US Indictment of Chinese Officers for Cyberespionage Is a Fabrication with Ulterior Motive

On May 19, the U.S. Justice Department announced the indictment of five Chinese military officers on charges of purported cyberespionage. This is the first time in the history of the U.S. that it has brought legal action against “known state actors for infiltrating United States commercial targets by cyber means.” One could say that the charges are a total fabrication, an example of the pot calling the kettle black, and being raised with ulterior purpose.

These authors believe that in this case, China should strike back decisively.

First, it should release its response into the realm of public opinion. China should move to counteract the notions that the U.S. is the only victim of cyberattacks and that China is the “common enemy” in global cybersecurity. The U.S. has been able to manufacture such ideas by virtue of having long held the advantage in competing systems of value, which in turn can be attributed to its adroitness at controlling global opinion. 1) Based on the fact that the U.S. initiated cyberattacks, espionage and network monitoring against China, China must force the U.S. to publicly admit that [China] is the primary source of cyberattacks by the U.S. and cease its one-sided accusations. 2) China should demand a response from the U.S. explaining its actions, as well as a promise to move forward in earnest toward investigating and putting an end to the cyberattacks on China that originate in the U.S. and not allow it to dodge the issue. 3) China should demand that the U.S. actively respond to the proposal put forth by China and other nations to set international information security standards, as well as promise to cease all Internet monitoring and criminal activity toward China.

Second, China must establish a mechanism for business-government cooperation so as to strengthen its position in this chess match. This incident provides a classic example of an American-style “business-government alliance” that strategically strikes its opponents in the competition between great powers. The U.S. uses these methods in an effort to check its adversaries and benefit itself at the expense of others. China should establish such a mechanism for business-government cooperation to combine their respective forces. It should continually work to enhance China’s strength and skill in the competition and chess match between powers through redirecting the technological capabilities of commercial enterprises to political ends. This will provide direct benefits for companies and also afford greater strategic options for the nation as a whole.

Third, China should take measures to effectively raise its cybersecurity-related technological support capabilities within this game between powers. It should strongly augment those resources that establish proactive defensive capabilities within cybersecurity. This includes increasing its capabilities to effectively discover, continue to track, and thoroughly analyze cyberattacks from all sources, greatly improving anti-tracking and cyberattack countermeasures, working toward closer integration with the development of modern information technology, and producing timely research into offensive and defensive technologies. This will allow China to gain more equal footing in the political game between powers by providing the means to expose the attacks of others, as well as technological support in refuting the accusations of foreign nations.

Fourth, China must establish a system for cybersecurity investigations as quickly as possible in order to better examine the information technology products, services and companies of foreign nations.