success of the first five units allocated in the war zones was so big, however, that it was decided to add 31 within a year, and the unit’s budget was increased several times to reach 150 million dollars a year. “The HTS team consists not only of scientists that were recruited from universities, but also of retired military, former intelligence officers, and translators who want to extend their careers.” -says Foust.

And even though it seems that the unit’s activities can only bring benefits, the scientific world boiled after it was established. The Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) issued a statement in which it stands against the practice of “unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.” A debate started among American anthropologists about the limits of the ethical involvement of social science in politics and war, and it is still on.

The supporters of HTS argue that the project helps to minimize the losses not only for Americans, but for the nations they fight against as well, especially among civilians and kids. And that cultural anthropology was emerging as a “war discipline” that used to be an instrument of the colonialists.

The opponents say that the program is shallow, trite, expensive and difficult to modify. Another claim says that it only refers to external behaviors. John Stanton, the author of the only book on HTS so far, criticizes that HTS had been successful in advising a U.S. military unit in Iraq on proper mealtime etiquette; i.e., not only how to properly eat, but also the gestures during the meal, and especially how to observe the Ramadan feast.

The more important controversy refers to the question of if anthropologists from academic circles should participate in any research ordered by the army at all. The program is “betraying basic ethical standards for protecting the interests and well-being of studied populations,” says Prof. David Price.

“From what I have seen, HTS is doing a good job, but I am not surprised with the controversy,” says Foust – “although some objections probably result from the fact that the large part of the academic circle in the U.S. is sympathizing with the left wing, if not with neo-marxism.”

The Analysis of the Russian Soul

HTS might be the first military unit in history consisting of cultural anthropologists, but it is not the first time when such specialists flirted with the army. During World War II, anthropologists from Columbia University, under the leadership of prof. Ruth Benedict analyzed “Japanese soul” to help in figuring out an efficient strategy against Japan.

Benedict summarized her research in the bestselling book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. From the beginning, the introduction states clearly that, unlike today’s cultural anthropologist, she had no ethical issues whatsoever. The United States was attacked in December 1941 in Pearl Harbor by Japan, an enemy of an entirely different culture and mentality. It was necessary to do all the best to learn about it and adjust the best possible strategy to its mentality, culture and ethical patterns. Benedict and her team made their research among more than one thousand Japanese internees in the U.S. The surveys showed that this was a very disciplined nation, obedient to authorities and the best way to avoid a blood bath after invading Japanese territory would be to ask for the Emperor to convince his subordinates that it made no sense to stand against Americans.

So was, more or less, the American strategy against Japan (although first they broke the Japanese spine by dropping two nuclear bombs). It proved to be successful. It convinced the Department of Defense that it was worth it to make investments in cooperation with cultural anthropologists

When the Cold War started, they got another assignment of creating a picture and strategy against Russians, the largest nationality of the Soviet Union and America’s main opponent. The research initiated in the 1940s did not go as well as the research on the Japanese people, perhaps because of Ruth Benedict’s death, or maybe because of the Russians living in the U.S. who would often contradict themselves and stand against the anthropologists, accusing them of being anti-Russian. They also were making sure the research lasted longer, as they were paid for each day of their participation in the program.

As a result, there were no different conclusions than the usual ones: that the Russians are subordinate to power and they feel well in the authoritarian regime. The interesting thing is the reason for such passiveness, as Americans believed. When analyzing iconography, films, literature and particular stories, as well as relations from people traveling to Russia, Geoffrey Gorer’s team discovered that Russian infants are wrapped in cloth diapers like in cocoons, having no possible way to move. This was the tradition coming from Byzantine and resulting from practical reasons. When the baby is wrapped in this manner, it cries less, is easier to take to the field and is well protected from injuries. The problem is that it can’t send or receive any impulses, as opposed to its peers who are raised in more relaxed ways. And after being unwrapped, after the ninth month of their lives, they have no sense of their bodies and move like bears.

Gorer’s team, in which Margaret Mead (another famous scientist) took part, claimed that such a way of handling babies was crucial for shaping Russian cultural patterns, including specific relations between the individual and power. The conclusions were not useful for the army, but the book The People of Great Russia, published in 1949, describes the project in detail, and is really fascinating.

Know-how from Vietnam

In the 1960s, an attempt was made, on CIA orders, to involve anthropologists and social scientists in researching Latin American societies. The Americans wanted to determine the threshold of their resistance to repressions and brutality of the ordinal forces in the countries governed by dictators sympathizing with Washington. The program was cynical and utilitarian. The case was made public by the social scientists from Chile, who felt insulted and refused to take part in the research, feeling that it treated them in an instrumental way. Moreover, there was a letter from the Special Operations and Research Office, showing that it was initiated and paid for by the CIA. The scandal was so big that the Camelot Project went under Congressional hearings, and the project was suspended. The media furiously reported on the army’s attempt to use science for accomplishing their goals in such a ruthless way.

The anthropologists would work in Vietnam too, but their work did not bring any significant benefits. The scientists were from the special support unit CORDS, which was based on the belief that the war would ultimately be won or lost not on the battlefield, but in the struggle for the loyalty of the people. As we already know, it didn’t work.

The diagnosis was good but – as historians working on CORDS conclude – the program started too late and ended too soon. But it is CORDS that should be considered as a precedent to HTS. “We still don’t know much about the activities of the anthropologists in uniforms, as they are part of the intelligence, even though open” says Foust. The official document of the Department of Defense says that the program is so successful that the research and HTS units will be moved to Africa, Latin America and even Mexico – to battle drug smuggling. There are not many publications dedicated to the program, but in them we can see the pictures taken during trainings that are not of military character, and look more like university classes. The participants wear civilian clothes and sit around, just like in the class, although they wear uniforms in the field.

In 2008, the American Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates announced the new scientific program called the Minerva Initiative. It is aim was to attract social science specialists to work on five issues: terrorism, China, Iraq, Islam and another one, which is supposed to be open. It divided the academic circle again, however became less controversial than HTS, as it was determined to be more based in science than military.

The controversy around HTS shows how ethical standards within cultural anthropology evolve with time. Its beginnings in the colonial times, when it was used for effective exploitation of other nations, were analyzed and judged. Anthropologists’ roles changed as well. Nowadays, it is believed that if an anthropologist knows how to get someone’s trust then they should stay loyal and never use the knowledge they get for any practice that could harm the subject or make the subject’s situation worse. In the case of Iraq or Afghanistan, it is not so unambiguous.