Justin Vaïsse Discusses American Foreign Policy

Historian Justin Vaïsse is director of research for the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He is the author of many books; his latest, “The Foreign Policy of Barack Obama,” has just been published in France. For “Les Echos,” he goes over some of the hot topics in foreign policy on the eve of the candidates’ third presidential debate.

Is there an Obama Doctrine?

In the narrow sense, yes; that would be reducing the American military footprint, most notably in the Middle East. The withdrawal from Iraq, fewer troops in Afghanistan — after a temporary rise in power — and light intervention in Libya, the famous ‘leading from behind.’ In the place of heavy on-the-ground interventions, the president has used new instruments of war — cyber-attacks, drones and special forces raids, which are less costly both financially and politically. This approach reflects the fact that, upon his arrival to power, the United States had been focused on questions of security and had launched two costly wars in the Middle East, to the detriment of the rest of its foreign policy. Yet during this period, Washington missed the birth of a new world — the rise in power of emerging countries, in particular the giant that is China, and the relative drop in power of the United States. Some adjustments needed to be made.

What kind of adjustments?

Several kinds. To go from ground wars to lighter military intervention methods, to go from questions of security to diplomatic and economic issues and, finally, to go from the Middle East to the emerging world and Asia Pacific, in particular, all of which were neglected by Bush. This rebalancing is Obama’s grand idea. It was disturbed by the Arab Spring, which forced the U.S. to reinvest in the region and specifically in Iran. The war in Libya confirmed the nature of the adjustments made by Obama; it cost around $900 million dollars and rested largely on the shoulders of European allies.

Is this what Republicans are calling ‘leading from behind’?

Yes, they see a condemnable abdication of leadership there, almost cowardice. Actually, this is rather wise. America no longer has the power required to have a hegemonic policy like that of the George W. Bush administration; it is necessary to find modes of less expensive action, while remaining effective. It’s also a question of image. It would be better to avoid alienating the rest of the world.

How did the United States experience the Arab Spring?

Obama wanted to disengage as much as possible from the Middle East, where America used up its forces, without this region becoming as important for its future as Asia, for example. This in part conditioned his response to the Arab Spring. He acted with great pragmatism, using a case-by-case approach which could appear to be a lack of political and moral coherence. Why intervene in Libya and not in Syria? Why let the Egyptian regime fall but not Bahrain’s? Above all, he wanted to avoid vicious circles.

Are Republicans more interventionist?

In discourse, yes. But Romney also has a good dose of pragmatism and the public mood, even that of Republicans, is not for interventionism. If he’s elected, he’ll be ready to adapt his position according to the circumstances which, in this context, are valuable. His speech on Oct. 8 demonstrated both tough neo-conservative rhetoric and a great prudence in its main points. He didn’t announce a no-fly zone in Syria. He’s not committed to attacking Iran. His only real difference from Obama is the defense budget, which he wishes to increase significantly. Journalist James Traub spoke of a Romney doctrine called “more enemies, fewer friends.” It’s a question of shaking up allies so that they take a tougher stance with China or Russia.

Israel also seems to be a subject that divides Republicans and Democrats.

Because of the strategy he selected, Israel has been Obama’s great failure. He wanted to put distance between America and Israel in order to obtain the cooperation of Arab states and thus start a virtuous circle of reciprocal concessions. This didn’t work because Netanyahu dug his heals in right away, and because he neglected the true arbitrator of this strategy — that is, namely, Israeli public opinion. After two years, he has switched to “damage control” mode. Republicans criticize the president for being a bad ally to Israel, which is absurd, because this country had never received so much money from the United States for its security.

Doesn’t the United States feel a certain indifference toward Europe?

The United States is interested in players of the international system when they pose a problem or offer solutions; this was not really the case with Europe during the first two years. As of 2011, Obama’s enthusiasm for emerging powers had dwindled. They were not ready to play the major role that Obama had reserved for them. The Brazilian-Turkish initiative on Iranian nuclear power, which directly contradicted the American stance, showed the limits of this strategy very clearly. Inversely, Europeans supported Obama on the major issues. This was seen with Libya, the Arab Spring and the issue of Iran, where European economic sanctions are a crucial element. Thus, Europeans are more a part of the solution to the world’s problems but, at the same time, they have become a problem for the United States, thanks to the Euro crisis.