A Weak United States Risks Future Crises

When Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize, he emphasized the importance of international standards and the necessity and responsibility to maintain them. He declared that to create lasting peace, those who violate those standards must be held responsible and be punished in a way that gets them to change their behavior, even if it means sacrifice. Obama has made it clear that he wants international relations to be regulated by international law, that human rights should be respected around the world, and that nuclear weapons should be controlled, reduced, and finally banned.

Obama showed, however, only one side of his foreign policy in Oslo in 2009; in conjunction with his international involvement, Obama wants to lessen America’s obligations. Obama believes that American foreign policy that is too activist not only constitutes a threat to international peace and security, but also to the freedom of the American people. He wants to avoid war and wants the U.S. to get involved in fewer disputes. In other words, Obama wants to pay less for international order while simultaneously getting more out of it.

There is nothing wrong with this goal, of course. It is completely rational. But to get there is not simple, and on the way you can land in very difficult situations. Obama is in just that kind of situation right now.

If Russia succeeds in incorporating Crimea without significant costs, it will weaken not only the status of international law — the main point of the U.N.-system is to protect small states from bigger, more powerful ones — but also the argument against the spreading of nuclear weapons.

When Ukraine became independent, the country’s leaders were persuaded to hand over its nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for what they somewhat naively believed were security guarantees from the U.S. and Great Britain. But the formal contract, known as the “Budapest Memorandum,” includes few obligations for the two Western powers. The U.S. can, for all practical purposes, leave Ukraine out to dry without breaching the contract.

If Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons it would probably still have Crimea. Instead, they gave them up for a worthless paper guarantee and now the country is subject to aggression of a more powerful neighbor that is armed with nuclear weapons. If Obama doesn’t act, he will send out a dangerous message. Keep your nuclear weapons and keep your land. Give up your nuclear weapons and get invaded.

If that happens it will be the second time over a short period that the Obama administration has taught the world how important it is to have nuclear weapons. Gadhafi laid down his nuclear weapon program and in many people’s eyes, the West rewarded him by invading Libya and overthrowing his regime.

After these two demonstrations of the importance of nuclear weapons, it is almost impossible to see how a land like Iran would give up its nuclear ambitions. Iran’s eastern neighbor, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s bond to Iran’s archenemy, Saudi Arabia, grows stronger by the day. What kind of agreement can Obama sign — specifically when his successor will almost certainly be more hawkish — that can replace the security Iran can achieve through nuclear weapons? North Korea and other countries that are observing Ukraine’s fate will draw a similar conclusion.

If Putin comes away relatively unharmed, not only will the Assad regime in Syria be strengthened, but so will Russia’s credibility in the Middle East. Iran isn’t as dependent of Moscow as Assad is, but if Putin stands against the West, it will certainly influence Iran’s strategic calculations.

Many critics are interpreting the Crimea crisis in Cold War terms. But even if the U.S. cannot use violence in Ukraine today, the same way it couldn’t be used in Hungary in 1956, that interpretation is missing the point. The crisis in Ukraine is, if anything, a critical test of the foreign policy rules of the new era — an era characterized by globalization where the West’s most dangerous rivals are often their most important trade partners. Today’s economic interdependence did not exist when the world was divided in two political and economic blocks.

The Western powers can hurt Russia financially, but by doing this they simultaneously hurt their own economies. The big question now is how much pain the West is willing to take to punish Russia. Confidence in economic sanctions has strengthened in recent years because of how well it succeeded in paralyzing Iran’s economy, but one reason for its success in Iran is that Iran doesn’t have much that the West has a demand for or that it can’t get from other sources.

Russia is a considerably more difficult challenge and the decision makers of the Western countries know that it is impossible to inflict real injury on the country without exposing their own weaknesses; for example, Germany’s dependence of gas, Great Britain’s role as a global financial center, or France’s enormous contract to build ships for Russia’s navy.

The confrontation between the West and Russia, therefore, is also a potential test case for a significantly bigger confrontation with China. The U.S. and China are in a complex relationship that’s becoming more and more hostile and conflict-filled. If the Chinese leaders, for example, decide to use military power in their dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, how will the U.S. and its allies act then? Unlike Ukraine, Japan has a security agreement with the U.S., but like Russia, it’s possible that China would calculate that the U.S. wouldn’t dare risk war with another nuclear power. Economic sanctions would then come into question.

In that case, the stakes would be even higher than in the case of Russia, now that China is the world’s next biggest economy. In theory, the U.S. would be able to limit its import of Chinese goods, but like Russia, China has several economic weapons to use in return.

Knowing that Iran, China, Syria and others are watching increases the West’s incentive to act in Ukraine. If Obama and European leaders threaten Russia with costly economic sanctions and then fail to deliver them, they risk more than just appearing weak. It can cause rivals of the West to come to the conclusion that the global economic interdependence hasn’t strengthened the West politically, but rather weakened it. Weakness provokes, and — if nothing is done regarding Ukraine — it can lead to new challenges, new crises, and a more dangerous world.