Documents Declassified: Release of All ‘Negotiation Secrets’ Needed
Published in Ryūkyū Shimpō
(Japan) on 16 January 2015
by (link to original)
(Japan) on 16 January 2015
by (link to original)
Translated from
by Maisha Kuniyuki.
Edited by Bora Mici.
On Jan. 15, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public diplomatic documents that concern the restoration of Okinawa, bringing to light a number of “dark diplomatic negotiation secrets” that effect present-day Okinawa.
Of particular interest was Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s visit to Okinawa in 1965; while under pressure from the USA, the Japanese government made quick changes to the prime minister’s speech, emphasizing the importance of the U.S. military base in Okinawa.
Japan’s submissive manner of diplomacy — quickly bending to pressure from the U.S. and accepting things as they are — is a familiar one, and as a result, damage from the bases in Okinawa continues. This lack of change, even after Okinawa was restored to Japan, is symbolic.
Conferences between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after restoration negotiations began are also suggestive. Accompanying the restoration was the following statement concerning the reduction of the amount of U.S. military bases:
“Even if a lot of the land for military use is returned, there is the danger of our country losing its capability for defense. It will also be expensive, and a nuisance.” The response to Okinawa’s sincere request for nuclear-free mainland status, which would greatly reduce U.S. military bases, was one of utter indifference.
Responding to U.S. considerations of relocating its P-3B patrol plane at Naha Airport to areas in other prefectures like Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture or Misawa, Aomori Prefecture, then-Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda refused the idea, stating that he “wanted it to stay in Okinawa.” Although the U.S. sounded out Japan for the complete withdrawal of its Marine Corps from Okinawa, it is also clear that Japan stopped them.
Essentially, once mainland Japan saw that lightening the burden of military bases in Okinawa might in turn become a burden to it, it turned its back on reducing the burden and sacrificed Okinawa. This was even repeated in the mutually agreed upon negotiations at the 1996 Special Action Committee and the 2005 negotiations for the plan to build a new base at Henoko. It is a system in which Okinawa continues to be sacrificed. This is how present-day Okinawa is affected by past negotiations.
Considering the adverse effects of keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa, inspection of later Japan-U.S. negotiations is essential. The government should make public not only documents at the time of restoration, but also all subsequent negotiations concerning the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.
This time it was also made clear that the Japanese government did not notify Okinawa of its knowledge that the U.S. military brought poison gas into Okinawa in 1970.
The amount of chemical weapons that were brought into Okinawa still remains unclear. It is still unknown whether the 13,000 tons removed after 1971 was the same as that brought in. The U.S. should release all materials during its occupation of Okinawa, and the Japanese government should request it do so.
Of particular interest was Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s visit to Okinawa in 1965; while under pressure from the USA, the Japanese government made quick changes to the prime minister’s speech, emphasizing the importance of the U.S. military base in Okinawa.
Japan’s submissive manner of diplomacy — quickly bending to pressure from the U.S. and accepting things as they are — is a familiar one, and as a result, damage from the bases in Okinawa continues. This lack of change, even after Okinawa was restored to Japan, is symbolic.
Conferences between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after restoration negotiations began are also suggestive. Accompanying the restoration was the following statement concerning the reduction of the amount of U.S. military bases:
“Even if a lot of the land for military use is returned, there is the danger of our country losing its capability for defense. It will also be expensive, and a nuisance.” The response to Okinawa’s sincere request for nuclear-free mainland status, which would greatly reduce U.S. military bases, was one of utter indifference.
Responding to U.S. considerations of relocating its P-3B patrol plane at Naha Airport to areas in other prefectures like Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture or Misawa, Aomori Prefecture, then-Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda refused the idea, stating that he “wanted it to stay in Okinawa.” Although the U.S. sounded out Japan for the complete withdrawal of its Marine Corps from Okinawa, it is also clear that Japan stopped them.
Essentially, once mainland Japan saw that lightening the burden of military bases in Okinawa might in turn become a burden to it, it turned its back on reducing the burden and sacrificed Okinawa. This was even repeated in the mutually agreed upon negotiations at the 1996 Special Action Committee and the 2005 negotiations for the plan to build a new base at Henoko. It is a system in which Okinawa continues to be sacrificed. This is how present-day Okinawa is affected by past negotiations.
Considering the adverse effects of keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa, inspection of later Japan-U.S. negotiations is essential. The government should make public not only documents at the time of restoration, but also all subsequent negotiations concerning the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.
This time it was also made clear that the Japanese government did not notify Okinawa of its knowledge that the U.S. military brought poison gas into Okinawa in 1970.
The amount of chemical weapons that were brought into Okinawa still remains unclear. It is still unknown whether the 13,000 tons removed after 1971 was the same as that brought in. The U.S. should release all materials during its occupation of Okinawa, and the Japanese government should request it do so.
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