The Roots and Pitfalls of the US Pivot toward Asia

The idea seems simple enough: The focal point of the U.S. foreign politics, which includes its national security and economic interests, will turn toward Asia. According to official terminology, this movement has been designated the U.S. “pivot.” In the eyes of Obama, this pivot will also consist of a change in America’s strategy, long considered one of the Pacific’s powerhouses, toward an Asian partnership.

America’s turn towards Asia is all the more justified since the U.S. fears the rise of Chinese military power and Beijing’s aggression toward the U.S.’ long-standing allies in both the East China Sea and West China Sea. China has been increasing its military spending by more than 10 percent per annum for the past 20 years — and predicts a 10.7 percent rise in 2013. This policy could one day see China become a worrying rival for the United States, not to mention the threat that North Korea presents to South Korea.

Today the pivot is facilitated by two completely different elements, which will allow the U.S. to reduce its presence in what former President George W. Bush called the “Greater Middle East,” a region stretching from the North African countries to Afghanistan and Pakistan. First of all, the U.S. Army completely withdrew from Iraq in December 2011 and is preparing to do the same in Afghanistan before the end of 2014. Furthermore, the U.S. foresees the possibility of reducing its energy dependence on oil imports from the Middle East thanks to shale gas. The end of the Cold War has paved the way for their gradual retreat from Europe, which should continue with an additional reduction in the number of troops based in Germany.

The “pivot” consists of two major elements. On the one hand, Obama’s America wishes to improve its economic and commercial integration with Asia by taking part, specifically, in the East Asia Summit for the first time. Obama also plans to announce his willingness to negotiate a free-trade agreement within the realm of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

On the other hand, Obama’s commitment to Asia-Pacific will also involve plans to reposition the military. This is shown in Obama’s announcement to progressively deploy 2,500 Marines to the new base in Darwin, Australia as of April 2012. America has also strengthened its ties with Singapore thanks to U.S. warships docked along its coast and with the Philippines by deploying surveillance planes and by carrying out troop rotations more frequently. The goal is to allow greater flexibility with military rotations in the region and to focus less on permanent U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea. According to the Congressional Research Service, around 4,500 U.S. soldiers in Japan could therefore be sent to Guam, which already has the exact same number of soldiers.

Another point: despite planned budget cuts to the military budget, America wishes to maintain funding for the Navy, to the detriment of other areas of the military.

Yet as simple as it seems, this strategic decision could produce the opposite result of what Obama aims to achieve: improve, stabilize and establish a partnership with Asia-Pacific and to reassure Asian allies, above all Japan, as China still considers itself inferior and could take offense at the Americans reinforcing their presence. In response to the presence of 11 American aircraft carriers, China built its first aircraft carrier in 2011, a relatively small warship bought from Russia and refurbished. Instead of easing tensions with Asia, analysts believe that the U.S. pivot could actually produce the opposite effect, resulting in the Chinese military authorities toughening their stance. Beijing is now talking about a return to “Cold War mentality.”

In a Foreign Affairs article entitled “The Problem with the Pivot,” Robert Ross, a Harvard professor, emphasizes that “the new U.S. policy unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities and will only feed China’s aggressiveness, undermine regional stability and decrease the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.” This policy is founded “on a judgment error”: Beijing’s toughened diplomatic stance has not arisen from overconfidence but from a feeling of instability after many years of financial crisis and social unrest.

An important question remains: Does America have the means to allocate part of its budget for its Asian ambitions? According to global intelligence company Stratfor, automatic cuts, which were implemented last week, will reduce military spending by at least 8 percent, or $500 billion, over ten years. These cuts will be spread out over all the military. Furthermore, America’s goal of energy independence from the Middle East is only a far-off possibility. Moreover, unlike Hillary Clinton, John Kerry — Clinton’s successor — took his first tour of duty as secretary of state in Europe and in the Middle East and not in Asia. This is a sign that Washington hasn’t yet turned its back on its “old” allies. Admittedly, it has been such a long time that the pivot has been under way that it would be impossible to turn back now. The United States will continue to go back and forth between the two.