Taiwan-Ukraine Convergence, US Inconvenience

In an analysis of the overall strategic situation, Wu Yushan, a scholar with Academia Sinica, pointed out a few days ago that Ukraine is on the front line of the conflict between the United States and Western countries as the hegemonic sea powers and Russia as the hegemonic land power, while simultaneously being at the forefront of a cultural clash between the Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church from an ideological perspective. Either way, what is clear is that the Ukrainian challenge presents something of a Gordian knot to the Biden administration.

For its part, Taiwan remains an important, U.S.-dominated tool in containing the mainland. Faced with China and Russia, the Biden administration cannot fight on both fronts, and the costs to both Ukraine and Taiwan are increasing. Particularly at a time when anti-China bluster and calls for independence are on the rise in Taiwan, with constitutional amendments and legal Taiwan independence pushing forward, from Afghanistan to Taiwan, the United States has jumped from the frying pan into the fire. It is clearly a complex and thorny issue, and one that deserves attention.

The Biden administration is currently still attempting to pressure Russia into abandoning its aggressive intentions toward Ukraine through diplomatic means, but Russia has not made the slightest move to desist. There have been various calls from within the NATO alliance to take security concerns over Russia seriously. President Joe Biden’s remarks have also generated dissatisfaction in Ukraine, causing both sides’ efforts at deterring Russia to fall short of the mark. Similarly, on the issue of the Taiwan Strait, U.S. intervention has led to misunderstanding and the misperception in the Democratic Progressive Party, and more broadly among the forces for Taiwan independence, that the United States will help Taiwan fight China unconditionally and without limit. All these expectations create a dilemma for the United States of its own making.

The problem began when the State Department ordered the evacuation of U.S. Embassy staff and family members from Ukraine. When the U.S. Embassy announced that the first shipment of U.S. security assistance and arms had arrived in Ukraine, the United States had to consider both the time and cost implications of evacuating its citizens and transporting materials — a bottomless, time-consuming task, handled in much the same way as with Taiwan. Even if the United States were willing to help, the fear is that this would be a difficult promise to live up to, and not one with any clear assurance of victory. That being said, it is clear that the crises in Ukraine and Taiwan should never have devolved into the situations they are in today.

From the standpoint of Ukraine and Taiwan, both countries have willingly placed themselves in the front line of the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese tug-of-war, and both must pay the price for the risk and uncertainty. All it will take to decide the winner and reach an outcome borne from a showdown is for war to break out. Judging from the frequency of mainland military flights around Taiwan, it would be unwise for the Tsai administration to continue to manipulate public opinion and risk amendments to the constitution and to the island’s name. When Ukraine and Taiwan become stakes in the game of great powers, all parties suffer, and the only winners are international arms dealers. The United States cannot fight both sides, and Ukraine and Taiwan run a high risk of presenting the same tragic outcome seen in Afghanistan.

Neither the Republic of China [Taiwan] nor Ukraine is a formal American ally, but they are currently both of strategic value to the United States, as they are sensitive spots that can be used for attacks on mainland China and Russia, respectively. Some commentators believe that Taiwan’s geographical location and high-tech industry have placed it in a strategically more important position than Ukraine, but both countries face a common dilemma — namely, the issue of having multiple cultural identities that arise from their complex histories, coupled with deliberate incitement and instigation by political leaders, all of which has turned into an emotional battle between enemy and national ideologies, leading to the current crisis. Both countries should hedge their bets, but the key factor is whether the United States can make a rational cost assessment in meeting the challenge.

Wu hits the nail on the head when he notes that, on the strategic fault line between maritime powers and land powers, there are two particularly dangerous hot spots — Taiwan in East Asia and Ukraine in Eastern Europe. The two cases are not just similar but are linked to each other, and what they have in common is their most dangerous aspect: On the one hand, both Taiwan and Ukraine are more closely linked economically to the land powers, but in matters of security, they are more connected to the maritime powers due to the threats they face. Although they are culturally, ethnically and linguistically similar to the mainland countries, they are closer to the maritime powers in terms of values and political systems.

On the other hand, neither Taiwan nor Ukraine is part of the system safeguarded by the maritime powers. The United States has stated frankly that should Russia attack Ukraine, it would not send troops, but would impose the strictest conceivable economic sanctions on Russia. Where Taiwan is concerned, it is a strategic ambiguity in that, should war break out between Taiwan and the mainland, the United States has not stated clearly whether it will be present or not. Both Taiwan and Ukraine lie outside of the United States’ formal defense operation. Pointing to the crux of the matter, Wu calls this “the risk of uncertainty.”

In short, both Ukraine and Taiwan are tools in a long-standing power struggle and evince the helplessness and despondency that is characteristic of small states: They must look to others for their national security; they lack the means for taking matters into their own hands; and both must hedge their bets and abstain from aggression or provocation. The Ukraine crisis and the risk of the Taiwan issue also represent new diplomatic tests for the Biden administration to face, following its extended withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The fear is that if Taiwan moves ahead with independence, it will be difficult for the United States to extricate itself.

For now, what Tsai Ing-wen’s administration should be most worried about is the “convergence zone” brought on by the simultaneous outbreak of the Taiwan Strait crisis and the Ukraine crisis; first, in terms of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the staunchly pro-independence Vice President Lai Ching-te becoming the fuse that ignites the Taiwan Strait; and second, the strong pro-independence online and media presence creating a political burden that Tsai is unable to shake off. It would therefore not seem like the best option for Tsai to defeat the Kuomintang at this point, and there is also considerable risk to the United States in adopting a one-sided political stance. In the face of the Ukraine crisis, it will be up to the political wisdom of the United States to avoid simultaneously making waves in the Taiwan Strait — unless the United States is intent on a showdown right now with the Chinese mainland to resolve the issue of Taiwan.

The author is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies, Chinese Culture University, Taiwan.