Still Missing: Washington’s Plan

At the meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Poland, the member from Washington had to put off his colleagues. Pentagon Chief Robert Gates crossed the Atlantic with the intention of convincing his allies they had to become more engaged in Afghanistan. But Gates can’t explain exactly how he intends to bring about a change in the Hindu Kush. The new U.S. strategy so eagerly awaited by NATO members is still in the works.

Even some in Washington admit that President Obama is putting the cart before the horse. They still have no plan, but Washington will proceed regardless by sending an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan, and will continue to press their NATO allies for increased engagement in both the militarily and civilian sectors. The White House is saying, in effect, that no time can be wasted, but that on the other hand an examination of the war strategy can’t be hurried. Better correctly than rapidly is the message here. The old strategy has admittedly failed. Gates says Iraq is no longer America’s “greatest military challenge;” Afghanistan is.

At least the basic tenets of the new approach are already recognizable. Obama had already promised to send an additional two combat brigades to Afghanistan while he was on the campaign trail. This week, he began that process by announcing deployment of 17,000 additional troops. There may be more: Obama’s commanders on the ground in Afghanistan would like to see a doubling of the 36,000 troops already in the country. General David McKiernan announced that the increased troop level would last for three to five years.

In contrast to George W. Bush, Obama doesn’t intend to win the war on the battlefield in Afghanistan. The new mantra in Washington is that the conflict in Afghanistan requires, above all, a political solution. This vision calls for a realization of special envoy Richard Holbrook’s mandate called “AfPak” in Washington – Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is clear, however, that Washington will first have to decide what future strategic goals it wishes to pursue in the Hindu Kush.

The United States is also reconsidering its support of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Vice-President Joe Biden has already put Karzai on notice that the U.S. expects more of him, especially in the fight against governmental corruption and the drug trade. One of the most important questions facing Washington is whether or not to support Karzai in the upcoming elections to be held in August. Who are the alternative candidates if the U.S. declines to support Karzai? Equally as thorny is the question of whether to increase support to the central Afghan government, or to turn to the power elites in the provinces. Iraq stands as an example, where the United States supported and armed the Sunni tribal militias. But critics warn that the potential risks of such a “warlord strategy” would be incalculable.