Why Washington Is Pressuring Iran to Join the Anti-IS Coalition

As the basic framework of the coalition to destroy the Islamic State takes shape, experts warn that the U.S. must be careful about which military partners it selects to join in the fight against the terrorists. With a quick glance at the existing coalition members, we can grasp that countries like Bahrain, Qatar, the U.A.E. and others do not possess the necessary force to stop the Islamic State group. On this issue, analysts have expressed their belief that failing to invite Iran, the largest regional power, to join the anti-Islamic State group coalition will lead to the coalition’s inability to deliver a serious and effective blow to the terrorist group. This is at a time when we have witnessed how American officials have, after some time, corrected their mistake with regard to [not] inviting Iran to join the coalition, but even still they are faced with a closed door.

Just days after Tehran listened to the speeches of the U.S. secretary of state and other American officials regarding Iran joining the coalition — with Iran considering these speeches a farce — John Kerry once again requested Iranian aid in a Security Council meeting. This contains several important messages.

American officials are continuing their efforts to trump up the coalition, named “The International Coalition against the Islamic State,” just as this past week John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, announced in a Senate hearing that 50 nations have joined the coalition to oppose the Islamic State group. Yet Kerry emphasized in the most recent Security Council meeting that Iran must have a role in combatting the Islamic State group, especially in terms of providing intelligence on recent developments in the Islamic State group’s terrorist activities. The Washington Post described Kerry’s statements to the Security Council one day later as follows: “America Requests Help from Iran in the Fight against Islamic State Group.”

But the question is: Why is the U.S. insisting that Iran have a role in the coalition while the highest ranking Iranian official has rejected such a joint venture outright?

The answer lies in response to another question: Are the coalition and its 50 member nations strong enough to combat Islamic State group militants? How influential are the member nations of the coalition? While American officials focus only on the quantity of nations, does the coalition also possess political and strategic quality? To answer this question, it is enough to take a look at the level of commitment of the current coalition members.

Despite the fact the UK, America’s greatest ally, has repeatedly supported Washington’s efforts from the beginning of the crises, it has emphasized from day one that it will not have an active military presence.

In most of the United States’ military conflicts in the last century, particularly post-Cold War, London has been at Washington’s immediate side. The height of this tendency [can be observed] in their participation in the Iraq War.

The French have carried out their first air strikes against the Islamic State group, leading some to believe that they have filled the UK’s shoes at Washington’s side. However, political observers have emphasized that these attacks are for show and France will not involve itself completely to help the Americans against the Islamic State group. On this issue the newspaper al-Ra’y writes, “The French air strikes at the request of the government in Baghdad could be the catalyst for similar involvement in Libya at the request of Tarablus.” Thus, by attacking the Islamic State group in Iraq, Paris could actually be laying the groundwork for military intervention in Libya and justifying that enterprise. On the other hand, France has announced that it will only participate in the attacks on Iraq, which indicates that it will take no part in the most difficult stage of the military campaign facing the American-led coalition, e.g., Syria.

None of America’s other Western allies, including Canada, Australia, Germany, Holland, Italy, Poland, Albania, Croatia and New Zealand, will have a significant role to play in the fight, other than lending America logistic and humanitarian aid, simply because they lack the military strength to do so. In this regard, after Great Britain and France, Turkey is perhaps the most important country that could come to the aid of the U.S. in Iraq and Syria, by virtue of the fact that it has the second largest army in NATO. Furthermore, it borders each of these two countries [Iraq and Syria], and has the Incurlik air bases and ties to paramilitary groups in Syria as well as good relations with Sunni groups in Iraq. As such, it could play a critical role in the coalition. However, Erdogan’s government has also thus far preferred to offer logistic support only, and not to play a role in the coalition. In the best case scenario, [Turkey would also] stop deploying armed individuals within Syrian borders and quit selling oil to the militants. In the past week, Turkey has finally announced it has joined the coalition.

Experts believe that Turkey does not want to involve itself directly against the Islamic State group, while others believe that the Islamic State group and the Ankara government are in league. Whatever the reason may be for Turkey’s unwillingness to join the coalition, it presents a difficulty for America. It’s clear that White House officials have been forced make such choices out of sheer necessity. Saudi Arabia, which throughout the last century has not been known for having a strong army, cannot be America’s arm in the region. Best case scenario, it can be the financial backer, provide military bases in this war, and induce cooperation against the Islamic State group from the five nations of the U.A.E., Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. Without a doubt, Saudi Arabia will not be able to play a significant role in ground operations. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s main goal in this coalition is to enter the U.S. in a war in Syria against Bashar al-Assad, in order to topple the Damascus regime. At the same time, the White House is not interested in entering into further opposition with Iran and Russia.

Jordan, which also could have come to the United States’ side, has tentatively aligned itself with the coalition because of its concerns over domestic reaction and the power of the Salafists and Takfiris within that country. However, officials in Jordan have reiterated time and again that they will not be participating in military operations against the Islamic State group.

Despite Cairo’s announcement of preparedness to join the coalition, Egyptian officials, including President Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi, have not yet clarified the country’s role. Only the religious leaders of Egypt have denounced the Islamic State group as “un-Islamic,” and they have influence only in the cultural sphere.

