America’s Coming of Age in Dealing With China

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden urged us to handle our differences through constructive methods during his meeting with President Xi Jinping on Dec. 4. If Biden spoke from the heart, it demonstrates a newly acquired maturity on the part of the U.S. vice president and government. Although the words were somewhat forced by circumstance, at the very least they also show that some policies of the world’s sole superpower still possess merit as it juggles a plethora of complex international issues.

The topics under discussion during Biden’s visit were many and varied, but it is clear that the air defense identification zone has quickly become an issue of utmost sensitivity for the U.S. since its announcement, as the U.S. has already openly called for China to revise the terms of the zone. Neither side can afford to skirt the issue. Any breakdown in communication or increase in misgivings will cause the new great power relationship built by both nations to suffer. To address this, then, in Biden’s words, we must use constructive methods to handle our differences.

When the U.S. established its air defense identification zone in 1950, the zone was extended several hundred nautical miles out beyond its territorial waters, reaching deep into international waters. The U.S. requested that foreign aircraft declare themselves prior to entering the zone, but this did not lead to an expansion of U.S. territorial waters, nor were foreign aircraft prohibited from entering the region. Instead, the U.S. dispatched fighter escorts as a form of pressure when deemed necessary.

Sixty-three years after the creation of the United States’ air defense identification zone, China has finally taken its own first steps in that direction; in doing so, it has drawn upon the experience of others. First, the East China Sea air defense identification zone encompasses China’s own exclusive economic zone and a portion of international waters, with the objective being obtaining sufficient forewarning. Second, China has not subsequently expanded its territory or territorial waters. Third, foreign aircraft should declare themselves to China as they enter our air defense identification zone for purposes of aiding identification. Fourth, if they are unwilling to cooperate, China has a certain degree of independent identification capability that it may use to maintain its national security. Fifth, regardless of whether foreign aircraft comply with the regulations, anything constituting a threat to our sovereign interests within the zone will be met with appropriate measures undertaken by Chinese military forces as required by the situation. International law gives every nation the right to freedom of navigation and freedoms of the air in international waters and airspace. The freedom of foreign aircraft over international waters and right to peaceful aviation in airspace over the exclusive economic zone beyond territorial waters should not be eroded by the establishment of the air defense identification zone, per considerations already made at the time of the zone’s announcement.

Even so, because this is China’s first air defense identification zone, its intentions must be made known to the world via public statements, explanations and communication. China’s “modus operandi” has not been established; the world has yet to become fully accustomed to China’s behavior through its dealings with the outside world. The attitude of using constructive methods to handle differences as expressed by Vice President Biden reflects a positive tilt in the politician’s handling of complex international matters. China has similarly shown its balanced principles and a high degree of sincerity. On Dec. 4, our government expressed that China is willing to maintain dialogue and communication with Japan on relevant technical issues on a basis of equality and mutual respect, collectively maintaining flight order and security within the airspace in question. Thus, if Japan can be pragmatic in recognizing the existence of a dispute over sovereignty in the East China Sea, ceasing the continued attacks to our rights and interests and opening the door for collaboration on security and development, then the area can become a zone of cooperation rather than one of danger.

The author is executive dean of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies.