The Future of the Liberal Order

The theory of the decline of U.S. hegemony is experiencing a surge of denial among the political elites in the United States. In a certain way, those opposing this theory raise valid arguments. Militarily, the United States remains unassailable. Economically, it is the biggest economy; the GNP per capita is 10 times more than that of China. In terms of security, the network of alliances is so extensive, accepted and desired that only with many decades of good diplomacy and changes of alliances will it be possible for China to arrive at the same position. Culturally, universities, science and research continue to be top and maintain a technologically enviable performance.

However, more important is the political dimension. A liberal order revolving around American power was capable of raising and amplifying multilateral institutions, liberal democracies and commercial freedom (an arc which passes over America, Asia and Europe). It happens that an order with these characteristics can only be maintained by liberal democracies. The organizations which support it are also a consequence of this political nature, not able to survive a collapse. In other words, the stability of this order, as we have known it in the last half of the century, is unlikely to survive an implosion of the European Union or of NATO. I say this for a reason: A multipolar order — which implies an equivalent distribution in all dimensions of power among the various great powers — will not necessarily lead to more stability, security and prosperity. This would be more linear if all the poles had a democratic nature and respected freedoms. This is not the case. In such a way a liberal order is only supported by liberal nations. Non-democratic powers and non-liberal orders influence a less free order. The great challenge for Western policy in the coming decades is not keeping track of the decline of the U.S., but rather concern with an autocratic ascension. Power is never won in vain.