The results of these investigations show that the American claims to 40 or 50 countries in the coalition are devoid of any reality and that American friends and allies have formed a shaky coalition with each other at best. Once again, White House leaders are aiming to aggrandize the coalition with trickery, a coalition which is an empty threat. But in this regard, Washington’s leaders aren’t fooling themselves. They know that in these circumstances, if they want gain the upper hand against the Islamic State group, they have to come to agreement with Middle Eastern leaders, even if from Tehran’s perspective, the statements of the head of U.S. diplomacy come off as a joke that no one will take seriously.

Analysis of American Relations with the Takfiri Extremists

Relations between the U.S. and armed extremist groups in the Middle East are strangely convoluted, to the point that analysts have difficulty comprehending these relationships correctly.

Extremist groups from the 1980s to today have entered the arena of developments and international relations in the Middle East among the new players. In this regard, understanding the complex roles of the U.S., Western countries, and even the Zionist regime in relation to these groups has proved difficult for many observers.

Some have tried to ignore entirely the role of Western and Zionist think tanks in the growth and developments of these groups. They consider these groups to be products of the conditions of their time and place. They see the intervening forces in these developments as non-existent. On the flip side, others, by oversimplifying and ignoring the subtleties and complexities of these groups, have described them as puppets of the intelligence services of various countries in the region or Western intelligence or security organizations. However, in recent years it has been shown that these extremist groups, from al-Qaida to the Taliban or from the Islamic State group to Boko Haram, are all extremely complex. This very complexity and the attempts to understand it — along with the reliance on abstract concepts to simplify decision-making processes of the executive bodies that strategize against these groups — have complicated conditions for both security experts and policymakers.

The most remarkable point is this: in recent decades, the U.S. has begun by supporting extremist groups, and other groups in that vein in Afghanistan, Iran and Syria, only to use those very same groups as a pretext upon which to engage in military intervention in the regions where these militant groups are present.

The question remains: What strategic approach are the Americans taking to militant and extremist groups in the region? It seems in American and Zionist think tanks that they are actually manipulating the conditions in such a way that, although these extremist groups believe they are working toward their own ends, they are actually playing the game on America’s terms. This phenomenon has led some experts to consider the “strategy of engendering anarchy” to be a viable framework through which to analyze U.S. relations with extremist groups.

On this basis, America and the West are leading the militants into a campaign of attrition. Thus, once the [Western] side has weakened these groups and converted these nations into “failed states,” it will target the groups that are on the verge of forming a new state, whereas the central government — preoccupied with fighting the terrorist groups — will fall from grace, no longer having the strength to resist supra-regional powers like the U.S. With this in mind, the following pattern can be discerned: First, we see an overlap between the interests of the United States and the interest of al-Qaida, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Jihad and Tawheed group, the Islamic State group, the Taliban, and any other extremist or Salafist group in the Middle East. Then, after a short time, this alignment of interests morphs into contradiction. But here is the question: Are the Americans actually incapable of predicting this contradiction? And if they are, why do they support these groups in the first place until the groups gain power and weaken local governments?

The response to this question can be divided into four parts:

1) The Crisis Cycle: The initial impetus for partnering with militia groups is the overlapping interests [of the two sides] resulting from a crisis. The West, led by the U.S., gains much from the cyclical and continuing crises in the Middle East, because by stoking crisis, countries in the region are weakened and the groundwork laid for the presence of extra-regional powers. Israel can be the foremost power, oil is sold at a lower price and weakened nations become even more reliant upon Europe and America to perform their basic functions, including guaranteeing security and welfare. In such circumstances, [Middle Eastern nations] are prepared to put their own land at the disposal of the West and turn the other cheek to their own sovereignty.

2) Encouraging the Arms Race: Unrest resulting from the cycle of crisis causes the arms market to burst open. Expenditures in the military sector and markets related to security are very cost-effective and generally no ruler or political official shies away from expenses in this sector because they know such expenses are directly correlated with their own power. They consider it an investment in order to stay in power.

3) Spreading Sectarianism: The third goal that brings the Americans and so-called “jihadi” militia groups together is the expansion of religiously-fueled conflicts. They pursue this strategy so that on the one hand these groups can gain power by fanning the flames of sectarian conflict, and on the other hand, the Americans can take advantage of the clashes to sow discord between various countries in the region, all in order to guarantee their own interests by following the principle of divide and conquer.

4) Creating Distractions from Israel: Without a doubt, one of the most important aims of the cycle of crisis in the Middle East is to generate diversions from Israel’s actions in the region. In this way, public opinion, and even the attention of many heads of state, will be shifted away from the expansionist policies of the Zionist regime in favor of dealing with an imminent threat, i.e. militant groups within their own borders or near their borders.

In conclusion, we will reiterate that the U.S. guarantees its own interests by taking advantage of ignorance, exacerbating existing tensions and exaggerating extremist groups’ actions in the Middle East. It uses the religious and political claims of these groups to intensify differences between nations and transform political differences into ideological ones. Then, after [its extremist partners] have reached their expiration date, the U.S. tries to destroy these groups, or at least make it look like it is fighting against them.