Turkey and Russia Are Shaping Tomorrow’s World
Published in Le Temps
(Switzerland) on 10 November 2020
by Luis Lema (link to original)
(Switzerland) on 10 November 2020
by Luis Lema (link to original)
Translated from
by Mireille Dedios.
Edited by Olivia Parker.
With Ankara, Moscow is the great winner of the ceasefire secured in the Caucasus. Americans and Europeans are left counting the points.
The issue has been “solved” without him. While Donald Trump is still entirely focused on making life at the White House difficult for his successor, Joe Biden, weapons have finally gone silent in Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. president had done nothing to prevent the escalation that led to a deadly conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Six weeks later, he did just as little to stop it. Russia and Turkey reap the benefits and continue to shape what the future diplomatic landscape will be, at the expense of Western countries.
Russia and Turkey? Like the Thomson and Thompson of geopolitics, both countries have practically become inseparable. Although they are often on opposite sides, above all else their leaders have one thing in common: their increasingly open rejection of the West.
This is now a proven recipe. Moscow and Ankara move into areas abandoned by American pullouts and European dysfunctions; they use all available means to put themselves at the center of the action; then they end up blowing up what is left of a multilateral framework in order to replace it by a tailor-made diplomatic structure. In Syria, this is called the Astana process, which now calls the shots at the expense of the U.N. In Libya, time for mercenaries and a lot of patience, with the hope eventually to divide the spoils. With the agreement found in Nagorno-Karabakh (where Turkey is an essential player, although it let Moscow play the leading role), the venerable quarter-century-old Minsk agreement is being consigned to oblivion. In clear terms: Both France and the United States are out of the game, once again.
Granted, the South Caucasus is historically the “natural” area of intervention for these two countries, much more so than for Washington or Paris. Russia so wanted to spare its two old friends, Azerbaijan and Armenia, that it actually ventured into it a little reluctantly. Still, by letting Armenia absurdly sink into this war, by making sure it didn’t oppose Azerbaijan’s wishes, supported by Turkey, then by obtaining the shipment of thousands of Russian soldiers sent to play the role of referee, Moscow gained on all fronts. For Biden as for Emmanuel Macron, the game, here, is already lost.
The issue has been “solved” without him. While Donald Trump is still entirely focused on making life at the White House difficult for his successor, Joe Biden, weapons have finally gone silent in Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. president had done nothing to prevent the escalation that led to a deadly conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Six weeks later, he did just as little to stop it. Russia and Turkey reap the benefits and continue to shape what the future diplomatic landscape will be, at the expense of Western countries.
Russia and Turkey? Like the Thomson and Thompson of geopolitics, both countries have practically become inseparable. Although they are often on opposite sides, above all else their leaders have one thing in common: their increasingly open rejection of the West.
This is now a proven recipe. Moscow and Ankara move into areas abandoned by American pullouts and European dysfunctions; they use all available means to put themselves at the center of the action; then they end up blowing up what is left of a multilateral framework in order to replace it by a tailor-made diplomatic structure. In Syria, this is called the Astana process, which now calls the shots at the expense of the U.N. In Libya, time for mercenaries and a lot of patience, with the hope eventually to divide the spoils. With the agreement found in Nagorno-Karabakh (where Turkey is an essential player, although it let Moscow play the leading role), the venerable quarter-century-old Minsk agreement is being consigned to oblivion. In clear terms: Both France and the United States are out of the game, once again.
Granted, the South Caucasus is historically the “natural” area of intervention for these two countries, much more so than for Washington or Paris. Russia so wanted to spare its two old friends, Azerbaijan and Armenia, that it actually ventured into it a little reluctantly. Still, by letting Armenia absurdly sink into this war, by making sure it didn’t oppose Azerbaijan’s wishes, supported by Turkey, then by obtaining the shipment of thousands of Russian soldiers sent to play the role of referee, Moscow gained on all fronts. For Biden as for Emmanuel Macron, the game, here, is already lost.
Previous article![]( "Staying Strangers")
Next article![]( "The World with Biden")