European-American Relations Cannot Return to the Past

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 11 June 2020
by Zhāng Jiàn (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Liza Roberts. Edited by Laurence Bouvard.
Recently, the conflict between Germany and America has become a focus of public conversation. On June 5, without consulting Germany or NATO, President Donald Trump unilaterally announced the withdrawal of 9,500 troops from Germany. The German public was in an uproar. Additionally, the United States wants to pass a bill in order to increase sanctions on the German-Russian Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s refusal to attend the Group of Seven major industrial nations summit due to the pandemic highlights the stark differences between the two sides.

The conflict between Germany and the U.S. has remained prominent over the past few years, particularly regarding disagreements over NATO, the refugee crisis, trade and German-Russian relations. It should be noted that the German-American conflict does not exist in isolation, but is only a part of the broader conflict between Europe and the U.S. Over the past few years, the Trump administration has ignored the interests and concerns of its European allies and abandoned these allies as worthless. European countries are also extremely dissatisfied and disappointed with the U.S., and have questioned the value of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

From the U.S. side, the Trump administration is self-centered and its neglect and even hostility toward Europe and the TTIP is obvious. First of all, simply and crudely, American unilateralist practices have repeatedly trampled on major European security interests. These include withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear agreement, assassinating important Iranian military leaders without informing U.S. allies, intensifying the conflict between Israel and Palestine, withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and so on. Second, regarding Europe as an economic enemy rather than a strategic partner, the U.S. has imposed special tariffs on exported European Union steel and aluminum products, and has repeatedly threatened to impose tariffs on cars imported from Europe. Third, the U.S. was pleased with the disintegration of the EU, and maintains an unprecedented attitude of disregard and even hostility toward its reunification.

In short, unlike previous conflicts in trans-Atlantic relations that focused on specific events such as the Vietnam War, the Iraq War and disagreements over Soviet policies, etc., the Trump administration can currently be described as initiating a comprehensive attack on Europe in many fields, such as diplomacy, security, economics and others.

Undoubtedly, aside from Trump, there are deeper reasons for the changes and uncertainties in the relationship between Europe and the U.S. Although the current conflict is focused on Trump, it is actually the result of several different factors, such as differences in geopolitics, economic competition and internal social and political changes.

First, the geopolitical differences between Europe and the U.S. have become increasingly apparent. The focus of U.S. strategy has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region, and a reduced focus on Europe has also meant a reduction in sensitivity to European concerns and interests. The U.S. regards China as its biggest adversary and security threat, but Europe’s views do not entirely concur with this view. Europe has its own interests and does not necessarily agree with U.S. perceptions of security threats. European security interests lie mainly in its surrounding area, and in this regard, the U.S. has become the greatest disruptor of European interests. In the long run, the demographics of Europe and the United States will increasingly diverge. Europe is more sensitive to the Islamic world, and many people in Europe dislike or even hate the United States; the U.S. pays more attention to Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. The cultural and relational ties across the Atlantic have weakened, and each side’s diplomatic focus will only become more disparate.

Second, the economic competition between Europe and the U.S. is becoming increasingly intense, and the conflict is growing. In the traditional manufacturing sector, Europe has a relatively large advantage, and the U.S. is increasingly dissatisfied. In the highly promising digital economy, the battle for control is more prominent. Europe has declared war on Silicon Valley through antitrust laws, digital taxes, privacy protection measures and other policies.

Third, there are profound changes in the internal society and politics of Europe and the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, populism has become an increasingly prominent social and political phenomenon. Populism is essentially nationalism over internationalism, anti-globalization rather than globalism, unilateralism versus multilateralism, and confrontation rather than cooperation. The Trump administration’s populism and nationalism lead it to scorn all traditional value systems, including the TTIP. American support for European populism will only further weaken the so-called foundational values of the TTIP, such as democracy, human rights, international regulations, free trade, etc., thereby fundamentally weakening relations between Europe and the U.S.

Overall, the conflicts between the U.S. and Europe will become more prominent over time. On the one hand, the U.S. is reluctant to pay its dues and no longer considers its alliance with Europe to be an entirely positive asset. The U.S. is currently reassessing its national interests, including whether or not maintaining the ally system is worth the cost to the economy and military protection. On the other hand, Europe has become accustomed to the aid and protection of the U.S. In the face of change, this reliance has become inappropriate and Europe has been forced to readjust its relationship with and policies toward the U.S. Changes in how the U.S. and Europe perceive each other, and how they perceive their role in the TTIP, will severely impact policies for each side. This interdependence may eventually create a self-fulfilling prophecy, loosening the American-European alliance.

It is impossible for the relationship between Europe and the U.S. to return to its past strength. On the one hand, the U.S. has changed and is no longer confident in itself, acting both skeptical and irritable. The U.S. would do anything to maintain its hegemonic status, including damaging the international order, or harming the interests of its allies. On the other hand, Europe is also changing. The United Kingdom has left the European Union, and the U.S. has lost its grip on Europe. Europe has begun to seriously prepare a plan B for a post-American era by strengthening its strategic autonomy and building European sovereignty.

