Obama in the Field: There Is Life After America

The news of the capture of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-era prime minister, Hesham Qandil, as he attempted to escape to Sudan was the last nail in the coffin for the Muslim Brotherhood as a governing movement. It can’t even be said that the Muslim Brotherhood returned to its original status of the days of Mubarak. Since the takeover by General el-Sisi, the movement has been in a deep crisis and its leaders scattered everywhere.

The Brotherhood is struggling to pick a strategy of action: passive opposition to the governing generals, violence or cooperation. The warnings concerning the shutdown of Egypt and its civilian and economic systems by the Brotherhood proved to be highly exaggerated. The movement thought to be the country’s most efficient political power turned out to be an ideologically unified group of believers that still lacked any organizational or operational ability. Even the accusations according to which “the Brotherhood stole the revolution from the Egyptian youth” were true. Without the younger generation, the Brotherhood is incapable of functioning as an opposition. It is doubtful whether they had any chance of toppling Mubarak by themselves.

Above all, General el-Sisi stands out as a determined and sophisticated opponent to the Muslim Brotherhood. Attempts to attach foreign interests, corruption or heresy of Islam to him — three constant accusations against Egyptian leaders — have failed. El-Sisi is a devout Muslim, there is no evidence against him of corruption, and he is amid a confrontation with the American government. The fact that the general-led government accepts his backup from the Gulf States (except Qatar), not from Washington, contributes to his credibility on the streets of Egypt and clears him of any suspected foreign influence.

The past few months have taught Cairo — and possibly also most of the moderate society in the Arab world — that there is life even without American support. In retrospect, it seems that the administration was not sufficiently aware of the hostility stirred by its involvement (in the name of democracy, of course) for the Islamic and Shiite protesters and rebels. The turning point was in Bahrain, where the principality chose to suppress the Shiite protests despite criticism from America. Only after the Gulf States decided to provide Bahrain with military assistance, even coercing Qatar into stopping Shiite-sympathetic coverage on al-Jazeera, did the administration realize it had bet on the wrong side. This was too late. Washington paid the heavy price for this mistake after the revolution in Egypt, when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE hurried to stand alongside the generals and even handed over extensive economic assistance to the new authority.

The ball is now in Obama’s court. He has the power to accept the reality of the situation and minimize the damages to the relationship with Egypt, or to try and continue to force foreign ideals on it, which are irrelevant to the way of life in the Arab world.

Egypt has always been a highly important strategic crossroads. Its circles of influence reach beyond the Middle East, across the entire Arab and Muslim world, and even into the heart of Africa. Despite suffering an economic and political crisis, the Egyptian elite have always been aware of its history, regional role and national honor. The U.S., losing Egypt, will struggle to function effectively in the ever-changing Middle East. Its ability to better handle the Islamic terrorist organizations will significantly diminish. The past months have taught Cairo that it can stand on its own two feet, even without Washington’s stabilizing support. Maintaining the power and influence of the U.S. is of significant interest to Israel, despite the occasional disputes with President Obama. Hopefully the administration will come to its senses and return to a more pragmatic behavior pattern, taking into account the complexity and unique nature of the Arab world, rather than imposing simplistic and irrelevant ideas.