A 'New Type of Great Power Relationship'?

The widely observed fifth round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue concluded a few days ago. This round of talks reveals that although some progress has been made toward establishing a mutual understanding on a new type of great power relationship, significant differences between the two nations have yet to be overcome.

What does “a new type of great power relationship” mean? The basic meaning is no conflict and no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. “New” refers to no conflict and no confrontation; it calls to mind the concept’s main goal of avoiding the conflict, confrontation and wars that characterized traditional great power relationships. “Mutual respect” refers to respect for each other’s territorial sovereignty and other core interests as a necessary precondition for the idea to succeed. “Win-win cooperation” refers to mutually beneficial interaction based on mutual trust, which is the optimal path for developing and maintaining a new type of great power relationship.

Based on the latest round of dialogue, it appears that the U.S. understands but does not completely accept this concept. At a prior leadership summit, Obama had expressed that although the U.S. and China are very important countries, the concept of a “new type of great power relationship” has not been used. It can be said then, that Obama’s formal affirmation of the formulation during this round of talks represents a measure of progress. In addition, 91 agreements were concluded on matters of strategic security, energy and environment, economy and trade, military exchanges and eight other areas. Although most of these were only declarations of intent, their significance to bilateral relations going forward should not be underestimated. China and the U.S. have many shared economic interests and interdependencies, which gives the nations a shared language and has enabled discussions to visibly bear fruit in areas such as energy, climate cooperation and investment agreements.

However, America’s lack of trust toward China is still apparent, for example in its stance on high-tech exports, where it is showing less flexibility than before. There is also ambiguity and a feeling of disrespect in America’s attitude toward China’s core interests. On the matter of cybersecurity, it continues to make groundless accusations toward China; on the Snowden affair, not only has it not provided the required explanations, it has falsely accused China of letting Snowden escape.

The dual nature of America’s attitude is not incidental, but rather consistent with the current nature of Sino-U.S. relations and the United States’ basic policy on China. The first aspect of this is the contradiction between China’s peaceful development and America’s hegemony. Although America understands that China has neither the power nor the political intention to threaten it, the rapid rise in China’s strength will inevitably pose a challenge to its hegemony (at this stage, primarily in the western Pacific region). America sees China as its primary rival, whose rise must be contained in order to mitigate the risk of having its hegemony challenged. This is the basis of America’s containment policy and Sino-American competition.

The other aspect of America’s attitude is the high degree of mutual interdependency, which stands in contrast to U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, and is not only limited to economic matters. If contradictions are allowed to fester and frictions escalate to direct conflict, not only would the gains from mutual interdependency fail to materialize, the losses to both sides would be something no one wishes to see. Since both countries are in the same boat in this regard, America too has been calling for increased cooperation. This is the basis of America’s engagement policy and Sino-American cooperation. In the face of this duality, the optimal path is to manage our differences and step up win-win cooperation. Such is also the foundation for the new type of great power relationship between China and America.

It should be noted that there is an overbearing attitude of “I’m the boss” and an exclusive consideration of U.S. interests that lingers, [indicating that] a kind of Cold War logic still occupies an important place in U.S. policy. This constitutes the biggest obstacle to the new type of great power relationship. It should also be recognized that reaching consensus and implementing it in practice are not the same thing. Building a new type of great power relationship between China and the U.S. will be a long process, one that will require plenty of strategic patience, deep political wisdom and excellence in the art of struggle and courage.

The author is the former Chinese ambassador to India and former Director of Policy Research at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.