An Error Reveals that USAID Is Meddling in Cuba

Details of a $6 million U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plan to destabilize the Cuban government were discovered thanks to documents that were sent without a secret-level classification over an unencrypted line to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

This error clearly exposes that the amount budgeted in USAID initiative SOL-OAA-13-000110, launched on July 10, 2013, was destined for at least 20 counterrevolutionary organizations that had requested financing to carry out subversive activities that were to be entrusted to them with the intention of toppling the communist regime.

Details of the plan, which were inadvertently divulged, included proposed budgets, forms for monitoring and evaluating progress, organizational charts and past experience gained by implementing organizations through other destabilization projects as permitted under the Helms-Burton legislation approved by the U.S. Congress in 1996 to reinforce the embargo.

Section 109 of the law authorizes the U.S. government “to furnish assistance and provide other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba,” a euphemism that lays the foundations for and legalizes U.S. meddling in the internal affairs of Cuba — a flagrant violation of international law.

USAID, directly under the U.S. secretary of state, has official responsibilities for offering development credit, technical assistance, emergency funds and other forms of assistance to foreign countries. However, it is very well-known that the U.S. government, consistent with its international policies, uses the development agency as a vehicle to destabilize and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

As a result of USAID’s dark history of interference in Latin America and in defense of their national sovereignty, several countries have expelled USAID country representatives as personae non gratae.

As a government agency, USAID often uses nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement activities. NGOs, in turn, may use other subcontractors whose directors and staff are not held to the same standards as USAID would be held to as a government agency.

A large portion of NGOs contracted by USAID to undertake activities are neither nongovernmental not independent; rather they are phantom organizations created to undertake the dirty work. This creates murky financial management.

This situation has exposed the conflicts between USAID and these NGOs that supposedly foment democracy in Cuba. The majority of the NGOs’ ultimate beneficiaries are counterrevolutionary Cubans living on the island or in the United States who, because of their illegal or shadowy character, cannot meet appropriate financial controls.

The directors and spokespersons of the NGOs complain that their work is obstructed by USAID’s lack of security and its exaggerated reporting requirements.

In 2011, Washington-based Freedom House voluntarily returned $1.7 million in grant funds that had been destined to support activities against Cuba after complaining that USAID was asking for too much information regarding how the funds would be used, including the identities and itineraries of participants.

NGOs that are directly responsible for implementing terrorist actions overseas or actions that are prone to detection by their targets feel that USAID’s reporting requirements are too onerous and increase the risks of their operations. The aforementioned $6 million plan to destabilize the Cuban government which included such disadvantages was discovered because USAID did not exercise appropriate security measures, enabling the discovery of specific budget amounts as well as project objectives and activities.

It is indeed very curious that NGOs refuse to reveal the activities that their proposed envoys would undertake since the activities are supposedly directed toward fomenting democratic development in a country they say they are helping.

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