On the Fence: What Will Australia Decide?

Yesterday, Australian Defense Minister Kevin Andrews indicated that Australia would seek to expand and deepen its security alliance with the United States over the coming decades. Some U.S. and Australian media groups were quick to attribute the move to the rise of China “fueling instability in the [Asia-Pacific] region.”

It is common consensus among outside observers that the U.S.-Australian military and security relationship is growing increasingly intimate. Just at the beginning of this month in Adelaide, the capital of South Australia, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott detailed a shipbuilding project that will cost as much as AU $89 billion, of which almost AU $40 billion will be used in the construction of new frigates and offshore combatant vessels and an additional AU $50 billion will be spent on submarines. Abbott himself called the unveiling a “historic announcement.”

On Australia’s part, Abbott’s announcement of the shipbuilding plans was likely spurred by internal political considerations, namely raising employment rates in South Australia. However, as warship construction will not begin until 2018 at the earliest, the plans themselves will be dependent upon a fair number of variables. Publicizing the news may help boost confidence in South Australia’s economy, but will not have any immediate effect toward resolving the state’s employment woes.

When taken together, the Australian defense minister’s stance and Australia’s historic shipbuilding project will be interpreted by many outside observers as the products of Australia’s intentions to adopt a more active, and some would even say radical, posture that will fit more closely with the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy. The project’s implementation would greatly enhance Australia’s capability to counterbalance increasing Chinese military strength at the southern end of the first island chain. Considering some of Australia’s recent statements and actions on the South China Sea issue, one could say that such an interpretation is not far off the mark.

In recent years, a growing number of nations in the Asia-Pacific have experienced a phenomenon in which they have become economically reliant upon China, but still dependent on the United States for security. Among those nations, Australia’s reaction to this phenomenon has been fairly typical.

On the one hand, China has been Australia’s largest trading partner for many years, with its exports to China gradually coming to account for more than 30 percent of its total, and its imports from China also making up approximately 20 percent of the aggregate. With the signing of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, the economic relationship between the two countries will only grow closer in the near future. On the other hand, as one of the United States’ most reliable allies around the globe, Australia is actively participating in the commencement of U.S. military action and has been called the “southern anchor” of the United States’ network of alliances throughout Asia and the Pacific.

In some senses, even as its economic ties with China continue to deepen, Australia has also stepped up military cooperation with the United States, although not nearly to a degree that can compete with the former.

Despite its constant economic gravitation toward China, Australia still believes itself to be a member of the West in terms of politics, security and its system of values, but in light of its practical interests, Australia will neither allow its economic cooperation with China to weaken its political and security relationships with the United States and other Western nations, nor have the need to cause any significant damage to its relations with China due to security cooperation with the United States. For now, it is clearly preferable for Australia to reap the benefits of both relationships while not having to sacrifice much in exchange, as such a course is compatible with both its security and economic interests.