Obviously, Europe and the U.S. still rely on each other, especially Europe, which remains very dependent on the U.S. In the future, the two sides will still cooperate relatively closely, but at the same time disputes and conflicts will continue unabated. Both sides are gradually moving away from relying on each other as a diplomatic starting point, and are beginning to look more at third parties. Even though the U.S. will have a new president in the future, European-American relations will not be able to return to those of the past.




最近,德美矛盾成为舆论焦点。6月5日,特朗普在未与德国和北约磋商的情况下,单方面宣布将从德国撤军9500人,德国舆论一片哗然。此外,美国欲通过法案收紧对德俄“北溪-2”天然气管道的制裁,德国总理默克尔以疫情为由拒绝赴美出席G7峰会,都凸显了双方的分歧。

德美矛盾过去几年一直都很突出,在北约、难民问题、贸易、德俄关系上双方龃龉不断。应该注意到,德美矛盾并不是孤立的,是更为广泛的欧美矛盾的一部分。过去几年,特朗普政府无视欧洲盟友利益和关切,弃盟友如敝屣;欧洲国家也对美国极为不满和失望,对跨大西洋联盟的价值和未来打上问号。

从美国方面看,特朗普政府以自我为中心,对欧洲和跨大西洋联盟的轻忽甚至敌意显而易见。其一,简单粗暴,以单边主义做法频频践踏欧洲重大安全利益,包括退出伊朗核协议,在不知会盟友的情况下暗杀伊朗军方重要领导人,加剧巴以矛盾和中东紧张局势,退出“中导条约”“开放天空条约”等等。其二,视欧洲为经济上的敌人而非战略合作伙伴,对欧盟输美钢铝产品征收特别关税,并一再威胁对欧进口汽车加征关税。其三,乐见欧盟解体,对欧洲一体化展现了前所未有的漠视甚至敌视态度。

总之,与以往跨大西洋关系中发生的矛盾集中于某一事件如越战、伊拉克战争、对苏联政策等等不同,当前特朗普政府可谓是在外交、安全、经济等诸多领域对欧洲发起了全面挑战。

毫无疑问,除了特朗普,当前欧美关系的变化及不确定性增加有更深层次的原因。当前欧美矛盾虽聚焦于特朗普,实际上是欧美地缘政策差异、经济竞争及内部社会、政治变化等多种因素综合作用的结果。

其一,欧美地缘政治取向差异日趋明显。美国战略重点转向亚太,对欧洲的关注减少,这也意味着对欧洲关切和利益敏感性的下降。美国视中国为最大的对手和安全威胁,但欧洲和美国的看法并不完全一致。欧洲有自己的利益,并不必然认同美国的安全威胁认知。欧洲的安全利益主要在大周边地区,而在这方面,美国成为欧洲利益最大的破坏者。长期看,欧美人口结构将发生越来越大的差异。欧洲对伊斯兰世界更为敏感,欧洲将有更多的人讨厌甚至憎恶美国;美国更重视拉美及亚太。跨大西洋关系中的人文、血缘纽带减弱,外交重点将更为分化。

其二,美欧在经济领域的竞争日趋激烈,对立性趋强。在传统制造业领域,欧洲对美国优势较大,美国日益不满。在极具前景的数字经济领域,美欧控制与反控制的争斗则更为突出。欧洲以反垄断、数字税、隐私保护等方式“向硅谷宣战”。

其三,欧美各自内部社会、政治的深刻变化。在跨大西洋两岸,民粹主义都成为日益突出的社会和政治现象。民粹主义本质上是民族主义而非国际主义、反全球化而非拥抱全球化、单边主义而非多边主义、对抗性而非合作性。特朗普政府的民粹性和民族主义注定其会蔑视所有传统意义上的价值体系,包括跨大西洋联盟。美国对欧洲民粹主义的支持则将进一步弱化跨大西洋联盟的所谓价值观基础,如民主、人权、国际规则及自由贸易等等,从而根本上弱化欧美关系。

总体看,未来欧美关系中矛盾和冲突的一面将更为突出。一方面,美国不愿付出,不再认为与欧洲的盟友关系是完全的正资产,正在重新定位美国的国家利益,包括是否必须要以经济付出和军事保护为代价来维系盟友体系。另一方面,欧洲过去习惯了美国的付出和保护,所以面对美国的变化感到不适应,需要调整自身定位及对美政策。美欧对彼此及对跨大西洋联盟认知的改变及政策调整将相互影响,互为因果,并可能最终成为自我实现的预言,让欧美联盟更为松散。

欧美关系已不可能回到过去。一方面,美国变了,自信不再,多疑而暴躁,为维护霸权地位无所不用其极,包括损害国际秩序,损害盟友利益。另一方面,欧洲也在变,英国脱欧了,美国失去了影响欧洲的最大抓手;欧洲开始认真准备“后美国时代”的B计划,加强战略自主和欧洲主权建设。

当然,欧美对彼此仍有较大需求,特别是欧洲,对美国仍十分依赖。未来双方也仍会有较为紧密的合作,但与此同时,纷争和矛盾也会有增无减,双方都在逐渐不再以对方为外交的基本出发点,而都开始更多地看向第三方,即使未来美国会有新的总统,欧美关系也不可能回复如初。
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