U.S. China Policy Team Change: ‘China Hands’ Out, ‘Japan Hands’ In

Recently the Obama administration successively replaced three key officials who have been in charge of the U.S.-China diplomacy for but a very short time. Jeffrey Bader, Obama’s chief adviser on China policy, will soon leave the White House and return to the Brookings Institute, the Washington think tank where he worked previously. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, whose responsibilities have focused on Chinese affairs, has been planning to return to the academic community. Some time ago, Jon Huntsman, the U.S. Ambassador to China, also announced his resignation; Gary Faye Locke, a Chinese-American who has been the Secretary of Commerce, will be replacing him.

Among these three people, both Bader and Huntsman are typical “China hands” who speak Chinese fluently, have had dealings with China for years and have established deep connections. Although Steinberg does not specialize in research on China-related issues, he has also been working in foreign policy study circles for many years. He is the author of the “strategic reassurance” policy on China and has adopted two Chinese girls as his daughters.

What concerns people more is that the successors to Bader and Steinberg are all “Japan hands.” Bader’s position as the White House National Security Council’s Senior Director of Asian Affairs will be assumed by his assistant, Daniel Russell, the former U.S. General Council to Osaka and Kobe in Japan. It is also reported that Steinberg’s successor will be Kurt Campbell, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is equally familiar with Japanese affairs.

Does this mean that United States’ decision making on policy on China will be guided by the “Japanese clique” instead of the “Chinese clique?” Will this have any influence on the U.S.-China relationship during the second half of Obama’s term?

“This could be just an coincidence, but could also represent other arrangements.” Professor Zhang Jiadong in the Center for American Studies in Fudan University told Oriental Outlook. “This round of personnel changes could just be Obama’s attempt to reconsider his policy on China.”

How significant will this change’s influence prove on U.S. policy on China after the three “China hands” have departed? We must first clarify one question: How is the U.S. policy making team on China formed?

Zhang Jiadong told reporters from Oriental Outlook that in the United States the national system is divided among the executive, legislative and judicial powers and that the departments involved in decision-making on Chinese policy mainly belong to the executive and legislative branches. Besides the White House and related administrative departments, associated members in both the House of Representatives and the Senate also participate in decision-making regarding Chinese policy. However, generally speaking, for the moment “U.S. China policy decision makers” mainly refers to the president and the executive branch.

Among them, the core level consists of those White House advisers who directly provide suggestions to the president. Many of them are not on the U.S. official names list or well-known to the public — they are just private advisers, though very influential. In addition, there are advisers involved with China-related issues in the White House administrative system, including the White House Asian Affairs Director at the National Security Council, who can also directly affect the president. The National Security Council is one of the most important diplomatic policy decision-making organs for the U.S. president. When the president handles important diplomatic affairs, he often has to convene meetings with the National Security Council.

The second level consists of governmental entities responsible for Chinese affairs, such as the U.S. State Department (comparable to the Chinese Foreign Ministry). The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. State Department is the official who directly oversees foreign policy related to China at the State Department.

The third level is the Pentagon, the U.S. Defense Department, which is also an important participant in the China policy decision-making process.

It is worth mentioning that although the U.S. State Department has a very strong reputation, its size is not very significant among administrative departments in the U.S. government. The Pentagon, however, is a very powerful department — its annual budget is already up to hundreds of billions of dollars, and it employs up to around two million people.

“For example, if China’s vessels crashed with U.S. vessels at sea, the Navy would vigorously appeal within the Pentagon that the U.S. should be tough on China. Then, this opinion would be brought to the president through channels in the Defense Department, thus affecting the president’s decisions,” Zhang Jiadong said.

Fourth includes other departments that exercise any influence on Chinese policy, of course, such as the intelligence departments made up of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Information gathered and put together by these two departments has significant influence on the U.S. president’s decisions.

Thus it is clear that the three high ranking officials who resigned this time did indeed occupy core positions on the U.S.’s China policy decision-making team. However, these departures are not decisive in the complicated U.S-China relationship. Professor Zu Mingquan of the Center for U.S. Studies at Fudan University told Oriental Outlook that as China and the United States stand today, there are already a lot more people and departments who have joined in the decision making process on Chinese policy. “The Departments of Commerce, Science and Technology, Agriculture and Labor all have exerted more and more influence on Chinese policy decision-making. The power to lead the making of diplomatic policy has been distributed to multiple administrative departments.” It is not decided by just few people alone.

