“My view is that Barack Obama would be a help to me and not a problem when he assumes his responsibilities. The world is vast and can accommodate two or three or four world statesmen.” This statement was made by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy in the beginning of 2009, just a few days before Obama settled in at the White House.
However, “winds may blow in a way that ships would not desire,” and relations between the French and American presidents are currently going through a state of real frostiness. Perhaps even the word frostiness could not describe the reality of the relationship between the two presidents. Barack Obama has not yet received Nicolas Sarkozy in the Oval Office of the White House. He has not even been officially invited to Washington; the last time he was officially received there was in November 2007, during the Bush era.
It is worth noting that, just a few weeks ago, Obama welcomed the president of the Republic of Botswana in the Oval Office. He also received other presidents and even the foreign minister of China. Moreover, Obama sent his first official letter to France to former President Jacque Chirac; however, the Élysée palace could wait.
In brief, there were not, as Sarkozy wished, “open” telephone lines, repeated one on one meetings, or an exchange of views on world affairs and the required strategies to deal with them between the two presidents. What seemed to be, and what Paris understood, was that Obama’s dealings with President Sarkozy were not based on the principle of a “special” relationships but rather as a president like many others, no more no less.
There were indications in what the French press reported from sources close to Sarkozy that he was, in the beginning, “deeply affected, but later defined his position even though a kind of profound anger still exists.” Indicators of this anger were noticed in Sarkozy’s own statements during his meeting with a number of journalists at the beginning of last November when he said, regarding the person he used to describe as a “close friend” during the American presidential campaign, what can be summed up as: “Obama is the head of power in America, and yet he faced defeat three times in secondary elections. As for me, however, I won in two legislative elections and in the European election. I wonder what would be said if I was defeated in those elections?”
The absence of Obama from the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall was an occasion where a great deal of anger could be seen in the statements of several French and European officials, all of whom demanded the reconsideration of relations between the old world and the new. His absence also stirred up questions in America itself. The New York Times reminded us of the fact that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War represents one of the most important moments in the common history between Europe and the U.S. in the 20th century.
What is even more profound than the “defective love” between the two men, Obama and Sarkozy, is the disparity, sometimes vast, between Washington and Paris on a number of issues; first, on the regulation of the global financial system in response to the current global financial crisis. There was an agreement between Paris and Washington during the Bush era on the necessity of a radical review of the current system, which Obama promised to follow. This is how Sarkozy dreamt “out loud” of the rise of the American-French pair which would be capable of changing the world and entering history through its widest doors.
However, disputes soon surfaced during the G-20 summit, which took place in London last April and was convened to face the ramifications of the global financial crisis. More disputes arose during the Pittsburgh summit, after the deep divisions between France and Germany on one hand, which both gave priority to regulating the international financial transactions while, on the other hand, Obama was more concerned with the revival of the American economy. This was in addition to the conflicting opinions of France and America on Afghanistan. Both presidents agree on allowing neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda free space to move. However, Sarkozy does not wish to increase the number of French forces in Afghanistan. Obama, though, adopts a strategy that relies on sending more soldiers – a strategy the American Defense Ministry (Pentagon) recommends.
There are also differences surrounding the Iranian nuclear question. Paris and Washington insist on “the complete agreement between the two countries’ viewpoints.” Nonetheless, Paris shows reservations about the diplomacy of “the extended hand” Obama adopted. One of the Élysée consultants said that “offering Obama the Nobel Prize was a mistake.” The policy of the extended hand toward isolated states has only been faced with resistance. In North Korea and Iran it was rejected.
In brief, Paris’s view is that Obama’s diplomacy and the delay of negotiations gave Iran the opportunity to gain more time to get closer to making the bomb. Among the six nations that deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, France also has the strictest discourse. Sarkozy, for one, did not hesitate to declare that he would never shake hands with the Iranian President Ahmadinejad.
On the Middle East conflict, there were differing views. Paris and Washington agree on the two-state solution and the importance of resuming negotiations, but the Obama administration looks skeptically at the great openness of Sarkozy toward Syria and what appears to be an attempt to magnify the role of France in the region at the expense of America.
There is chilliness in the relations between Obama and Sarkozy on the personal level and a disparity on the policies of their countries regarding a number of international issues. However, relations between countries are built upon interests, not emotions.
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