Biden’s Visit to East Asia Tests the United States’ ‘Balancing Act’

As the year comes to a close and winter thickens, another storm of change sweeps across the Asia-Pacific region. China’s demarcation of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea has incited a heated reaction from Japan and has successively pushed the United States, Japan and South Korea closer to a trial. At this sensitive moment in time, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s tour of East Asia largely serves to test the United States’ “balancing act.”

It should be observed that the dispute between China and Japan over the East China Sea air defense identification zone is merely a tactical dispute. The United States’ chief strategic interests lie in how to coordinate its Asia-Pacific allies and seek an avenue for peaceful coexistence between China and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific, thereby ensuring its dominant status in the region. America’s “balancing act” in the Asia-Pacific is no easy task. It must focus on four key factors.

The first is the strategic balance between China and the United States. This is a matter of whether the two countries can realize the goal of building a new major power relationship. A strategic balance between China and the United States does not indicate that the two countries are equally matched, but rather questions how the U.S. and China can gain mutual satisfaction through mutual understanding. Preventing conflicts and controlling crises play especially critical roles in this question. To that end, while the United States is continuously pressuring and testing China, it will also seek to mitigate issues. This goal of mitigation, however, is not only intended to avoid conflicts, but also to develop principles that promote the systematization and transparency of bilateral relations. Although Biden will consider how to harmonize the conflicts between China and Japan on this visit, realizing the Sino-U.S. strategic balance will remain one of his major objectives. Sino-U.S. relations are wide-ranging and complex; there are many issues that need confronting. In addition to strengthening cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, China and the United States must join hands to combat many issues on a global scale. The two countries cannot lose sight of the big picture over a minor air defense identification zone incident.

The second is the balance between the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies. America’s Asia-Pacific allies are the important backbone of its implementation of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, the differences in strategic objectives and divergences in strategic interests between the U.S. and its allies have also led to incessant quarreling amongst themselves. Japan is using China’s air defense identification zone demarcation to launch an attack, utilizing the old maxim “the crying baby gets the milk.” On his visit to Japan, Biden will consider appeasement, but more importantly how to strengthen the United States’ allies, coordinate responses and thereby ensure stability in the East China Sea.

Simultaneously, the United States also intends to bring together its Asia-Pacific allies to strengthen cooperation, thus propelling the transformation of the U.S. and its allies into a fan-shaped net across the region. Among Northeast Asian countries, its cooperation with Japan and Korea is the most crucial. However, over the course of the past 60 post-war years, Korea and Japan have lacked sufficient internal power to strengthen security cooperation; the outlook is not promising. Aside from this, the United States must also coordinate with its allies on a multitude of other issues, including security and the economy. How to provide security appeasement in exchange for economic concessions presents further difficulties.

The third is the United States’ internal strategic balance. The crux of the U.S. strategy to rebalance the Asia-Pacific lies in whether it can realize a balance between its own objectives, means and resources. Prior to this, Obama’s absence from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit due to domestic issues revealed that the United States is sometimes inadequate to the task of rebalancing the Asia-Pacific. That Biden’s visit is focused on China, Japan and South Korea suggests that he is by no means making up for the regret of Obama’s absence. Fundamentally, America’s formidable strength is its cornerstone for the rebalancing of the Asia-Pacific. If the United States blindly persists in holding China as an opponent or an enemy, it will forfeit the strategic initiative in the implementation of balance. In fact, there are too many difficulties for the United States to cope with in rebalancing the Asia-Pacific. The majority of the issues lie within the United States itself and not within China; the U.S. must do some self-reflection.

The fourth is promoting the balance between China and the United States’ Asia-Pacific allies. The United States’ rebalancing risks are amplified in the face of China’s accelerating development and its allies’ increasing anxiety. On one hand, the United States will need to rely on its allies to implement rebalancing and push them to the forefront; on the other hand, the U.S. worries that in so doing it will accidentally set off an explosion between its allies and China, plunging everyone into a difficult predicament. Therefore, the United States’ interests in promoting balance between its allies and China are enormous. America plays the role of an honest broker to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation between its allies and China, integrating both sides and hedging risks. South Korea’s recent deliberations on promoting strategic dialogue between China, the U.S. and Japan can be seen as a type of test; Biden’s visit to Korea may thus strengthen consensus.

Ling Shengli is a doctoral candidate at the China Foreign Affairs University Institute of International Relations and special commentator for Haiwai Online.