The Peace Process and Kerry’s Travels

Amid the political atmosphere — charged with the pessimism and frustration that the Palestinians and their negotiators feel because of Israel’s policies, which fill the negotiations with stumbling blocks and place the Palestinians in a weak position, considering their national commitment to deadlines — is U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, on his new Middle East tour. Leaks and speculations about the format or the American ideas, which will be exposed to the two sides in the event of their failure to move forward on the issues of borders and security in the coming weeks, accompany him.

Evaluations say that the United States places priority on its calculations that there will be a political vacuum in the peace process. This was leaked weeks ago across American and Israeli media as the cornerstone of the American thought process. Despite the reigning Palestinian, Israeli and American denial or lack of confirmation about these leaks, the truth is Kerry possesses similar views. Those views will be marketed as a foundation for the negotiations of a lasting peace, convincing the Palestinians to remain at the table. This comes in the context of the comprehensive Arab peace initiative that deals with the security, economy and requirements of both sides.

Dominant in Palestinian thinking is the idea that the U.S. is more serious than ever before about advancing the peace process. This thinking perhaps acts as one justification for diplomacy and civility. I consider it as such. The question is — does the American administration have a political desire in this direction? Or, what about the speculation coming from a perception that engaging in changes to the arrangement of a new regional map requires calm everywhere, including in the Palestinian negotiations?

In fact, most observers tend toward the assessment that considers new regional arrangements to be basic factors behind the American surge in moving the Palestinian/Israeli issue forward. Moving forward does not necessitate moving far in any solution toward a historic compromise. For its part, Israel realizes that it must harmonize with the U.S. position. I do not think that head of the Israeli government Netanyahu’s policy of resentment, which is based on the Geneva agreement between Iran and the West, includes resisting America’s position on this issue.

Perhaps the West seeks to realize gains, political and material, from this. It follows that there is no escape from bending to the American desire — which he supports deep down as more than a passing cloud dictated by circumstances. The most important thing is that Washington accept a veto disabling or obstructing any advancement in the later stages to remain exclusively Israeli.

For example, early elections require the Palestinians to wait for the new Israeli political order, while the Israelis “shuffle the cards” for months — remember the elections of 1999. The Palestinians will not escape from the resultant calls to wait, and waiting does not strengthen their position for many reasons.

From their side, Palestinian negotiators do not see an escape from entering into these negotiations, despite previous thinking that they would never come to fruition. President Abbas expressed that he was sure of this on more than one occasion, paving the way for possible alternatives. He ascribes to the decision to engage in the negotiations under unclear standards and on unstable ground to the wider Palestinian opposition’s meeting diplomatic considerations that cannot be ignored. Abbas does not mind accepting this formula, and he sees it as providing him with cover and a political rationale to demonstrate alternative choices in the international arena in the later stages of the peace process in light of the expected failure.

This is what explains the Palestinians’ requirement for a timetable for these negotiations, which one American writer, Ian Lustick, in an editorial entitled “The Two-State Illusion” defines as discussions, meaning they did not live up to the level of the true definition of the term “negotiations.”

Parallel to this, in the middle of Israel stalling these negotiations for the last four months and in the shadow of American tardiness — normal during the last 20 years — in bridging gaps, rescuing the situation from collapse, pressuring Israel by defining it as the obstructionist party, come the American efforts to deal with Israeli/Palestinian bickering. Those efforts were unknown until recently and have attained no official status. The purpose is to strengthen the basis for diplomacy from every angle, and they are exclusively American. Moving again toward the broadening and expansion of time limits, undoubtedly, the negotiations are empty of any political value. The hope for compromise solutions remains far from possible in the issue’s defining moment.