Why Is America Anxiously Demanding that Japan Return Nuclear Materials?

As soon as the U.S. demanded from Japan that they return nuclear materials, the announcement drew rapt attention from the worldwide community. At the same time it also left people feeling baffled — why has the U.S. has been giving plutonium to Japan for decades, and why is it now suddenly demanding that it all be returned? Ultimately, what is the connection between the U.S. and Japan where these nuclear issues are concerned? In truth, these affairs stem from the U.S. re-evaluating its position toward Japan with regard to America’s nuclear umbrella policy.

The nuclear umbrella policy is a promise made by the U.S. to its allies. During the Cold War period, the U.S. nuclear umbrella covered America’s staunchest supporters, which included those in the NATO alliance as well as South Korea and Japan. After the conclusion of the Cold War, America’s nuclear umbrella remained an important cornerstone in maintaining relations with its friends and allies; in fact, the trend has actually been to prolong the policy’s existence. In January 1965, when Japan’s Prime Minister Eisaku Sato visited Washington, the U.S. president at the time, Lyndon B. Johnson, told him that “Japan has no need for nuclear weapons because the U.S. already has them. Should Japan ever need to be defended or need to contain nuclear weapons, the U.S. promises to supply them.”* This statement is a concrete example of a top level bilateral arrangement made between the U.S. and Japan concerning the nuclear umbrella policy. In December of 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made his famous announcement at Japan’s national parliament, stating Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles of nonpossession, nonproduction, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons. This became Japan’s founding policy regarding nuclear arms. The nuclear umbrella and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles are not in contradiction with one another — the former is the cause, the latter is the result. In South Korea, the U.S. also put into effect a similar nuclear umbrella policy. According to the U.S. and South Korean agreement of 1978, the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, America has promised that it will defend South Korea as part of its nuclear umbrella. This promise remains in place, even today.

In truth, America’s intentions in providing a nuclear umbrella have been, without question, to prevent Japan and Korea from possessing nuclear arms. At the same time, come any nuclear attack on Japan, the U.S. would be personally committed to protecting it. From this perspective, we can say that the U.S. nuclear umbrella policy was formulated with the idea of maintaining America’s nuclear monopoly throughout the world. But this policy, aimed at stopping the rise in the number of nuclear capable countries and the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, did have a positive effect. This is especially evident where preventing nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of those seeking to revive Japan’s militarism has been concerned — here it has been a crucial strategic move. Japan, South Korea and other countries that are still operating within a no-nuclear weapons framework cannot neglect the checking power that the United States’ nuclear umbrella holds over them.

However, America’s nuclear umbrella policy also has some seriously exploitable points within it. Its greatest weakness comes from this: The U.S. and Japan are not united on the execution of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and in some important areas of concern, they even contradict one another. To give an example, the U.S. once entrusted Japan with processing nuclear waste materials. Another case in point: During joint military exercises with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. does not refrain from transporting, possessing and installing any nuclear arsenal. The most frightening thing of all is that the U.S. and Japan have a “secret agreement” to directly transport nuclear weapons within Japan’s borders.

From this it can be seen that, under the shelter of a nuclear umbrella, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles lost shape at an early stage — it doesn’t live up to its name. This kind of slant to the nuclear umbrella policy has bought along with it disastrously negative results, and ones that are becoming all the more clear as time go on. The first of these is that America’s nuclear materials, its nuclear manufacturing techniques, its atomic experts and even the importing of its nuclear weapons into Japan have — when combined with Japan’s own advanced nuclear energy capabilities — created the world’s greatest hidden “nuclear empire” or “permitted nuclear empire.” The second is that this has stimulated the wild ambitions of Japan’s right wing’s militarization revival and its nuclear potential. It has also aroused Japan into talking more about the “logic of possessing nuclear weapons.” Therefore, it has magnified the dangerous potentials for a nuclear capable Japan.

We should thank our lucky stars that the U.S. is already on the alert over Japan’s nuclear moves. Its insistence that Japan return 331 kilograms of plutonium is a clear indication of this. This writer believes that the U.S. — being absolutely clear on demanding these nuclear materials — is doing the astute thing here. But there is also another suggestion that I can raise — intimidate those who seem ambitious to form a nuclear Japan into submission. Along with the glorified rise of Japan’s right wing will come a subsequent loss in power control. The U.S. must take preventative measures against this by increasing its control over Japan, its control over the nuclear umbrella and its influence, as well as demonstrating the effectiveness of its awesome power. Also, the U.S. should revise the nuclear umbrella policy to remove the weak points throughout it — keep the good parts and dispense with the bad ones. The evils within it must be eradicated completely.

Fengjun Chen is a Lecturer for Beijing University Graduate School of International Relations and a Global Network columnist.

*Editor’s note: This quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.