Washington Steps Back

Based on U.S. government sources, as per the article, if what “The Economist”* contends about the military treaty between Colombia and Venezuela** is true – and there is no reason to doubt it – then the hypothesis that I defended in last Sunday’s article*** gains momentum: the United States is a bad ally, as proven by the history of its international relations and conflicts in which it has participated, and it is necessary for Colombia to take this into account in order to redesign its foreign policy.

The Obama administration is beginning to distance itself from the treaty, which, according to the sources mentioned, was made more to please President Uribe than for strategic reasons, because, the sources go on to say, the United States already has bases in Panama, El Salvador and Curacao, from which they could act in Venezuelan territory. In addition, even without the treaty, they say, the United States has had a presence in Colombia for years, including initiating the flyovers that have caused Chavez so much annoyance. In the eyes of Washington politicians, for the two reasons cited, the agreement was doubly unnecessary.

Some say that the United States did a favor for Uribe, who, fearful of the increase in Venezuelan military power, begged for the treaty to be signed in order to deter Venezuela without having to enter into an arms race – unwinnable because of the asymmetry in economic resources which oil produces in the latter country. The worst thing, add The Economist’s sources, is that the North American government did not foresee the consequences that this treaty would have in South America – neither did Uribe, by the way – and ended up creating distance with countries such as Brazil and Chile, which in some form were friends of Colombia.

It is common knowledge that when politicians from any country in the world, especially the United States, leak a story or informally release some information through the news media, it is because it is preparing public opinion for actions or policies that could not be implemented without advance work in manipulating public opinion. For the first cracks to appear in its resolve to maintain the military alliance, it was sufficient for Chavez to make threats and raise the tone of his aggression against Colombia and his rhetoric against the United States In the end, the U.S. can live without a democratic Colombia, but it cannot live, at least not now, without Venezuelan oil.

In the geopolitical chess game, Colombia is a pawn that could eventually be sacrificed in exchange for energy, and Chavez knows this. So he intensifies and accelerates his offensive strategy to destabilize our government and create conditions for the arrival of one of his henchmen to our government. He is supported by armed Colombian groups, whom he protects and strengthens, and by his domestic political allies. Thus, he intimidates the Colombian people, who, weary of a prolonged and systematic propaganda campaign and accompanied by a growing number of provocations that give the very real sense of imminent danger, may end up accepting that it is better to have a dictatorship in peace with the madman and under his direction than a democracy that is permanently besieged by internal and external forces.

I suppose that military experts are doing their job and coming up with strategies for the various scenarios that Colombia will experience in the near future. One of them will almost certainly be that of a democracy not only besieged by its enemies but abandoned to its fate by its allies. Chavez will be calculating what the United States reaction would be towards an attack on Colombia.

Interestingly, this is also the job of the Colombian military. In case the conclusion is that the U.S. considers the loss of the Colombian democracy acceptable, then time begins to be an important factor. Preparing to confront and win this hypothetical, but not improbable, conflict requires, in great measure, trained and experienced personnel, something that this country already possesses as a result of decades of internal conflict and technology. Regarding the latter, we are far from satisfying our own defense needs because of the enormous cost required, but it is precisely the accumulated experience and scientific and technological development achieved so far that permits one to think about accelerating the development of defense technologies, which I understand to exist in embryonic form, and do not require so many economic resources. It also requires finding allies in other parts of the world who can support us with technology at affordable prices.

*Translator’s Note: The article entitled “Off Base” appeared in 05 December 2009 issue of “The Economist,” describing the unintended negative consequences of a recent defense agreement between the USA and Colombia, which can be summed up in one sentence: “Despite frantic explanations, Colombia is now distanced from Brazil and Chile.”

**Translator’s note: The treaty is between Colombia and the USA; this appears to be an error in the original text.

***”Last Sunday’s article” refers to “La semana internacional” by Alfonso Monsalve Solorzano in “El Mundo,” 29 November 2009. The article concludes with “Democracy in Colombia is at risk and the truth is we do not have a trustworthy ally to preserve it. We must restructure our strategy in order to obtain it. I will discuss this further in a future article.”