The “Japanese clique” takes over: A coincidence or an arrangement?

After the “China hands” leave, the “Japan hands” take over all aspects of the work. Is this just a coincidence or is it a deliberate arrangement?

Zhang Jiadong thought that there could be factor of coincidence, because it is known that the United States has a very limited reserve of highly trained diplomats, so the selection of such talented people draws from a relatively small circle. “China hands” have directed the first half, and now the “Japan hands” have taken over the second half.

At the same time, he thought that this round of personnel changes might just be Obama’s attempt to reconsider his policy on China — letting people who thoroughly “know China” very well to participate directly in decision-making on China policy is not usually something that is seen as a bonus in the United States’ complicated political arena.

“If you can speak Chinese and have been to China, then Americans will suspect your loyalty to the United States. More often than not, people who ‘know China’ well are more anti-China and strongly uphold their stand against China inside the U.S. This phenomenon often appears in United States’ foreign policy,” Zhang Jiadong said.

Zu Mingquan also maintains the same perspective: “If one seems to have a very intimate relationship with China, then one is more willing to make this a clear-cut relationship. For example, every time Gary Faye Locke faces ethnicity related questions on public occasions, he always emphasizes his identity as an American. In our country, certain people feel that Chinese-Americans and Chinese experts would be more moderate and friendly, but such an expectation is very difficult to realize in reality.”

Looking at it from another point of view, it is also possible that these core advisers have made the attempt to change Obama. People in the United States now have given Obama a new name: “George W. Obama,” meaning that Obama’s diplomacy has become more and more like Bush Jr.’s.

“Some people who resigned might have first entered Obama’s administration with the expectation that Obama would be a president who was multilateral, moderate, would contract internationally and be able to handle diplomacy well. However, now many of Obama’s international actions seem to indicate that he was forced to walk Bush Jr.’s path. For instance, American troops have stayed a little longer in Iraq, more were invested in Afghanistan’s army, and troops were sent to attack Libya. These actions were in contradiction with many people’s ideologies when they first joined the administration.”

Is this bad news for the U.S.-China relationship?

As the three “China hands” depart, and two “Japan hands” and Gary Faye Locke, a Chinese-American ambassador, walk center stage and take charge of the co-existence of two major countries for the second half of Obama’s term, the crucial question asks: Is this good news or bad news for the U.S.-China relationship?

The matter indeed seems worrisome.

As some experts have pointed out, Gary Faye Locke’s status as a Chinese-American might make him to less free to act on certain key issues. “As the U.S.-China relationship is placed on a basis of mutual distrust, sending over a Chinese-American ambassador could mean that promises will be made but not kept,” Zhang Jiadong said.

In regard to the other two people, Daniel Russel’s Japanese is fluent, and he was the American General Council to Osaka and Kobe in Japan. The Associate Press called him directly a “Japan hand” and Bader a “China hand” and thought that both were distinguished.

Before Kurt Campbell joined the State Department, he was employed at the Pentagon, and was a high ranking official in the Defense Department responsible for Asian and Pacific affairs during the Clinton administration. He reportedly guided the redefinition of the Japanese-American military alliance while he was in office.

The Associated Press indicated at the time when he was confirmed to join the State Department that “[a] State Department official said that if Campbell assumes the post, it would be favorable to Japan as he could serve as a counterweight to Clinton, who some in Japan fear would lead the United States to tilt toward China.”

But, all the experts who have accepted Oriental Outlook’s interviews thought that we should not simply divide the so-called “China hands” and “Japan hands.” The U.S.-China relationship will not significantly change just because of this; and certain personnel changes “may not be a bad thing but rather helpful” to the future development of the U.S.-China relationship.

Zu Mingquan said, “In the past we often saw that objective and friendly assessments from these ‘China hands’ did not really reflect the state of the development of the U.S.-China relationship. On the one hand, ‘the more one knows about China, the more anti-China one is’ is a common phenomenon. On the other hand, diplomats must first represent and safeguard their country’s interests: Personal specialty, background, behavior and likes and dislikes are stringently restricted by their country’s foreign policy.”

It seems that the U.S. side has a similar point of view. Bader, who is soon to be relieved from duty, accepted Oriental Outlook’s interview when he first took office and emphasized “The United States’ policy on China always has a strong continuity. All seven U.S. presidents since President Nixon have been constantly fixing and perfecting this concept. The similarities between every president’s policy are greater that their differences. Therefore, I don’t believe that Obama will deviate from this policy.”