Mubarak Is Not Dead

The concern of the United States is not a simple diplomatic formula: Egypt and Turkey are the two pillar-states of U.S. politics in the Middle East (not counting Israel, which falls under a different definition, or Saudi Arabia).

Egypt underwent a military coup. Even the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, admitted it. The United States cannot admit it; that would mean cutting back on [Egyptian] Army funding. U.S. law forbids giving aid to countries where the current leaders resulted from a coup. And in 2013 — as announced by Secretary of State John Kerry at the Cairo meeting in March, with Minister of Defense General Abdul Fatah Saeed Hussein Khalil al-Sisi — Americans are prepared to give the Egyptian army $1.3 billion.

In the meantime, the coup occurred. The elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was arrested. After two weeks of cautious statements, the Americans — following Germany — asked for Morsi’s release. This way, one of the most obvious evidences of the coup might be put aside.

Egypt is on the brink of economic collapse; the American aid offered to the [Egyptian] Army could be a lifeline. Otherwise, the renewal of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (whose loan would lead to a long period of austerity) could keep people protesting in the streets.

The removal of President Morsi is seen in Washington as a third stage of the revolutionary process (the first, Mubarak’s removal; the second, the transition to free elections). Let us remember, however, that the Egyptian revolution started at the end of January 2011 with the overthrow of Mubarak, under two slogans: 1) “Bread, liberty, social justice”; 2) “The people want an end to the regime.” But the dragon that is “nizam*” had three heads: the dictator Mubarak, his clique and the [Egyptian] Army.

Today, the [Egyptian] Army is back in power at the head of the country (whose control it always retained), but — the irony of history! — it also now controls the street, or at least the part of the street that asked it for help against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other side of the street are the winners of the elections, who consider themselves cheated and betrayed. With these two immense groups facing one another, the spark of civil war is at any moment ready to ignite.

The United States cannot afford to declare open support for one side or the other. According to General Al-Sisi, the Egyptian Army is, in any case, deeply grateful to them.

Maybe a short history of the substantial military aid that the Americans have been pouring into Israel (approximately $3 billion per year) and Egypt for over three decades would be relevant. The story started in 1979, with the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Then, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and its oil reserves, demanding instead long-term compensation from the United States.

For its part, Egypt had to be rewarded for this historical step that built a pillar of stability in the area. The fall of Mubarak, America’s main Arab ally, was not at all good news for Israel. (Nor for another ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia; King Abdullah asked President Obama imperatively at the time to not humiliate Mubarak in his sympathetic statements toward those in Tahrir Square.) Moreover, after the installation of Morsi as president, Prime Minister Netanyahu sent him a letter, in which he reminded him, essentially, of one thing: the peace treaty from 1979.

Between civil war and military dictatorship, the promised democratic elections in Egypt will not bring — not immediately — bread, freedom or social justice.

*Translator’s Note: The meaning of the word is broader than “regime”; it would be more synonymous with “system.”