Wiretapping: Culture ShockBetween Washington and Berlin

Intelligence operations create a dynamic that eventually spirals out of control. Intelligence capabilities are growing exponentially. But is it always wise to use them? One person who expresses his reservations in a small group has held top security posts in several U.S. administrations. While distancing himself from the positions of the National Security Agency, he answers, or attempts to answer, the aggressive criticism expressed by several European dignitaries. “I want to understand,” says one critic, “how a single contractor from the Booz Allen firm may have access to such potentially shattering information?”

Far from subsiding, the Snowden case deepens every day with new revelations, to the point of seriously poisoning the existing atmosphere between America and its European allies. The most symbolic element of the case, undoubtedly its climax, concerns relations between Angela Merkel and Barack Obama. It indeed shows the encounter between two experiences, two cultures and two people who thought they had established a relationship between them of trust and who no longer understand each other. Angela Merkel can only overreact learning that her phone has been tapped since 2002, even before she became chancellor. She comes from East Germany, a country that used systematic wiretapping of its citizens as a method of government, if not a way of life. Angela Merkel could have been a heroine in the wonderful movie, “The Lives of Others.” The dubious NSA exploits remind her too forcefully of those equally routine Stasi practices of yesteryear. What was the purpose of carrying out a low-key “de-Stasification” in the reunified Germany, only to be faced with similar practices by their American friend and ally? Hasn’t Germany become the heart of Europe as its most powerful country, after decades of being the best student of the Atlantic class? Berlin was justified in having become the most-listened-to Washington ally, but it did not expect to be so in the literal sense. Angela Merkel feels betrayed and hurt and expresses the depth of her disappointment from her profound personal experience, with an assertiveness which she can claim after her triumphant last re-election. She wants an apology and the assurance that “it will not happen again.”

As for the Americans, although some embarrassment begins to emerge, they live in a different world. Beyond the dual argument, “everyone spies on everyone,” and “if you only knew how much you should be thankful for, we have not kept an eye, but an ear on you,” there exists a particular culture, which is not just the result of the 9/11 attacks, contrary to what the head of the NSA, General Alexander, would have us believe. This case is a perfect example of American exceptionalism, that is to say, the United States’ deeply rooted belief that its previous history and its current responsibilities give it additional rights to its duties to common nations. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, exceptionally held in New York in January 2002, it was necessary to acknowledge the city’s resilience in the aftermath of the tragedy. I found myself chairing a closed meeting between the heads of the major Western security countries. I still remember the frustrations/complaints against Washington, expressed by the security chiefs of Anglo-Saxon countries, supposedly associated with the United States through reciprocal agreements. “You do not think of us as equals,” they said. “We give you all the information we have. You do not do the same!” Like a Frankenstein devouring its creator, would the hydra of American security services shirk control? Barack Obama’s personal inexperience regarding security and information, which causes him to act like a “child” around his generals and chiefs-of-staff, also played a part. While his departments indulge in an escalating war among themselves, undoubtedly as they have always done and all the more tempting because it is technically increasingly possible, the president isn’t putting a brake on the enthusiasm of his staff because of his lack of experience in the area. The culture of “The Lives of Others” up against that of “Three Days of the Condor” could only result in a rude shock. In reality, it would be advisable to find a new code of conduct between allies and do so without too many illusions and naiveté.

“Capabilities create intentions,” said Raymond Aron. The technological capabilities of wiretapping will continue to grow, as will the irresistible temptation to use them for a good cause. Lacking an alternative choice, the United States remains and will continue to remain a mainstay of world order. This is not a Europe, increasingly dominated as it is by Germany, which could stand as an alternative. A little more caution, if not suspicion, in what is expressed and a little more self-restraint in the pursuit of information are likely to be needed. It is precisely because there is no alternative to America that it must show itself to be more accountable in the use of its technological superiority. In an ideal world Washington would “listen to” its allies better and “listen in” on them less.