US: Those Who Vote Are Wealthier, So the Struggle against Social Inequality Stays Only on Paper

The book “Who Votes Now?” shows how the social imbalances between voters and abstainers can explain the divide in the struggle against inequalities — and the lack of any real measures designed to do anything about it.

Reducing inequality is now one of the permanent features of many political programs. The question we should now be asking ourselves is why nothing — or very little, not counting the numerous public speeches — has really been done. “Who Votes Now,” a book by Jan E. Leighley of the American University of Washington and Jonathan Nagler of New York University, attempts to answer this question, which is particularly relevant in the American context, where Barack Obama’s first election in 2008 saw a record rate of participation at the polls that year: some 61.6 percent of the total voting population. In their study, Leighley and Nagler analyze electoral data from U.S. presidential elections between 1972 and 2008. They conclude that the difference in social conditions and class between those who vote and those who do not is the fundamental factor explaining this gap between the rhetorical struggle against inequality and the lack of any concrete action to reduce it. As Nagler explained to IlFattoQuotidiano.it, on average, it is women who turn out to vote more than men, and the differences in voting rights between African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans and white Americans is negligible nowadays.

So what do these conclusions mean? Given that the majority of people who turn out at the ballot boxes have an income that is generally above the national average, White House candidates are not likely to defend government activity and reform that would redistribute wealth in any way. Moreover, “Who Votes Now?” shows that, while economic politics still favor the free market — even if this is now pretty much government-regulated — as far as social questions such as gay marriage and the legalization of marijuana are concerned, the measures and reforms are likely to be much more practical and varied.

However, the two professors do not confront the fundamental questions. If, as is the case in Australia, there was an obligation to vote, and the turnout represented more or less the total voting population, to what extent would the final results of U.S. presidential elections change? And would Democrats shift further to the left, if this abstaining 40 percent were to show up at the ballot boxes? Ultimately, the model imagined by the two American professors could also be applied in countries like Italy, where electoral participation is much higher. In the 2013 Italian elections, the turnout was at 75.13 percent of the total voting population.

Nagler explained to IlFattoQuotidiano.it that his model would be less helpful for political analysis in the Italian system. Indeed, the majority of European countries, including Italy, have always had a Socialist Party that was much more left-wing than Democrats were in America. What is more, these political parties have historically picked up the vote of the poorest classes in society. The conclusions made by the American University professor agree with the evidence from Tito Boeri, after Matteo Renzi’s victory in the 2013 Italian primary elections. On average, Renzi, the mayor of Florence, had attracted the voters of the Pd (or Partita Democratica, Italy’s Democratic Party) whose income was above the national average. As far as economic politics are concerned, this newly elected minister has positioned himself as both centrist and liberal, which bears more resemblance to the American model than to the traditional position of the Italian left as the redistributor of wealth. It is not clear if this will translate into a policy of minor redistribution, but Leighley and Nagler’s book would suggest that this is the conclusion to draw here.