Why Washington and Beijing Are Playing a Game of ‘Mask Diplomacy’

The pandemic is helping Southeast Asia make a geopolitical choice

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, a peculiar game of “mask diplomacy” has broken out between states. The aim of the game is to use humanitarian and medical aid to form a positive image of one’s country, smooth over rough patches in international relations and realize foreign policy ambitions. Consequently, the standoff between The People’s Republic of China and the United States in Southeast Asia is getting a lot of attention.

Today, this small region is extremely significant both for the world’s two most powerful countries and for the rest of the world. Therefore, any changes in American and Chinese policies will immediately trigger a reexamination of the orientations and strategies of Southeast Asia’s smaller nations, which are forced to rely on the decisions and capabilities of these large countries.

In total, Beijing’s “mask diplomacy” has affected 120 countries. Naturally, the majority of the governments in Asia, which is vital for China, have been given help. For the most part, China has been helping those Southeast Asian countries that are trying to soften their position in relation to Beijing’s South China Sea policy. And although China’s actions, despite all the public declarations, don’t look particularly sincere considering the fact that they ignored the threats at the end of last year, they have still played an important role in combating the virus in Asia. Two factors have enabled this: the U.S.’ temporary retreat from Southeast Asia back in March, when Washington gave the region just $18 million out of a general investment of $274 million, as well as America’s refusal to finance the World Health Organization.

With this in mind, Beijing’s actions in the fight against COVID-19 and their increase in WHO funding are exceptionally positive deeds, despite their obviously politically-motivated nature. However, it’s hard for the majority of countries, be it Malaysia, Indonesia or Myanmar, to confront China’s “soft” pressure, since the current pandemic carries a significant threat and not all states have the necessary resources to fight it. Aid was particularly important during the first stage of the pandemic due to a serious lack of testing kits for the new type of coronavirus. The local Asian elite basically had nobody else to turn to.

The situation changed in June when the U.S. provided more essential assistance in the fight against COVID-19 by increasing its funding to four times as much as it was in March, including for Southeast Asia. It should be pointed out that of the $77 million that the Americans had earmarked for this region, the majority of it went to countries that are the most susceptible to Beijing’s influence, i.e., the Philippines ($19 million), Cambodia ($13.5 million) and Myanmar ($13.5 million).

It’s also worth mentioning the size of the aid package that was given to the Philippines as a separate issue, as the government had previously been debating the possibility of terminating the Visiting Forces Agreement. The U.S. sending aid to the Philippines practically coincided with Manila’s desire to prolong the pact with Washington. This, coupled with the Philippines’ claims against China regarding the Chinese Navy’s disproportionately active operations and the inclusion of several disputed islands in the Chinese administrative divisions, demonstrates a partial geopolitical reorientation from the Philippines and President Rodrigo Duterte’s wish to negotiate better conditions for his country.

The actions of Vietnam, which is, as we know, backed by the U.S., will be illustrative of the actions of the other countries in the region: it’s Vietnam that essentially serves as the yardstick for Washington’s real interest in the region. Right now, Hanoi is trying to carry out its own independent humanitarian policy; however, due to limited means, the focus is less on its own efforts, and more on the collaborative action of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states, which was conclusively set out in a joint statement during the Special ASEAN Summit on April 14.

In this way, for the time being, American and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia is almost on a level footing. And even Beijing’s careless attitude toward COVID-19 at the end of last year, as well as China’s aggressive operations in the South China Sea, which have triggered a deterioration in relations with the ASEAN countries, has not stopped the growth of China’s influence in the region as a result of geographical proximity and Washington’s current unpredictability.

However, at the end of the day, the activities of the two superpowers that are competing to increase their influence in the region depend on two strategic factors. The first is the development and distribution of a vaccine against COVID-19. Whoever is the first to produce an effective vaccine and can deliver it in sufficient quantities will be the one who strengthens their position among the Southeast Asian countries, forcing those countries to rely on them.

The second factor is the process of reanimating the region’s economy, as the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and quarantining restrictions have taken a drastic toll on the economic performance of both of these countries and the globe. As a result, despite the success of the virus combating measures, countries in Southeast Asia such as Cambodia are often experiencing extremely unfavorable economic situations. Whoever helps these governments in today’s difficult circumstances, be it the U.S. or China, will have the right to look forward to a bout of reciprocal “geopolitical gratitude.”